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ABSTRACT 
 
When New Labour were elected in 1997, the party’s leader, Tony Blair, claimed the 
dawn of radical labour market reforms that would substantially reduce long-term 
unemployment and welfare dependency.  This thesis is an evaluation of New Labour’s 
active labour market policy (ALMP), and focuses on the three central components of 
that policy agenda: the New Deal programmes, Tax Credit programmes and the 
National Minimum Wage.  These reforms were targeted at key client groups such as 
the young (defined as those aged 18 to 25 year olds), the long-term unemployed, 
those aged over 50, the disabled and lone-parents.  This thesis adopts Economics of 
Conventions (EC) as its focal theory, and uses a range of quantitative methods to 
analyse official labour market data while drawing into question the trajectories of 
improvement found in the official statistics.  It also provides a systematic review of 
existing evaluative research including that conducted by the Department for Work and 
Pensions, Low Pay Commission and HM Treasury. 
This thesis found that rates of unemployment declined while New Labour were in 
power, arguably as a result of strong economic growth but potentially as a result of 
their ALMP.  Rates of economic activity and inactivity did not significantly change, even 
after the introduction of additional obligations on lone parents.  However, due to the 
introduction of programmes like the New Deal for Young People, individuals were re-
categorised, drastically altering labour market statistics and trends.  Indeed, when it 
comes to the justification and evaluation of their ALMP, New Labour made clear moral 
judgements about ‘the deserving poor’ and ‘the undeserving poor’ based on links 
between rights and responsibilities of benefit claimants. Indeed, the economic policies 
of New Labour continued and promoted neo-liberal precepts of labour market 
12 
 
management, i.e. they focused on individual behaviour and personal responsibility, at 
the expense of potentially more effective policy alternatives. 
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KEY DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP): “benefit structures that give strong labour-
market incentives, together with policies aimed at improving people’s labour-market 
skills” (Barr, 2012. p. 21).  Sometimes known as ‘welfare to work’.  ALMP can also 
involve subsidising employment through Tax Credits and/or imposing a minimum 
hourly wage.  
Effectiveness: “focuses on the relationship between the objectives of an activity and 
its actual outcomes” (Gregory & Lonti, 2008. p. 842). 
Efficiency: “is a ratio of the outputs of an activity to the inputs used to produce them” 
(Gregory & Lonti, 2008. p. 842). 
Employability: ‘Employability’ is best defined as “the capability to move into and 
within labour markets and to realise potential through sustainable and accessible 
employment,” (DELNI, 2002).  
Long term unemployment: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has defined long-term unemployment (LTU) as “involving 
people out of work and looking for work for 12 months or more” (OECD, 1988).  This 
definition is also the one used by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), and will be that used in this thesis. 
Public policy: Despite the wide range of definitions for public policy, it can effectively 
be defined as “how, why and to what effect governments pursue particular courses of 
action and inaction” (Heidenheimer et al., 1990, p. 3).  
Recycling: ‘Recycling’, ‘re-tread’ or ‘churning’ is the situation where individuals 
repeatedly claim Job Seeker’s Allowance (the unemployment benefit paid in the UK to 
those actively seeking work) without finding sustained employment between claims 
(Carpenter, 2006).   
Welfare reform: Welfare reform can be defined as reform, alteration or change of 
“social security and social assistance provision and its relationship to the labour 
market” (Cebulla, Ashworth, Greenberg & Walker. 2005. p. 1).   
15 
 
Worklessness: “‘Worklessness’ is a term which encompasses more than just those 
who are of working age and unemployed.  It encompasses the entire inactive 
population – all those who are out of work and are either not actively seeking or not 
available for work – as well as the unemployed” (Balls, Grice & O’Donnell (eds.), 2004. 
pp. 175-176).   
NEET: Young people who are Not in Education, Employment or Training.   
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
“Welfare should become more focused on helping people to become 
independent, rather than locking them into dependency. It should be about 
ensuring that there is work for those who can, as well as providing security for 
those who cannot” (Department for Education and Employment, 1998. p.1).   
 
The history of the UK labour market policy has been one of a continuous tension and 
cycle between expanding provision to help the working-poor and unemployed, and 
retrenchment to prevent the perceived threat of welfare dependency and reduce public 
spending (Pierson, 1997; Thompson, 2002; Hill, 2012).  The active labour market 
policy (ALMP) implemented by New Labour upon their ascension to power in 1997 
was arguably an attempt to find a more sustainable balance between the rights and 
responsibilities of those requiring welfare assistance from the state.  A key New Labour 
intellectual, Anthony Giddens wrote at the time, “The welfare state, seen by most as 
the core of social democratic politics, today creates almost as many problems as it 
resolves,” (1998. p.16). This observation may demonstrate one of the many perceived 
policy problems confronting the New Labour government when it was first elected in 
1997: the problem of a large and complex welfare system which was failing to tackle 
long-term unemployment (LTU), welfare dependency and associated social problems 
often termed ‘social exclusion’ (Levitas, 1996; 1999; Byrne, 2005).   
 
Prior to their ascension to power, New Labour set the tone of their labour market 
reform agenda to match these perceived challenges: “[...] we will face up to the new 
issues that confront us.  We will be the party of welfare reform.  In consultation with 
the people, we will design a modern welfare state based on rights and duties going 
together, fit for the modern world” (Labour, 1997a, p. 4).  New Labour clearly believed 
that the welfare state as they inherited it was no longer fit for purpose and had a 
negative impact on the British labour market.  Over their subsequent three terms in 
office, a total of thirteen years, New Labour implemented a range of labour market 
reforms and programmes designed to tackle these perceived problems.  The largest 
and most important of these were the New Deal programmes, the National Minimum 
Wage and various Tax Credit programmes.     
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These programmes were driven by moral judgements concerning what Daly (2010) 
described as the “‘deserving and undeserving’ fault line, which existed as far back as 
the New Poor Law of 1834” (p. 440).  New Labour, like the governments which 
preceded it, made these moral judgements between the ‘deserving poor’ (the very 
young, the very old and the disabled) and the ‘undeserving poor’, described as “the 
indigent, the ‘passive’, those compelled or content to subject themselves to the 
beneficence of the state,” (Daly, 2010. p. 440). Such judgements are at the heart of 
classical liberal thinking.  This is in stark contrast to alternative policies such as the 
universal ‘Basic Income’ advocated by the Green Party for the 2015 General Election.  
According to liberal thinking, the poor should always work for their income while those 
claiming benefits should be policed to avoid dependency, i.e. individuals should be 
‘workers not shirkers’. 
 
New Labour’s moral values had a range of influences; these included international 
sources, evolving ideology, changes in the underlying discourse of social policy and 
electoral considerations1.  As this thesis will demonstrate, such moral judgements 
were not constant over New Labour’s time in office, for example, moral judgements of 
family structure and the expectations placed on lone parents evolved over time2.  Such 
moral judgements underpin the social conventions of New Labour, for example, the 
treatment of female claimants is indicative of New Labour’s approach which is far less 
judgemental than the preceding Conservative government.  These conventions 
determined how individuals were categorised into client groups, were counted by 
administrators and how the basis of their ‘treatment’ was designed.  This thesis adopts 
Economics of Conventions as its focal theory to analyse these conventions, and is 
explored in greater depth in Chapter 3.   
 
Conventions are collectively acceptable bases of social behaviour and embedded 
collectively-held moral values.  They can be understood as ‘what we know and 
understand’, sometimes labelled ‘social norms’.  They are, therefore, central to our 
understanding of the social world.  What society understands as ‘employed’, 
                                            
1 These are discussed in Chapter 2, the literature review.  
2 This is discussed more in Chapter 8 which examines client groups defined by family structure.  It 
also explores the changing expectations placed on lone parents, especially mothers in general and 
deserted mothers in particular. 
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‘unemployed’ and ‘economically inactive’ are all conventions.  In the post-WW2 era 
labour markets were highly regularised and clear distinctions existed between these 
categories.  However, as this thesis shows, the definitions used by policy makers have 
been increasingly challenged as the nature and structure of work changed.  
 
This thesis brings together previous academic and administrative evaluations while 
analysing previously unscrutinised administrative data in an effort to evaluate the 
effect of New Deal programmes, the National Minimum Wage and the Tax Credit 
programmes on social dependency and labour markets.  This work raises important 
questions regarding the continuing use of social statistics as a sole basis for social 
policy evaluation.  This is in light of the categorisation process used to construct those 
statistics being driven by the under-recognised moral assumptions of policy makers 
and wider society.   
 
1.1. Current body of knowledge  
 
Despite there being a large body of work in the field of policy examining narrow 
sections of New Labour’s labour market policy, especially on the New Deal for Young 
People, there remain significant gaps in the current body of knowledge.  
 
Although rates of unemployment fell and rates of employment rose during the majority 
of New Labour’s terms, it is not clear what caused this.  Existing literature appears to 
present a self-evident link between New Labour’s labour market policy and changing 
labour market trends and behaviour (Toynbee & Walker, 2005; 2010; Giddens, 2007; 
Powell, 2000; 2002; 2008).  It could be argued that these researchers fell into the 
fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc.  This is rarely the case, and economic theory 
suggests a much more complex policy space.  The present author did not find the 
existing literature convincing.  Even a cursory glance at available data suggested a far 
more complicated labour market and range of possible processes at play that the 
existing research does not adequately explain.   
 
At the centre of New Labour’s labour market policy agenda were the New Deal 
programmes, Tax Credits and the National Minimum Wage.  Although at first sight 
these programmes are well-researched individually, no research has examined how 
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they interacted together and the labour market effect they would have had as a result.  
Most importantly, no researcher has questioned how New Labour came to define 
those who were ‘unemployed’ and ‘employed’, reflecting moral judgements that are 
made of such individuals.  The body of knowledge is critically reviewed in Chapter 2. 
  
1.2. Scope of this thesis 
 
To fill this important gap in the current body of knowledge, the scope of the thesis 
includes New Labour’s labour market reform agenda aimed at the working age 
population (defined at the time as those aged 16-64) between 1997 and 2010; from 
the ideological birth of New Labour and the development of this agenda, to its electoral 
demise.  Labour market policies explicitly aimed at children and pensioners are not 
within the scope of this thesis.   
 
This thesis analyses the prima facie statistical effect of reforms on the UK labour 
market.  It then probes into the more complex labour market mechanisms occurring, 
and especially the effect of New Labour’s social policy conventions upon their policy 
choices and the effect this had on the statistical measures.       
 
Although a range of possible avenues for research were available, a core research 
question was developed which attempts to address the critical gaps in knowledge 
identified above:    
 
What were the effects of New Labour’s active labour market policy on 
rates of social dependency in the working age population during their 
time in office?  
 
This core research question not only allows for the examination of the prima facie 
‘statistical impact’, but also an examination of the more contestable ideas surrounding 
New Labour’s social policy.  This research question also was chosen because, despite 
assertions of a self-evident link found in the literature (Toynbee & Walker, 2001; 2005; 
2011; Powell, 2002; Diamond & Kenny (eds.) 2011), authors have struggled to 
establish a clear causal link between New Labour’s welfare reforms and the downward 
trend in measured ‘unemployment’ and the upward trend in measured ‘employment’.   
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Although numerous ALMP projects/programmes existed, including the creation of the 
Jobcentre Plus network, the most central and important were the New Deal 
Programmes, Tax Credits and the National Minimum Wage.  These programmes were 
designed as part of a strategy of ‘joined up government’ and intended to complement 
each other in achieving the policy goals stated in their 1997, 2001 and 2005 
manifestos. Therefore, it was decided that these key programmes would form the 
scope of this thesis.       
 
It is contended that this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in the 
following ways:  
 
Although a limited range of holistic evaluations of New Labour’s record have been 
conducted (Toynbee & Walker, 2001; 2005; 2011; Powell, 2002, Diamond & Kenny 
(eds.), 2011), these evaluations failed to offer depth of critical analysis, were overly 
sympathetic and focused heavily on headline social statistics which they accepted at 
face value.  This thesis seeks to correct what Booth, Colomb & Williams argue is a key 
driver of many research questions: “incomplete knowledge or flawed understanding,” 
(2003. p.59).   
 
There are also many existing evaluations focusing on the impact of individual policies 
over a limited time period.  This thesis differs in that it seeks to analyse the contribution 
of multiple policies to labour market change over a longer time period.  
 
This thesis adopts Economics of Conventions (EC) as its focal theory.  To my 
knowledge no previous author has adopted EC to evaluate New Labour’s ALMP.  
Therefore, this is a unique and original contribution.  
 
Finally, arguments made and conclusions reached by this thesis push the boundaries 
of knowledge about New Labour’s ALMP.  They are supported by evidence deemed 
credible by fellow academics and they have important implications for future research 
in labour market policy, especially the development and implementation of ALMP and 
how it is evaluated.   
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1.3. New Labour’s labour market policy agenda in historical context 
 
New Labour’s welfare reforms took place in the broader context of de-industrialisation, 
structural economic change and an aging population.   
 
Over the course of the late 20th century, the UK economy underwent radical structural 
change.  Bazen & Thirwall (1989) argue that de-industrialisation can be defined in one 
of two ways: A declining share of total employment in manufacturing, or, an absolute 
decline in employment in manufacturing.  However, this definition is potentially limited 
as Brazen & Thirlwall’s definition relies on measures of unemployment which this 
thesis demonstrates as being socially constructed and subject to change. Wall (2001) 
similarly argues that ‘de-industrialisation’ refers to a shift in resources out of the 
manufacturing sector and into the service sector of the UK economy.  It could also be 
argued that de-industrialisation can be defined as industry making up a declining 
proportion of GDP.  As a result of de-industrialisation, the UK economy has also shifted 
geographically with service sector roles located away from formerly industrialised 
areas.  Thus areas of formerly intensive industrial activity such as Lancashire, South 
Yorkshire, Tyneside, Clydeside, and South Wales amongst many others emerged as 
geographical pockets of high unemployment (Bartholomew, 2004).    
 
Debate surrounding Britain’s alleged relative economic decline can be tracked as far 
back as the late 19th Century. For example, Williams (1896) writes about the rapid 
industrialisation of Germany and mastery of more modern industries such as chemical 
engineering (Williams, 1896. cited in Grant, 2002).  However, most academics would 
agree that the strongest period of de-industrialisation has occurred since the late 
1960s (Kenny & English, 2001; Grant, 2002).  De-industrialisation has not been limited 
to the UK; it is also a recognised phenomenon in Japan, Canada, the USA, France, 
Italy and Germany (Rowthorn & Coutts, 2013).   De-industrialisation is important 
because it will lead to unemployment unless the growth of employment in other sectors 
of the economy is sufficient to absorb the labour shed by manufacturing (assuming a 
workforce of constant size) (Bazen & Thirwall, 1989).  This explanation is severely 
limited, firstly by the assumption of a constant size of workforce; the workforce (as 
defined) is never a constant size.  There is a constant flux of school leavers entering 
the labour market and individuals leaving at various points and for various reasons, 
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for example, migration.  Secondly, it implicitly assumes perfect occupational and 
geographical mobility, i.e. that workers made redundant in manufacturing can simply 
walk into a job in another sector without retraining or having to relocate geographically.  
Neither of these assumptions is very likely.  It could, therefore, be argued that de-
industrialisation will almost inevitably lead to an increase in unemployment3.   
 
Some have argued that although there has been structural change in the UK economy, 
this is not de-industrialisation as such.  Lipsey & Chrystal (2007) suggest that although 
the number of those employed by manufacturing declined from over 7 million in 1978 
to 3.5 million in 2005, actual manufacturing output measured by volume was at an all-
time high in the year 2000.  Therefore “a key element of the UK manufacturing story 
is that the industry has achieved growing output with fewer and fewer employees” 
(Lipsey & Chrystal, 2007. p. 225.).  Lipsey & Chrystal speculate that the cause of this 
change is due to increases in labour productivity, meaning that fewer workers are 
required.  Real wages rose as a result.  Alongside this the cost of capital equipment 
such as computers has dropped substantially4.  Thus, Lipsey & Chrystal argue, 
companies chose to substitute cheaper capital for increasingly expensive labour.  
Routine tasks were also automated by computerised machinery/robotics further 
removing the need for large numbers of unskilled workers.  Lipsey & Chrystal also 
suggest that globalisation has allowed UK companies to take advantage of cheaper 
labour costs abroad to support their supply chains5.  Thus component parts can be 
imported while final assembly occurs in the UK, e.g. Jaguar Land Rover.   
 
Additional explanations have also been given for the declining number of individuals 
recorded as working in manufacturing.  One that chimes with the arguments advanced 
in this thesis is that significant numbers of workers have been re-classified from 
                                            
3 The UK also has an ageing population due to declining birth rates.  When focusing on older workers 
placed in such a position, combined with industrial diseases and related health problems from a 
career in manufacturing or heavy industry it can quickly be seen that this particular client group is 
likely to face much higher levels of unemployment.  Chapter 7 discusses active labour market policy 
aimed at the over-lapping client groups of older and disabled workers.  
4 Technology such as Computer Aided Design and Manufacture (CAD/CAM) have also revolutionised 
production processes, requiring considerably fewer but much higher skilled operators.   
5 Although there has been an emergence of newly industrialised countries such as Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC) as a result of off-shoring, the USA, UK and other Western countries still have 
continued structural advantages (Cox, 2012).  On the other hand BRIC countries, and China 
especially, have significant obstacles to continued growth.    
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working in the manufacturing to alternative sectors (Lipsey & Chrystal, 2007; Rowthorn 
& Coutts, 2012).  This convincing argument says that, while in the past a large 
manufacturing company may have directly employed all of the services it needed, such 
as drivers, gardeners, cooks, cleaners, etc., over time there has been a movement 
towards outsourcing of these and other functions.  The externalising of key functions 
such as marketing and finance through sub-contracting has also allowed firms to 
externalise risk as well as large numbers of individuals who would previously have 
been direct employees. Therefore, whereas these workers may previously have been 
counted as working in the manufacturing sector, they are now counted as service-
sector workers. IT has also made this re-classification increasingly possible as workers 
can work remotely and on a consultancy basis.  It can be said that in addition to anti-
trade union legislation of the previous Conservative Government (for instance the 
Employment Act 1980, Employment Act 1982, Trade Union Act 1984, Public Order 
Act 1986, Employment Act 1988, Employment Act 1989, Employment Act 1990, Trade 
Union & Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights Act 1993 and the Employment Rights Act 1996), de-
industrialisation and worker re-classification also contributed to the decline of Union 
power and employment rights.   
 
It is important to highlight that de-industrialisation in the UK did not occur in isolation, 
but within a wider context of globalisation.  Dicken (2011) argues that we must 
distinguish between overlapping definitions of globalisations: “the structural changes 
that are occurring in the way the global economy is organised and integrated. The 
other meaning refers to the neo-liberal, free-market ideology of the ‘globalisation 
project’,” (p. 2).  These structural shifts have been characterised in terms of a widening 
gap between skilled and unskilled workers: 
 
“Countries in the South have increased their production of labour-intensive 
goods (both for export and domestic use) and their imports of skill-intensive 
goods, raising the demand for unskilled but literate labour, relative to more 
skilled workers.  In the North, the skill composition has been twisted the other 
way.  Production of skill-intensive goods for export has increased, while 
production of labour-intensive goods has been replaced by imports, reducing 
the demand for unskilled relative to skilled workers [… U]p to 1990 the changes 
in trade with the South had reduced the demand for unskilled relative to skilled 
labour in the North as a whole by something like 20 per cent […]. Thus 
expansion of trade with the South was an important cause of the de-
24 
 
industrialisation of employment in the North over the past few decades,” Wood 
(1994) cited in Dicken (2011. pp. 502-503).   
 
Therefore, the breakdown in trade barriers which began with the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and which has evolved into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), has led to the shift in low-skilled industrial production from the 
industrialised North and the industrialising South, i.e. nations like China and India.  The 
emergence of Neo-liberalism as the dominant political paradigm has meant that such 
dramatic structural change is seen as not only inevitable, but desirable.  However, 
both this structural change and ideological dominance have undermined the power of 
nation states and their ability to continue classic welfare policy.  It could, therefore, be 
argued that New Labour had little choice but to re-define the role of the welfare state 
in the face of a globalisation tide they could no hope of commanding.  Neo-liberalism 
with its central belief in individual responsibility has further undermined the social 
values which underpinned universal benefits.   
 
The UK’s ‘classic welfare state’ was also based on an industrial working class in 
permanent, structured employment whose welfare rested on sustained social 
insurance contributions designed to bridge any gaps between permanent full-time 
jobs.  This was William Beveridge’s vision and promise, firmly located within a policy 
of full-employment.  As a consequence of de-industrialisation, the relationship 
between benefits and contributions collapsed, in part due to flexible and self-
employment that falls outside its remit.  Consequently, conditionality and compulsion 
have replaced universality and social responsibility.  
 
Kitson & Michie (2014), as an interesting counter to the negativity of the de-
industrialisation debate, argue in favour of ‘positive de-industrialisation’.  Firstly de-
industrialisation reflects shifts in comparative advantage, i.e. advanced economies 
specialise in producing services because they are relatively more efficient at it, while 
developing countries can produce cheaper goods for export.  Secondly, as countries 
develop, the structure of their domestic consumption will shift anyway towards services 
and away from manufactured goods.  Thus, de-industrialisation is inevitable.  Kitson 
& Michie (2014) also support previous arguments of increasing labour productivity and 
the shifting of global supply chains.  De-industrialisation, they conclude, is not a major 
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problem, but creates an over-reliance on financial services and stimulates a balance 
of payments deficit.  
 
Despite the arguments for ‘positive de-industrialisation’ by writers such as Kitson & 
Michie (2014), all writers in this field acknowledge de-industrialisation has had an 
impact on the UK labour market.  Geographical areas which had previously been 
dominated by heavy industry appear to have been particularly affected6 by de-
industrialisation, for example, steel and cutlery making in South Yorkshire, shipbuilding 
on Tyneside, cotton weaving and coal mining in Lancashire, pottery making in 
Staffordshire, slate quarrying in North Wales and coal mining and steel in South 
Wales.  Skills from these industries do not translate into the new industries such as IT 
and pharmaceuticals which have emerged.  Geographical pockets of long-term 
structural unemployment have appeared as a result7.  Within the context of fiscal 
retrenchment of the 1980s there had been pressure to reduce the cost of providing 
welfare payments to these new claimants (Grant, 2002).  Consequently, in the UK and 
other European countries experiencing such labour market change active labour 
market policy (ALMP) emerged in response.  Indeed, ALMP policies are central to the 
EU and its Employment Strategy which was introduced in 2000.  ALMP seeks to 
encourage and help individuals into employment by supporting job-search activity, for 
example, by improving information on job vacancies or helping with CV writing, 
through training and through employment subsidies.  However, issues have emerged 
with the ‘work-first’ agenda which tries to force workers into the first available job.  It 
often encourages a mis-match between the skills of the worker and the role.  This can 
lead to sporadic employment and an increasing incidence of recycling/re-tread 
between work and out-of-work benefits (see Carpenter, 2006 and Hill, 2012 for a 
thorough discussion of recycling).   
 
It can be argued that New Labour’s labour market agenda was a perfect example of 
ALMP in practice.  However, the changes of de-industrialisation have not been the 
                                            
6 Although as this thesis will argue in Chapters 3, 4 and 9, the nature of wok has changed over time. 
‘Unemployment’ as a classification for social policy makers emerged in the 1930s as a necessary 
component of Keynesian economic management. ‘Employment’ has also moved away from ‘9 to 5’, 6 
day a week jobs to something more fluid.  
7 With many older workers being pushed out of the Labour market. These are discussed in Chapter 7 
of this thesis.  
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only ones impacting the UK labour market prior to New Labour’s election in 1997.  
‘Flexibility’ has emerged as an important strand of academic debate relevant to this 
thesis.  
 
‘Flexibility’ as a key feature of the UK labour market arose long before New Labour’s 
time in office.  As a result of the economic contraction and the collapse of trade union 
influence in the 1980s, the personnel management concept of flexibility materialised.  
This was noted in academic debate in the highly influential papers of Atkinson (1984; 
1985).  Atkinson observed that in increasingly uncertain economic conditions firms 
were becoming more flexible in their approaches to manpower/staffing.  Atkinson 
identifies a range of types of flexibility which can be adopted: functional flexibility 
(matching skills to needs, multi-skilling), numerical flexibility (adjusting numbers 
employed according to current business requirements), temporal flexibility (variation 
in working hours, for example, zero hours contracts which do not guarantee an 
employee any hours, but where an employer has absolute flexibility with regards how 
many hours work they offer), financial flexibility (matching pay to performance) and 
behavioural flexibility (encouraging adaptability and versatility amongst staff).  
According to Atkinson’s ‘Flexible Firm’ model, shown in Figure 1.1. below, a 
company’s workforce is increasingly like the layers of an onion: a core group with 
functional flexibility, a first peripheral/variable group with functional but also increased 
numerical flexibility, i.e. part-time/flexitime workers, job-share, annualised hours 
contracts, fixed term and self-employed workers.  This is followed by a secondary 
peripheral group who are part of the external labour market made up of freelancers, 
agency workers, the self-employed, sub-contractors and outsourced workers.  
Atkinson also argued that some of those on the periphery were closely associated with 
secondary labour market characteristics (low-skilled labour with limited training or 
career prospects, mostly undertaking tasks not seen as central to the organisation’s 
business) (Atkinson, 1985. cited in Hunter et al. 1993).   
 
It should be noted that it is not clear exactly what types of firm/industry Atkinson had 
in mind while writing his papers or whether they were a reflection of prevailing market 
conditions.  Atkinson offers little evidence to support his claims. However, the 
argument appears strong in an era of self-employed professionally qualified 
‘consultants’. For instance, the emergence and spread of sub-contracting and IT-
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based communication has also enabled the transformation of the structure of firms 
from hierarchies to networks.   
 
Figure 1.1. The Flexible Firm 
 
Source: Atkinson, 1984. p. 29. 
 
As Atkinson’s ‘Flexible Firm’ model developed over time, it came to dominate 
discourse within the labour market focused academic disciplines from the 1980s 
onwards (MacInnes, 1988; Cordery, 1989; Guerrier & Lockwood, 1989; Hunter et al. 
1993; Kelleberg, 2003; Cloonan, 2004; Bryson, 2004; Maggs, 2004; Watson, 2005; 
Schmidt, 2005; Conley, 2006; Gabriel et al. 2013).  
 
However, the concept of ‘flexibility’ has received extensive criticism.  It is seen by many 
as a smokescreen to legitimise the erosion of employment rights, encouraging 
casualisation, increasing the insecurity/precariousness of work (Bryson, 2004; Maggs, 
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2004; Watson, 2005; Schmidt, 2005; Conley, 2006; Standing, 2011; Gabriel et al. 
2013).   
 
Standing is under no illusions about what was really meant by ‘flexibility’:  
 
“Flexibility had many dimensions: wage flexibility meant speeding up 
adjustments to change in demand, particularly downwards; employment 
flexibility meant easy and costless ability of firms to change employment levels, 
particularly downwards, implying a reduction in employment security and 
protection; job flexibility meant being able to move employees around inside the 
firm and to change job structures with minimal opposition or cost; skill flexibility 
meant being able to adjust workers’ skill easily.   
 
In essence, the flexibility advocated by the brash neo-classical economists 
meant systematically making employees more insecure, claimed to be a 
necessary price for retaining investment and jobs.  Each economic setback was 
attributed in part, fairly or not, to a lack of flexibility and to the lack of ‘structural 
reform’ of labour markets” (2011. p. 6).  
 
Standing develops his argument further saying that in addition to other economic 
forces the flexibility agenda has led to the emergence of a new social class, the 
‘precariat’. This class is characterised as: 
 
“[…] younger and older individuals alike that flit between jobs, are unsure of 
their occupational status, possess little labour or work security, lack income 
security, experience a precariousness of residency (migrants) and often 
encounter “status” frustration whereby jobs do not fit their acquired skills and 
qualifications” (Orton, 2012. p. 121).   
 
New Labour was explicitly supportive of flexibility but with reservations.  In their own 
words: “New Labour believes in a flexible labour market that serves employers and 
employees alike” (Labour, 1997. p. 13).  It could also be said that New Labour did not 
go as far as clarifying publicly exactly where they felt the balance of the benefits and 
burdens of flexibility should reside.   Although arguably set up to reduce in-work 
poverty, the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) and Tax Credits 
enabled those who had been defined as unemployed and economically inactive to 
participate in the labour market in what Atkinson called ‘peripheral groups’ (1984; 
1985).  Chapter 9 argues that this may have occurred due to NMW and Tax Credits 
allowing individuals to work flexibly as a periphery worker while being able to maintain 
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a minimal income just above the breadline.  This is evidenced in Chapter 9 by a 
dramatically increasing rate of self-employment and underemployment.   
 
1.4. Structure of this thesis 
 
The first half of Chapter 2 of this thesis is a literature review exploring the roots of New 
Labour and its labour market reform agenda.  The second half critically reviews 
previous evaluations of the same agenda and demonstrates where the gaps in existing 
knowledge lie.  Chapter 3 explores evaluation studies and the limitations of current 
evaluative methods.  It also outlines the theory and methodologies used in this thesis.  
Chapter 4 addresses the pertinent macro-economic and labour trends which were 
occurring both before and during New Labour’s time in office.  The chapter attempts 
to untangle the effect New Labour’s reforms may have had on those trends. 
 
Chapters 5 to 8 represent an intensification of focus towards key client groups, namely 
‘the young’, the long-term unemployed, ‘the disabled’ and ‘older workers’, lone 
parents, and their partners by analysing ALMP designed to address their situations 
and the consequences for the client groups concerned.  
 
Chapter 9 explores the National Minimum Wage and Tax Credits programmes in the 
context of New Labour’s mantra of trying to “make work pay” (Grover, 2005).  The 
thesis concludes in Chapter 10 which draws together the previous chapters and 
presents plans for future research following on from this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Tony Blair was elected as Leader of the Labour Party in July of 1994, heralding the 
birth of the political project which became known as ‘New Labour’.  From this point 
onwards, New Labour came under intense academic and media scrutiny.  This was 
particularly the case in the area of labour market policy, where New Labour adopted 
a range of labour market activation policies.     
 
To explore the current state of knowledge in this area, this chapter is structured as 
follows: 
 
 2.1. A literature review of the roots of New Labour and its labour market reform 
agenda. 
 2.2. Literature evaluating New Labour’s labour market reform agenda 
 2.3. A summary and critique of this literature.   
 
Section 2.3. seeks to address the important questions:  
 What debates are occurring in the discipline? 
 Where are the tensions/issues? 
 Where do gaps in knowledge exist?, and 
 What does the research in this thesis add to current knowledge? 
 
From this foundation, a research question and methodology were developed to 
explore this area more fully to make an original contribution to this debate. The 
literature is reviewed thematically following the strands of debate.   
 
2.1. Literature focusing on the roots of New Labour’s labour market 
reform agenda 
 
To date, a wide range of literature has been written focusing on the roots of New 
Labour, with more limited attention devoted to the formulation phase of their active 
labour market reform agenda. Intense debate by commentators and academics means 
there appears to be little consensus regarding the origins of New Labour or the sources 
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of their policy ideas.  Instead, the literature comprises various strands of debate, some 
contradictory, some over-lapping and mutually supportive.  These strands attempt to 
explain what may have led to the emergence of what became known as New Labour.    
 
2.1.1. International sources 
 
Some academic commentators argue New Labour’s active labour market policy can 
trace its origins back to international sources.  The key works in this strand of debate 
are Walker (1998), Deacon (2000), Dolowitz (2000), Ramsey (2002), Daguerre & 
Taylor-Gooby (2004), Hale, Leggett & Martell (2004), Page (2009) and Fergusson 
(2009).  The central thrust of this argument is that an ‘Americanisation’ of British 
welfare reform occurred (Walker, 1998).  Here, the thinking and language within UK 
public policy, especially in the area of welfare, were influenced by, and drawn from, 
the US. 
 
To better support this strand of argument, attempts have been made by Dolowitz 
(2000) to create a theoretical framework for this Americanisation; the idea that ‘policy 
transfer’ can be applied across social policy in an increasingly globalised world.  This 
could explain the influence of US policy on the changes in British public policy which 
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.  Under New Labour, policy transfer can best be 
seen in the decision to implement the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC).  This was 
very similar to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US.  Policy transfer in this 
case is attributed to the rise of the New Right in both the UK and US and the strong 
personal relationships between Thatcher and Reagan.  This also existed between Blair 
and Clinton leading to strong ideological and political similarities (Dolowitz, 2000). 
 
The importance of these formal and informal policy networks between the UK and the 
US meant that: 
“[...] during the past twenty years governments around the world (to 
a certain extent) have been actively borrowing the ideological rhetoric 
emerging from the American New Right in relation to welfare reform.  
This is particularly true in terms of the New Right’s ideological 
rhetoric in relation to ‘welfare dependency’; the need to ‘enforce’ 
obligations upon ‘lazy’ welfare ‘scroungers’; and the growing use of 
concepts such as rights and responsibilities’ and ‘duties,’” (Dolowitz, 
2000. p. 23). 
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Dolowitz cites Murray 1984; Mead 1986; 1997; Katz 1989; and Pierson, P. 1994; 1996 
as examples of influential New Liberal ideological rhetoric.  It could be argued that 
locations of policy transfer could include Anglo-American think tanks such as the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the 
Institute of Economic Affairs, The Cato Institute, The Centre for Policy Studies and the 
Adam Smith Institute.  These organisations, and others, are important, since they 
maintain strong informal policy networks through influential policy thinkers, for 
example, Dr Madsen Pirie of the Adam Smith Institute who advocated the privatisation 
of British Railways in the years prior to its implementation in 1994.   
 
Policy transfer is occurring on a more frequent basis thanks to globalisation and the 
development of international policy networks linking politicians, academics, policy 
wonks and advisors (allowing for the faster exchange of knowledge and ideas) 
(Dolowitz, 2000).  The breaking down of social and economic barriers has also allowed 
for cultural exchange, e.g. educational schemes such as Fulbright Scholarships and 
EU Erasmus Mundus programme.  Linked to this is the importance of the English 
language as the language of business.  However, while policy transfer occurs, 
Dolowitz argues, the reasons are not always rational, nor are they always successful 
(ibid). 
 
Both Deacon and Dolowitz argue that not only did New Labour draw on US experience 
but also “the design and delivery of the so-called New Deal for the unemployed owes 
much to the experience of active labour market policies in both Europe (especially 
Sweden, Denmark and Holland who have been at the forefront of Active Labour 
Market Policies (ALMP) due to their higher developed (large and expensive) welfare 
states.  See also Bonoli (2010) regarding influence of Sweden on other OECD 
countries) and Australia [...] however [...] these other influences have been much less 
marked in respect of the wider issues of welfare reform” (Deacon, 2000, p. 6).  
Therefore, the Americanisation of welfare reform remains central to this strand of 
debate, despite other influences. 
 
The US was a central and “continuing source of ideas for Britain” (Daguerre & Taylor-
Gooby, 2004. p.29.), despite there being three competing paradigms for welfare 
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reform: the French model of social inclusion, the Nordic model of activation policies 
and the US workfare model.  Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby claim that the American model 
was the most influential due to an absence of policy networks between Continental 
Europe and Britain. There were, however, some imports from Europe in terms of an 
emphasis on rights and responsibilities.  It has been argued that this was an oscillation 
between US inspired intellectual emphasis on “fighting a dependency culture with an 
emphasis on mutual obligations between the state and welfare recipients” and the 
European emphasis on “solving the problem of social exclusion” (Annesley, 2003; 
Trickey, 2000 cited in Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby, 2004. p.29). Furthermore they argue, 
the lack of networking between British and European officials meant that British 
officials were inclined to look to American social experimentation for inspiration.  They 
argue this was partly due to the ‘Special Relationship’ which had been especially 
strengthened under Reagan and Thatcher and was later developed further under 
Clinton and Blair.  It is not clear why Daguerre & Taylor-Gooby completely overlook 
the European Union, the European Commission, other trans-European institutions and 
the increasingly important role they play in European social policy. 
 
The wider Americanisation of social democratic politics has been linked to ‘The Third 
Way’, an ideology that claims to be a compromise between Neo-Liberal and traditional 
Socialist politics (Hale, Leggett & Martell, 2004).  The Third Way originated in the 
Clinton administration, first elected in 1992. It was then drawn upon by Blair’s New 
Labour Government in what has been dubbed the ‘Clintonisation’ of Labour (Powell, 
2000). These arguments have also been echoed by a number of writers including King 
& Wickham Jones (1999); Holmwood (2000); Drive (2004) and Page (2009). As New 
Labour drew on the lessons of various US ‘Workfare’ programmes, work became 
central to the Third Way under the slogan ‘Making work pay’ (Hale, Leggett & Martell, 
2004).  According to Hale, Leggett & Martell, New Labour sought to promote work, 
education, training, life-long learning, and employability through active labour market 
policy. 
 
The effectiveness of the ‘work first’ approach has been negatively compared to New 
Labour’s previous Human Capital Model which sought to improve the skills and 
qualifications of the unemployed: 
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“While significantly more broadly based and service-rich than US-
style ‘work first’ programmes, the New Deal for 18-24 year-old 
unemployed people nevertheless places overriding emphasis on 
assisting transitions into paid employment.’  This reinforces what they 
see as the neo-liberal policy orthodoxy on flexible labour markets, 
and it erodes, not builds, the stock of human capital [...]. The 
implication, then, is that the Labour Government’s New Deal 
becomes orientated more around ‘work first’, its ‘progressiveness’ 
declines because it re-enforces existing labour market inequalities” 
(Theodore & Peck, 2000. cited in Hale, Leggett & Martells, 2004. p. 
136). 
 
In summary, the arguments advanced by the majority of writers are that New Labour’s 
labour market policy originated from international sources are highly convincing, 
presenting strong evidence of US (and to a lesser extent European) influence on the 
ideology and agenda of New Labour before and during their time in office.  However, 
Powell summarises this strand thus:  
 
“There is little agreement on the international roots of the Third Way.  
While commentators such as Driver and Martells (1998) and Jordan 
(1998) argue for a transatlantic route, Blair (1998a) and Giddens 
(1998) point to links across the Channel towards European social 
democracy” (1999. p.13). 
 
There does appear to be an intellectual and political convergence in the late 1970s 
and 1980s between Thatcherites and Reaganites, and the increasing prevalence of 
the ideas and language of Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead in the UK press.  For 
instance Charles Murray and the Underclass: The Developing Debate by Charles 
Murray (1996) was a publication by the IEA Health and Welfare Unit in association 
with the Sunday Times which included commentary by Frank Field MP.  This work 
suggests an influence by Mead not only on the Conservative party during the 1980s 
but a continuing influence on the welfare reform debate and New Labour in the run up 
to 1997. 
 
The legacy of trans-Atlantic discourse could be argued to have inspired and 
encouraged New Labour’s language and policies in the run up to the 1997 General 
Election, especially given the contribution of the influential Labour thinker Frank Field 
to the debate.   
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It could be argued that the strength of the trans-Atlantic relationship, cultural links and 
common history may also have played a role.  UK think tanks such as the Adam Smith 
Institute regularly draw on ideas from centre-right US think tanks such as the Heritage 
Foundation and the Cato Institute.  The work of the Adam Smith Institute has then 
been regularly drawn upon by the both the Conservative and Labour parties, such as 
in the case of the railways and other privatisations during the 1980s and thereafter. 
 
Although this evidence demonstrates a self-evident connection between welfare 
reform in countries such as the US and New Labour’s own welfare reforms, there is 
by no means a consensus over these alleged international roots.   
 
2.1.2 Evolving ideology 
 
The second strand of debate is the influence of evolving ideology within the Labour 
party.  The key works in this strand are Hutton (1996), Levitas (1996; 1999); Deacon 
(2000); O’Brien (2000); Giddens (2000); Powell (2000); Hale, Leggett & Martell (2004); 
McDowell (2004); Byrne (2005); Wiggan (2007) and Corry (2011).  The central thrust 
of this strand of debate is that the shift in Labour’s thinking around welfare reform was 
influenced by evolving ideology, i.e. a shift to the political right. 
 
Lund and Deacon both argued that the Christian Socialist beliefs of key figures in the 
Labour party such as Jack Straw (although not directly involved in welfare reform, he 
was a central New Labour thinker), Frank Field, and, most importantly, Tony Blair 
himself challenged Titmuss’ non-judgmentalism and emphasised welfare 
responsibilities rather than rights (1999; 2000).  Blair advocated a ‘progressive 
alliance’ between ‘New’ Liberals, Christian Socialists and elements of Fabianism 
(Blair, 1996).  This meeting of religious and political values has been labelled 
‘Anglicanised communitarianism’ (Deacon, 2000).  It has been argued that Blair 
borrowed language from the works of Scottish philosopher John Macmurray (1997; 
1999), the theological writings of Askonas & Kwan (1997) as well as frequently 
borrowing the language of Amitai Etzioni (1993; 1997) and Phillip Selznick (1996) in 
terms of emphasising the notions of personal responsibility within a community 
(Deacon, 2000; also supported by O’Brien, 2000; Hale, Leggett & Martell, 2004).  
However, it is, unclear to what extent New Labour has borrowed this language, and 
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where specific examples can be found, raising questions regarding the validity of these 
claims. 
 
Although the changes in the use of language were important, others have emphasised 
the evolution of socialist philosophy towards the centre and the resulting Third Way in 
response to “specific dilemmas conceived largely in terms associated with the New 
Right,” (O’Brien, 2000. p. 403), and that as a result, New Labour sought to create what 
they defined as an ‘enabling’ welfare state that promoted ‘social and economic 
inclusion’.  O’Brien argues that New Labour borrowed the philosophy that was an 
amalgamation of recent communitarian and stakeholder research from thinkers such 
as Etzioni (1995; 1997), Giddens (1994; 1998), and Hutton (1995). O’Brien further 
argues that Blair’s belief in an active society upheld by reciprocal rights and duties 
drew heavily from traditional socialist belief in individual freedom accessed through 
communities and within communities (Blair, 1996. cited in O’Brien, 2000).  Thus “the 
roots of New Labour [...] extend far beyond either the New Right or thinkers such as 
Giddens, Etzioni and Hutton,” (O’Brien, 2000. p. 408). 
 
However, Giddens’ contribution to the evolving ideology of the Labour party is still 
noteworthy.  For example, he argued that welfare reform was a key part of the Third 
Way for three reasons: firstly, the dynamics of inequality have changed; secondly, in 
at least some aspects the welfare state has become unsustainable, and can 
undermine social solidarity, and; thirdly, the welfare state has its own limitations and 
contradictions (Giddens, 2000).  Key elements of the Third Way approach to welfare 
reform are therefore tackling social exclusion and the mechanisms that produce or 
sustain deprivation.  There also should be investment in human capital and a new 
social contract appropriate to an age of globalisation and individualism that stresses 
both the rights and responsibilities of citizens.  It could be argued that this, as well as 
his previous works, exerted a strong influence on New Labour, especially during the 
development of their New Deal programmes.  Giddens’ language of rights and 
responsibilities also appears regularly in New Labour discourse (Blair, 1996; Labour, 
1997) suggesting a strong influence. 
 
Despite arguments for an evolving ideology within the Labour party and its approach 
to welfare reform, there are also those who say it was not a clearly distinctive approach 
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from earlier strategies, as had been argued by Blair (Labour Party, 1997. cited in 
Powell, 2000).  Powell claims that New Labour had an unmistakably different and 
unique approach when compared with Old Labour.  ‘Old Labour’ was the name given 
to the more Social Democratic Labour Party before the election of Tony Blair.  It was 
characterised by a discourse of rights, equality and market failure, values of equality 
of outcome and security, policy goals of full employment through state finance and 
universal delivery based on redistributive taxation (Hale, Leggett & Martell, 2004).    
 
However, there were some clear trends of policy convergence between New Labour 
and the Conservatives.  Nowhere was this truer than in the areas of public expenditure, 
the mixed economy of welfare and welfare-to-work.  Powell (2000) claims that old 
linguistic battle lines were abandoned for new, less sharply defined positions.  The 
Third Way can be seen not as a coherent concept but as “a poorly specified, pick and 
mix strategy, largely defined by what it is not.  Neither does it appear to be new: 
arguably some of its key components such as the centrality of work and civil society 
have their historical roots in the New Poor Law and in the writings of New Liberals 
such as Beveridge,” (Powell, 2000. p.57).  Powell raises the question of the newness 
of ‘New’ Labour, i.e. can it be defined as something radically different from the past, 
moving beyond ideology to an almost scientific use of evidence to support policy 
making? 
 
Further criticisms against the impact of the evolving ideology are that the social 
communitarianism of the Third Way did not have a socially progressive impact on New 
Labour policy (Hale, Leggett & Martell, 2004).  Hale, Leggett & Martell argue that 
despite Etzioni‘s progressive influences upon New Labour thinking, Etzioni would have 
been disappointed by the realisation of policy through the New Deals. For example, 
the New Deal for Lone Parents suggests a deep mistrust of a single mother’s ability to 
cope alone rather than trusting parents in non-traditional family units.  The Working 
Families Tax Credit (WFTC), so Hale, Leggett & Martell claim, could help to re-
establish the male breadwinner model among some low-income households, and the 
‘Sure Start’ element of the New Deal for Communities including a consultation 
proposal for a male mentoring scheme. 
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The Third Way could arguably demonstrate a convergence between neo-liberal and 
traditional social-democratic (‘Old Labour’) ideology rather than a marked change in 
ideology.  The following table demonstrates how the ‘Third Way’ summarises the 
language and ideology of this convergence. 
 
Table 2.1. Dimensions of the Third Way in social policy 
Dimension Old social democracy Third way Neo-liberal 
Discourse Rights 
Equity 
Market failure 
Rights and 
responsibilities 
Equity and Efficiency 
Market and state failure 
Responsibility 
Efficiency 
State failure 
 
Values Equality of outcome 
Security 
Inclusion 
Positive welfare 
Equality of opportunity 
Insecurity 
 
Policy 
goals 
Equality of outcome 
Full employment 
Minimum opportunities 
Employability 
Equality of opportunity 
Low inflation 
 
Policy 
means 
Rights 
State 
State finance and 
delivery 
 
Security 
Hierarchy 
High tax and spend 
High services and 
benefits 
 
High cash redistribution 
Universalism 
 
High wages 
Conditionality 
Civil society/market 
State/private finance and 
delivery 
Flexicurity 
Network 
Pragmatic tax to invest 
High services and low 
benefits 
High asset redistribution 
Pragmatic mix of 
universalism and 
selectivity  
National minimum 
wage/tax credits 
Responsibilities 
Market/civil society 
Private/state finance 
and delivery 
Insecurity 
Market 
Low tax and spend 
Low services and 
benefits 
Low redistribution 
Selectivity 
 
Low wages 
Source: Hale, Leggett & Martell, 2004. p. 15. 
 
This use of convergent language can be seen clearly in Blair (1996) and Labour (1997) 
with much of this vocabulary being seen in both.  
 
Despite the rise of the Third Way within New Labour, the ideology was far from fixed 
over the course of their time in office.  There was not an entrenchment of a progressive 
consensus in British politics nor across wider society either (Leggett, 2007).  Leggett 
claims that regardless of attempts by positive-modernisers to renew the New Labour 
project, it was going to face growing competition from a modernising Conservative 
Party, better able to align itself with a position of individual aspiration expressed 
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through market-based choice.  The election in 2010 of a Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition government has since seen the continuation of Third Way thinking 
and language usage in their welfare reforms along similar lines, i.e. increasing 
responsibility, conditionality and reducing eligibility. 
 
As well as arguments against a fixed ideology, it has also been argued that New 
Labour was heavily influenced by emergent macro-economic theories such as 
endogenous growth theory.  New Labour’s claim to a Third Way, independent of 
Keynesian social democracy and Conservative Neo-Liberalism, rests on an 
endogenous growth-inspired strategy. Many claim it was this strategy that informed 
New Labour’s introduction of new governance and performance frameworks for social 
security administration, specifically the creation of Jobcentre Plus and the Department 
for Work and Pensions (Wiggan, 2007; Dolowitz, 2004a; 2004b and Buckler & 
Dolowitz, 2004).  However, it should be noted that the previous Conservative 
government had also commissioned private providers of job search/placement 
services, for example, under their Youth Training (YT) scheme (1989-1995).  
Influential members of New Labour within the Treasury, such as Ed Balls and Gordon 
Brown, favoured policy strongly influenced by endogenous growth theory and adapted 
this to Labour’s political traditions and priorities (Wiggan, 2007).  The beliefs of these 
influential people at the heart of New Labour had important implications for the 
development and implementation of welfare reform policy before and during the party’s 
time in office. 
 
Neo-liberalism as an influence on New Labour has been a serious concern for some 
authors (McDowell, 2004; Dorling, 2010; Corry, 2011).  The dominance of 
individualism in the labour market and welfare state undermines ideas of collective 
welfare and what McDowell called an ‘ethic of care’.  This is often called the 
‘financialisation’ of childcare and other caring responsibilities, i.e. where what was 
previously free within the family unit becomes an external service that has to be bought 
to support paid employment.  Arguably this has important consequences, especially 
for women being placed in the difficult position of having to sacrifice direct care of their 
children so that they can go out to work.  Dorling (2010) calls attention to New Labour’s 
structuring of childcare as a two-tier system split between the childcare element of 
WTC for low-income households and tax relief on childcare vouchers for middle-
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income households.  This and other related tax policy did little to reduce the growing 
gulf of post-tax income inequality that had occurred since 1977 (ibid).  These issues 
are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8 which examines the New Deal for Lone 
Parents and the New Deal for Partners.  Perhaps the most scathing criticism of Neo-
liberalism’s influence comes from Corry (2011) who claims that Labour made a 
‘Faustian pact’ with the City and capitalism more generally.  Smith (2009) made a 
similar argument highlighting that New Labour would do little to help trade unions, 
collective bargaining or workers’ rights.  Corry concedes that it would have been 
difficult for New Labour to have done otherwise: “As social democrats operating in a 
world where options are significantly constrained – from mobile capital to tax-resistant 
voters – Labour will always to have make tough choices” (2011, p. 137).  Others such 
as Heffernan (2011) similarly argue that the Thatcherite economic settlement was 
perhaps too strong a tide to challenge and only incremental change was possible. 
 
In preparation for the 1997 General Election, measures were taken to modernise the 
Labour party.  Blair and other senior intellectuals within the Labour Party sought to 
redefine the ideology of the party (for instance Blair (1996) and Mandelson & Liddle 
(1996)). Mandelson & Liddle proposed the principles that would underpin New 
Labour’s welfare reforms, and ultimately fed into the 1997 election manifesto, 
especially the commitments to reducing long-term and youth unemployment (Labour, 
1997).   
 
Blair’s New Britain: My vision of a young country (1996) is perhaps one of the best 
works for understanding the internal debates and soul-searching that was occurring in 
the Labour Party at this time.  In his book, a compilation of his speeches and 
deliberately written chapters, Blair outlines his vision for New Labour, and for the 
country as a whole.  This work covers a range of Blair’s beliefs and the values which 
Blair argues are behind New Labour. On the topic of labour market policy, he outlines 
New Labour’s values and policy ideas of long-termism, welfare rights balanced with 
responsibilities, a minimum wage, building a knowledge-based economy by improving 
education, promoting skills and training, reforming the benefits system so that welfare 
payments are used to support work and not unemployment, and reforming childcare 
and training opportunities to support single parents to enter the labour market.  What 
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he wrote in this book went on to be developed and clearly informed the 1997 Labour 
party manifesto. 
 
A related argument (also linked to international sources) is that the entire nature of the 
public debate surrounding the welfare state had also changed due to the impact of 
conservative governments on both sides of the Atlantic (Pierson, 1994).  Conservative 
governments in both the United States and United Kingdom pursued policy agendas 
of retrenchment during the 1980s in an attempt to reduce the size and scope of the 
welfare state.  Although they only made limited progress in pursuing this agenda, 
Pierson argues, the UK Conservative government weakened welfare state advocates 
including trade unions.  This change in the terms and language of the debate ultimately 
limited the scope for a return to more traditional socialist/social democratic terms of 
reference.  This is an idea echoed by Thompson (2002) who strongly laments New 
Labour’s shifting ideological foundations towards the Third Way language of 
‘stakeholderism’ advanced by thinkers such as Hutton (1996).  This, Thompson felt, 
was too much of a compromise with the iniquitous capitalist economic model.  
Thompson especially dislikes that even New Labour do not appear to fully subscribe 
to their own rhetoric, and “the Labour Party could no longer realistically be viewed as 
a potential agent of change” (2002. p. 287).  Thompson also notes that no sooner had 
Labour come to power than they abandoned all language and ambitions towards 
creating a stakeholder society.  I would tend to agree with this analysis: there appears 
to have been a move away from radical banking reform, instead embracing traditional 
Anglo-American conceptions of capitalism rather than the more German language of 
a negotiated compromise in industrial relations, for instance. Under the German 
tripartite system of industrial relations industry, unions and government work 
cooperatively together through frequent negotiation and seek consensus.            
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2.1.3. Changing discourse 
 
Strongly related to the rightward shifts in New Labour ideology is that of a rightward 
shift in wider political discourse.  It has been argued that this shifting discourse was 
an important influence on New Labour, especially the increasing use of the vocabulary 
of welfare reform and ‘workfare’.  US academics Murray & Mead (1987) were the first 
to explicitly introduce the concepts and language of ‘welfare dependency’ and 
‘underclass’ to UK political debate.  This phenomenon became known in the early 
1990s as ‘Moral Underclass Discourse’ (MUD) (Levitas, 1996; 1999).  The strength of 
Murray & Mead’s contribution is claimed to be such that “their ideas [...] had a profound 
impact upon all points of the party political spectrum in Britain.  They all but furnished 
some members of the Conservative government with a new vocabulary,” and as a 
result, “more than anyone else it was the American dependency theorists who pushed 
onto the agenda issues which had been neglected, indeed all but suppressed, by the 
then dominant academic tradition” (Deacon, 2000. p.8).  This influence came to define 
the terms of the debate surrounding welfare reform for all UK political parties. 
 
Murray & Mead appear instrumental in the move away from Titmuss’ dominant 
paradigm of universal welfare which formed part of the post-WWII political consensus, 
and the move towards the language of dependency.  Titmuss advocated a universal, 
unconditional, non-judgmental welfare state and the importance of altruism rather than 
self-interest in understanding human behaviour and motivation.  His work was also 
characterised by a denial of agency and almost total emphasis on structural factors 
(Welshman, 2004).  Deacon argues that the movement away from Titmuss occurred 
within academic circles and even the highest echelons of British government. He 
concludes that “the importance of the Americanisation of the British welfare debate [...] 
lies primarily in the contribution which it has made to the shift in the focus of New 
Labour thinking from the problem of inequality to the problem of dependency” 
(Deacon, 2000. pp.16-17). 
 
The discourse surrounding ‘social exclusion’ also made an important contribution to 
New Labour thinking, particularly after the 1997 election (Hutton, 1996; Levitas, 1996; 
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1999; Byrne, 2005)8.  Walker & Walker define social exclusion as “the dynamic 
process of being shut out [...] from any of the social, economic, political and cultural 
systems which determine the social integration of a person in society” (1997. p. 8).  
The term ‘Social exclusion’ is actually derived from a French concept to describe those 
unable to find work, who as a consequence, lose their right to elect representatives to 
local social security administration (and other political activities).  It is therefore a 
deeper idea than just poverty and subsistence, but is about an individual’s ability to 
participate in the customary life of society (Levitas, 1999).  This is not to say there are 
not ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of this discourse.  The weak version argues that:  
 
“[…] the solutions lie in altering these excluded peoples’ handicapping 
characteristics and enhancing their integration into dominant society.  ‘Stronger’ 
forms of this discourse also emphasise the role of those who are doing the 
excluding and therefore aim for solutions which reduce the powers of exclusion” 
(Veit-Wilson, 1998. p. 45).   
 
Levitas (1999) was highly critical of New Labour’s approach to social exclusion, 
especially the limited progress of the Social Exclusion Unit, the lack of clarity of causal 
processes that lead to social exclusion, and the politicisation of indicators and targets 
so that ‘success’ can be claimed.  Although this is a common criticism of the evaluation 
process9, Levitas strongly argues that there is a failure to address the fundamental 
issues of poverty and inequality affecting wider society.  It is, of course, possible that 
evaluation processes designed to measure the ‘social problem’ to be solved can so 
easily be manipulated or ‘spun’ to maximise positive media coverage of a 
government’s work. 
 
The New Labour thinker Hutton (1996) similarly strongly argued for the importance of 
social exclusion due to its costs to firms and government alike.  Hutton advocated a 
‘stakeholder society’ response to the problem of social exclusion.  This would have 
involved radical changes to British banking to foster a more German-style of co-
operative capitalism between finance, industry and (organised) labour.  Alongside 
many other changes, he advocated strong active labour market intervention after 18 
months of unemployment: “Either it would train those out of work, or provide them with 
                                            
8 Social exclusion is discussed with reference to ‘young people’ and the New Deal for Young People 
in Chapter 5.  
9 This is discussed at length in Chapter 3. 
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some form of subsidy to help lower their wage costs to an employer, or it should pay 
relocation costs for those who find work in a new area” (Hutton, 1996. pp. 309-310).  
This policy idea fed into some of the highly conditional aspects of the New Deals, 
especially the training and wage-subsidy components.       
 
2.1.4. Electoral considerations 
 
Whilst some believe that international ideas have influenced New Labour and their 
approach to welfare reform and others describe their approach as one of changing 
ideology, there is a third strand of debate which focuses on the influence of 
populism/domestic political factors, and electoral considerations (Powell, 1999; 
Stepney, Lynch & Jordan, 1999; Lund, 1999; White, 2000; Deacon, 2000; Lister, 2001; 
Hills, 2002).  The central thrust of this strand of academic debate is that New Labour 
was driven by their desire to get elected after so many years in opposition, and thus 
changed their policies to increase their electability. 
 
New Labour differed greatly from Old Labour in that less emphasis was placed on 
inequality, redistribution and social justice, and that instead New Labour sought to 
reduce unemployment through a continuation of the Conservative’s labour market 
‘activation’ policies such as the conditional benefit of Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
which requires recipients to be ‘actively seeking work’ amongst other job search and/or 
preparation activities (Powell, 1999).  New Labour added to this its flagship welfare 
reform policy ‘The New Deal’ programmes to aid the unemployed still struggling to find 
work after six months. They were funded through a windfall tax on the privatised 
utilities (Labour, 1997a)10.  In addition to changes to benefits, New Labour introduced 
Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), Childcare Tax Credit (CTC) and Disabled 
Persons Tax Credit (DPTC) along with the National Minimum Wage (NWM) in an effort 
to reduce the replacement rate of benefits to in-work income, thus encouraging low-
income families, lone parents and the disabled into work (ibid).  Powell (1999) speaks 
                                            
10 The New Deal introduced between 1998 and 1999 was split into 6 ‘Gateways’ depending on the 
nature of the claimant: the New Deal for Young People (NDYP), the New Deal for the Long-Term 
Unemployed (NDLTU) (renamed as the New Deal 25+ in April 2001), the New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP), the New Deal for Partners of the Unemployed, the New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) 
and the New Deal for People Aged 50 Plus.  The New Deal programmes are evaluated in chapters 5 
to 8.    
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positively about New Labour’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach where workers are given 
greater incentives to work, or face an increasingly conditional benefits regime. 
 
This shift in policy stance was not accidental or sudden, but in fact the result of moves 
by modernisers within the Labour Party working after the 1992 General Election defeat 
to make the party more appealing to middle class voters (Powell, 1999).  By 1995 
“both the Labour and the Conservative parties were moving in the same direction in 
terms of policy on work and welfare, partly as a direct result of electoral impulses and 
the perceived preferences of voters” (ibid. p. 261).  This line of argument is strongly 
and convincingly supported by a number of other writers (Lund; 1999. Stepney, Lynch 
& Jordan, 1999; White, 2000; Deacon, 2000; Lister, 2001; Hills, 2002).  New Labour 
was changing what it thought and said, and “ [...] without doubt the origins of that 
rethinking [on welfare] lay in successive election defeats and in changing perceptions 
of what the electorate was prepared to pay for” (Deacon, 2000. p. 11). 
 
It has been argued that New Labour was driven by the populist tendency to follow 
rather than lead the electorate using a pragmatic ‘what works’ approach (Lister, 2001). 
As part of this populist tendency, New Labour “[spoke] the language of welfare 
‘dependency’” (Lister, 2001. p. 430) and sought to continue the then government’s 
approach to welfare where “paid work [was] fetishised as the citizenship responsibility 
over other forms of work such as care work and community or voluntary work” (ibid p. 
432).  New Labour, therefore, failed to challenge the values of a Thatcherite legacy in 
British politics and “tended to subordinate other principles of judgement to the 
managerial calculus of economy and efficiency” (Clarke et al. 2000. p. 10)11.  
Therefore, despite their language of inclusion, New Labour’s agenda and policies had 
the potential to be as socially excluding as their predecessor’s.  They failed to consider 
the important roles played by those with caring responsibilities such as mothers and 
carers who could have inevitably taken pressure away from state-funded services 
such as nurseries and care homes.  Perhaps this reflects the move away from the 
male-breadwinner family paradigm and the ‘emancipation’ of women to become wage 
earners in their own right.  Lund (1999) described the ‘atomisation of British 
                                            
11 The emergence of managerialism is often linked to New Public Management (NPM).  NPM is 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3 within a broader examination of evaluation studies.  
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communities and society’ as having a part to play in diminishing the perceived 
importance of these unwaged caring roles. This is related to the argument that there 
was an increasing financialisation of welfare, i.e. from non-waged to waged social 
care. 
 
2.2 Literature evaluating New Labour’s labour market reform agenda 
 
The following section focuses on works which have sought to evaluate New Labour’s 
active labour market agenda, including the various New Deal pathways.  These works 
include: Stepney, Lynch & Jordan, (1999), Dickens, Gregg & Wadsworth (2000), 
Taylor-Gooby (2000), Hyland & Musson (2001), Lindsay (2002), Fieldhouse, Kalra & 
Alam (2002) Giddens (2002), Powell (2002), Finn (2003; 2005), Clarke (2005), 
Dingelday (2007) and Fergusson (2009).  These works were reviewed thematically.  
The themes are:  
 
 Positive evaluations 
 Potential criticisms 
o Informal labour market participation 
o The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) 
o Worklessness 
o Organisational obstructionism 
o Support for the newly employed  
o Divesture of responsibility 
o Increasing numbers on Incapacity Benefit 
o Failure of capitalism 
 
This section concludes with a further summary and critique of this literature linking 
both the origins of New Labour with prior attempts to evaluate the welfare reform 
agenda.   
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2.2.1. Positive evaluations 
 
There have been a number of studies that have attempted to evaluate New Labour’s 
welfare reforms.  A minority have been generally positive towards the outputs and 
outcomes of these reforms. 
 
Those who advance its success argue that programmes such as the New Deal 25+ 
represents a great leap forward in terms of tackling joblessness amongst groups who 
would otherwise rapidly lose touch with the job market (Lindsay, 2002).  Lindsay 
argues that the long-term unemployed face complex and multi-dimensional barriers to 
work. The New Deal interventions for job seekers provided basic learning and training 
opportunities whilst supporting them as they sought to secure employment through 
low-skilled entry-level positions.  However, despite these advances, Lindsay claims 
New Labour had no coherent strategy in place to ensure continued opportunities for 
skills development and lifelong learning.  Thus former New Deal participants were 
likely to be susceptible to repeated spells of unemployment without gaining the skills 
which might allow for long-term mobility in the labour market.  This would appear to be 
an important failure, given New Labour’s rhetoric of joined up government and lifelong 
learning.  Arguably it failed due to a narrow focus during policy development with a 
move away from the human capital model they had previously adopted.  It would 
appear that New Labour failed to take an holistic approach to improving the 
employability and welfare of individuals and families.  
 
It has also been argued that the New Deals did much to help ethnic minorities 
(Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam, 2002).  Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam claim that there was an 
overall positive perception by ethnic minority participants who were interviewed.  This 
was especially true of the subsidised placements which gave them jobs they might not 
have previously thought open to them.  Furthermore, many NDYP participants felt that 
the NDYP provided the right opportunity at the right time; participants mentioned an 
improvement in skills, confidence and motivation, helping them to overcome previous 
barriers to employment.  41,700 or 12% of NDYP leavers had dropped out prior to the 
initial interview since its inception, the figure for ethnic minorities was a very similar 
11%.  Reported reasons for leaving the NDYP included domestic responsibilities, 
deliberate avoidance and finding alternative employment.  It was also found that the 
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experiences of young Asians in Oldham appeared similar to those of white 
unemployed people elsewhere with no evidence of direct racism in the delivery of the 
programme.  Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam point to a number of other studies conducted 
around the same time which also examined the NDYP and which corroborated their 
findings (Bonjour et al, 2001; Bryson et al, 2000; Hasluck, 2000a; 2000b; Legard & 
Ritchie, 1999). These studies are important as they show no significant differences 
between ethnic groups.  
 
The New Deal, the Working Families Tax Credit, National Childcare Strategy and other 
innovations have proved effective in increasing employment rates amongst single 
parent households (Giddens, 2002).  Attempts to improve the employment rate of 
single parents by reducing benefits and increasing opportunities and job training via 
the New Deal were encouraging, although the UK still fell far short of the 90% 
employment rate for single parents in Denmark.  It could be argued that many lone 
parents who found work were easy to place ‘low-hanging fruit’ in that they were already 
well qualified, had recent work experience and were therefore much closer to the 
labour market, perhaps having only taken a short career-break before returning to 
work once their children went into childcare.  In pursuing the goal of higher 
employment rates in single parent households, however, Giddens argues state 
agencies are unable to deliver public services efficiently and equitably without working 
collaboratively with non-state agencies such as non-profit, third sector organisations 
and private companies.  However, this argument and those which are positive about 
New Labour’s reforms appear to rest on an implicit assumption that state-funded and 
state-led efforts to improve employability and find work are always necessary, and 
were the only possible factor in contributing to falling unemployment.  The importance 
of strong economic growth and favourable macro-economic conditions has not been 
widely discussed or given the prominence that empirical evidence would suggest it 
might deserve12.   
 
Finally, it has been argued that targets set out in New Labour’s 1997 manifesto 
pledges were being met by the end of the first term (Powell, 2002).  Using a balanced 
                                            
12 Chapter 4 includes an examination of the relationship between rates of economic growth and 
unemployment first observed by Okun (1962). 
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scorecard approach for each social policy area, each was assessed by New Labour 
in their annual reports, and, seemingly arbitrarily, assigned a score out of 10.  The 
results were as follows: 
 
Table 2.2.: Progress against Manifesto/Annual Report targets for social 
security 
Pledge New Labour’s Assessment Score/10 
27: 10p starting rate for 
income tax 
Done 10 
28: Cut VAT on fuel to 5% Done 10 
46: Introduce NMW Done 5 
47: Get 250,000 long-term 
unemployed young people 
back to work 
On course 8 
48: Tackle long-term 
unemployment 
On course 7 
50: Help single parents back 
to work 
Kept 5 
52: Crack down on benefit 
fraud 
On course 2 
83: National Childcare 
Strategy 
On course 8 
85: Retain universal child 
benefit 
Done 7 
94: Protect BSP Done 7 
95: Help poorest pensioners Done 7 
96: Retain SERPS Kept 6 
97: Produce framework for 
stakeholder pension 
On course 5 
98: Create citizenship 
pensions for carers 
On course 4 
(Source: Powell, 2002, p. 198) 
 
Across the board Powell concludes that “from an ‘intrinsic’ viewpoint, it is possible to 
credit government reforms with a degree of success” (Powell, 2002. p. 199).  Analysis 
of New Labour’s welfare reform record to 2002 shows that “existing verdicts give a 
mixed but generally positive evaluation on New Labour’s welfare reforms [...] however, 
the exaggerated promises, the two-year spending freeze and the obsession with 
meeting ‘targets’ is viewed as ‘poor or indifferent’ policy, ” (ibid. p. 231). 
 
Although Powell’s work was a seemingly systematic analysis, he acknowledges the 
limitations of using a balanced scorecard approach: “Clearly, on one level this is a 
crude and impressionistic exercise to be regarded ‘just for fun’ like the famous 
swingometer on election nights. However, on another level, it is no less crude and 
impressionistic than the verdicts provided by the civil servants in the Annual Reports” 
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(2002. p. 239).  This is possibly an oblique reference to New Public Management’s 
use by the UK Civil Service. The results of his balanced scorecards, like many previous 
works in this field, contribute to the debate, but ultimately rely upon a somewhat 
shallow and subjective judgement of the success or otherwise of New Labour’s 
reforms. 
 
The creation of Jobcentre Plus has also been praised as representing the culmination 
of the New Labour’s policy solutions.  It was seen as enhancing the capacity of the 
working-age population to take advantage of new technological and economic 
developments, and expanding the effective supply of labour (Wiggan, 2007).  By 
combining the Employment Service and the Benefits Agency, their separate individual 
objectives and targets no longer hinder each other but instead provide for effective 
joint working towards the new socio-economic goals underpinning New Labour’s 
welfare-to-work policy (Wiggan, 2007).  Nevertheless, there remained shortcomings 
of New Labour’s welfare reforms. For instance, the active labour market policies put 
in place to encourage individuals into the labour market have failed to raise skill levels 
successfully and simply pushed people into insecure contingent employment (Peck & 
Theodore, 2000. cited in Wiggan, 2007).  Welfare-to-work programmes also 
emphasised the improvement of basic soft skills, and yet large numbers of the working 
population continue to lack basic literacy, numeracy and job ready communication 
skills (Work and Pensions Committee, 2002a; Leitch, 2006, cited in Wiggan, 2007; 
Hill, 2012). 
 
Very few evaluations have attempted to provide an holistic evaluation of New Labour’s 
record with the exception of Toynbee & Walker (2001; 2005; 2011) and Diamond & 
Kenny (eds.) (2011).  While these works attempt to cover a considerable amount of 
ground, they fail to offer the depth of critical analysis and are generally sympathetic.  
They focus instead on headline social statistics which they take at face value and lack 
the curiosity which would have yielded more constructive conclusions.   
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2.2.2. Potential criticisms 
 
Despite the arguments made for New Labour’s success, there are a range of 
reservations and insightful criticisms aimed at the actions, and often inaction of New 
Labour during their time in office.  These are discussed thematically below.     
 
2.2.2.1. Informal labour market participation 
 
A strong initial criticism is that attempts to reduce fraud and increase participation in 
the formal labour market would inevitably lead to a reduction in informal labour market 
activity, thus damaging productivity, increasing coercion of the poor, and intensifying 
exclusion of a small minority (Stepney, Lynch & Jordan, 1999).  According to Stepney, 
Lynch & Jordan, the New Deals were built on the dominant poverty discourse of the 
time with two assumptions: firstly, that the benefits of a largely unregulated labour 
market outweigh the associated social costs; secondly, that what they perceived to be 
a growing underclass posed a threat to the prevailing economic recovery and stability.  
Given these assumptions, they claim the New Labour government was morally 
justified in using its coercive power to push people off benefits and into work using 
such measures as benefit disqualifications, tighter conditionality and stricter 
enforcement.  Jones & Novak (1999) made a very similar criticism referring to a 
‘disciplinary state’ which demonised the poor. They also claim that New Labour, as a 
continuation of the New Right, sought to police the unemployed through measures 
such as Job Seeker’s Allowance and the New Deals which instead forced the poor 
into low-wage exploitative work.  Stepney, Lynch & Jordan are also highly critical of 
what they argue are flawed assumptions by New Labour, i.e. that the New Deals would 
do little to improve productivity or reduce unemployment and public expenditure.  They 
conclude even if this approach to informal labour market activity can be morally 
justified it is questionable whether programmes such as the New Deal made economic 
sense. 
 
These arguments can be developed further.  Once the unemployed or those working 
in the informal labour market have been forced into the formal labour market, they 
would inevitably be worse off, given the low tax-free allowance and wages, in spite of 
the National Minimum Wage.  The high replacement rate of benefits to income would 
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continue to create negative incentives to work.  The Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government elected in 2010 recognised this issue and committed themselves 
to raising the tax-free allowance to £10,000 during their time in office.  It could be 
argued that New Labour’s strategy to ‘make work pay’ and reduce poverty – especially 
child poverty – rested more upon the use of Tax Credits rather than allowing workers 
to independently work themselves out of poverty without state assistance.  One could 
easily question the motivations of a government that seemingly seeks to encourage 
dependency on Tax Credits, and subjugate the low-paid workforce in this manner.  A 
cynical argument would be that this may perhaps have been done for electoral 
reasons; i.e. to leave the working class in the position where they have no choice but 
to vote New Labour, or face a less generous welfare provision under a Conservative 
government.  Although plausible, it would be very difficult to prove this to be the case.  
Alternatively, a more traditional liberal perspective of the labour market would 
understand Tax Credits as a temporary stage in the rising value of the worker as a 
consequence of increasing work experience.  
 
2.2.2.2. The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) 
 
The NDYP is included here as it was the New Deal programme which received the 
most public funding, had the most participants, and also received the most attention 
from researchers.  Critics highlighted the worryingly low success rate of a variety of 
New Labour’s programmes including the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) (Hyland 
& Musson, 2001; Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam, 2002; Finn, 2005; Fergusson, 2009).  
Using a range of quantitative measures and a case study of the NDYP in the West 
Midlands, an evaluation was carried out that focused on the first two years of the NDYP 
(Hyland & Musson, 2001).  Hyland & Musson found that the NDYP had made few 
positive steps: of the 379,000 NDYP ‘start ups’ by the end of 1999, 251,600 of them 
had left the programme; of these 251,600, 43% went into unsubsidised jobs, 12% 
transferred to other benefits, 18% left for known reasons and 27% for unknown 
reasons.  DfEE statistics also show that from April 1998 to October 1999, 169,000 
youngsters entered employment from the New Deal Gateway with 126,189 entering 
sustained jobs, and 42,870 going into subsidised employment.  This all suggests poor 
performance of the NDYP (DfEE, 1999c. cited in Hyland & Musson, 2001).  The NDYP 
was also found to have had other shortcomings.  In research conducted by the Institute 
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for Employment Studies there was found “unresolved operating difficulties which are 
not yet properly understood and which are now important priorities to get right,” 
including “a smaller and more difficult to assist client group than was originally planned 
for [...,] longer than expected average duration of clients in the gateway [and] problems 
in coordinating employers offering potential vacancies for New Deal clients [...] with 
suitable applications from the programme” (Institute for Employment Studies, 1999. p. 
7. cited in Hyland & Musson, 2001. p. 27).  Finn (2003), also echoed the criticism that 
the NDYP struggled to assist the ‘hardest to help’ into jobs.  This was made worse by 
the excessive range of options, the increasing focus on unsubsidised job entry and the 
frequently inappropriate sanctioning of benefits.  Integrating job search and placement 
alongside other services through the Jobcentre Plus would continue to pose a major 
challenge he argues, and that modernisation could lead to the creation of new barriers 
in addition to reinforcing existing barriers, i.e. closing 300 local offices and increasing 
the use of call centres and computerised access points would significantly reduce 
face-to-face contact for those with limited proficiency in English or IT skills.  In Hyland 
& Musson’s West Midlands case study it was also found that 27% of Gateway leavers 
entered unsubsidised jobs.  This fell way below the national target of 40% and the 
achievement rate of 43%, although 21% entering full-time vocational education and 
training was in line with other regions. 
 
Criticism has also been made of the low success rates across the NDYP (Fergusson, 
2009).  Examining the administrative data Ferguson found that by June 2001 over 
640,000 young people had started the NDYP since its inception. However, of those, 
only 33% had gained unsubsidised employment.  Of those who had, 43% did not 
sustain their new job for the 13 week period which was deemed to constitute ‘sustained 
employment’.  This means that only around 40% (260,000 of the 630,000 ‘starts’) 
gained as little as 13 weeks of unsubsidised work despite up to a year on the NDYP 
programme (Unemployment Unit/Youthaid, 2001c. cited in Fergusson, 2009).  These 
figures may even have been over-optimistic.  Stewart (2001) highlights The National 
Institute for Economic and Social Research’s (NIESR) independent study on the 
NDYP.  This study found that the government’s estimates of 250,000+ young people 
for whom the NDYP would find work was greatly exaggerated.  A more accurate figure 
would be 45,000, and that many of those on the programme would have found jobs 
anyway during this period of economic growth (Stewart, 2001. cited in Fergusson, 
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2009).  It was also found that the value of the NDYP was a 0.1% per annum boost to 
GDP, and the scheme was estimated to return only 60% of its cost to the government 
in reduced benefit costs and additional tax revenues (Fergusson, 2009).  These are 
scathing figures which suggest that the NDYP failed to achieve its targets (an essential 
component of New Public Management is the belief that targets help to push up 
standards), and ultimately that government finances would have been better had the 
government not launched this programme at all. This raises the question of whether 
reducing welfare spending was the object of the exercise. 
 
NDYP training was also found to be wanting, i.e. it performed badly or failed to perform 
at all (Ritchie, 2000. p. 309. cited in Ferguson, 2009).  Provision was noted as being 
disorganised and often absent.  Workplace training linked to the NDYP was viewed as 
weak or non-existent and was heavily criticised by young people.  The effects of the 
mandate of the NDYP appear to have been to speed up and intensify movement in 
and out of activity slots rather than slowing down and stabilising the churning and 
instability which characterises much of young people’s early post-school lives13 
(Ferguson, 2009).  Ferguson argues that as a result of these criticisms, New Labour’s 
claims of social inclusivity can be called into question and, that in fact, new exclusions 
may be emerging as a result of the NDYP. Mizen (2003) is equally distrustful of New 
Labour’s youth policy, questioning whether young people were being equipped for a 
future in the knowledge-based economy or perhaps that there was a retreat away from 
traditional forms of support and shifting responsibility for poor employability onto young 
people themselves.  The compulsory nature of the NDYP was also associated with 
higher than average turnover, disappointing rates of job placement, and obvious 
indications of tactical resistance by programme participants, and the perpetuation of 
unstable trajectories into the 18+ age group (Ferguson, 2009).  
 
It could also be argued that all of the New Deals suffered a fatal flaw in that they 
attempted to treat the symptoms of unemployment rather than tackling the root 
causes, i.e. poor educational achievement, skills mismatch, limited work experience, 
geographical immobility, incentive, childcare and related socio-economic issues.  
                                            
13 See also Carpenter (2006) and Hill (2012) for in-depth discussion of the problem of recycling/re-
tread.   
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Chapter 5 of this thesis examines the NDYP in greater detail and presents conclusions 
which challenge the veracity and usefulness of the administrative data that it 
generated.  
 
2.2.2.3. Worklessness 
 
A very strong criticism of New Labour is that, despite strong economic growth and an 
active labour market strategy, there remained concentrations of worklessness 
amongst key individuals, households and socio-economic groups, and that skills 
development has been limited, (Dickens, Gregg & Wadsworth, 2000). 
 
According to Dickens, Gregg and Wadsworth, New Labour’s strategy consisted of: 
 
i. Skills improvement and attempting to reduce the supply of low-skill labour by 
improving basic education;  
ii. The New Deal Gateway which intensified the pressure to search for work and 
apply for and take up available vacancies.  Work placements were compulsory 
if claimant’s independent search was unsuccessful and the monitoring of 
search activity was intensified; and finally, 
iii. Increasing the take-home pay from low-wage work through the NMW, 
reductions in income tax, such the so called ‘starting rate of income tax’, also 
called the 10p tax rate, was in place from 1999 to 2008 which replaced the 
previous 23% basic rate for those in the lowest income bracket. Also national 
insurance contributions, and the Working Families Tax Credit for low-income 
families with children.  
 
However, Dickens, Gregg and Wadsworth drew attention to what they saw as the clear 
limitations to this strategy:  
 
 The scale of these interventions was modest, and skills development was 
limited;  
 A large proportion of the jobs found during the Gateway or Off-flow periods of 
the New Deals were likely to be short term/insecure.  Dickens, Gregg and 
Wadsworth felt that not enough was done to raise the probability of sustained 
employment or wage progression for members of the marginalised groups 
targeted by the New Deals; 
 The potential effectiveness of the strategy for unemployment black spots or for 
those facing labour-market discrimination by employers was questionable; and 
finally, 
 What they felt was a tightening labour market linked to the relative success of 
intensive job-search enhancing schemes suggested that the Employment 
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Service (which became the DWP) should have used a more specific vacancy 
referral. 
 
Similarly, Dingelday (2007) found that of the LTU aged 25 and over, few participated 
in one-year programmes such as Education and Training Opportunities (ETO). ETO 
would have led to a recognised vocational qualification.  The majority instead opted 
for much shorter programmes designed to improve basic skills (BET), update work-
related skills (LOT) and job-search skills (SJFT) (Somerville & Brace, 2004. cited in 
Dingelday, 2007).  Training and skills enhancement was underdeveloped in the UK 
with low expenditure on labour market training (0.02% of GDP) and apprenticeships 
(0.10%) in 2002-2003 (Dingleday, 2007).  The positive accomplishments of the 
provision of nursery and childcare places meant that whereas less than 11% of under-
fives had childcare places in the 1990s, in 2001 in England this figure stood at 90% 
for 3-4 year olds.  The New Deal for Lone Parents also saw an increase in the activity 
rate of lone mothers to over 55%.  However, this disguised the fact that most of the 
labour market activation in this group was due to mostly short-term part-time work 
which did not pay a living wage (Dingleday, 2007).  Dickens, Gregg and Wadsworth, 
perhaps very rightly, claim that the New Labour government’s failure to tackle 
disincentives associated with the housing benefits system may also be a reason for 
the limited success of the New Deal for the Over-50s.  I would add to my previous 
criticisms that New Labour was failing to tackle the underlying problems behind 
unemployment.  Perhaps the myopic viewpoint of the welfare-to-work policy and the 
‘work first’ agenda failed to consider welfare beyond gaining employment.  It seems 
almost inevitable that pushing individuals into occupations for which they are not 
suitable, or motivated to succeed in, will lead to their inevitable return to out-of-work 
benefits. It could also be argued that despite the government’s attempts to make a life 
on benefits less appealing, it seems that it still remained a more desirable choice for 
many when compared to a minimum wage job with no prospects, and no easily 
discernible route out of poverty. 
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2.2.2.4. Organisational obstructionism 
 
The reforms which New Labour introduced faced considerable opposition from within 
the ‘state sector salariat’ i.e. welfare state professionals, managers and policy makers 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2000).  Taylor-Gooby claims this was due to conflict arising between 
public sector workers and the New Labour government during the initial 
implementation of their welfare reform policies during the years 1997 to 2000.  Conflict 
arose because of different assumptions implicit in many of New Labour’s policies 
compared to those underlying the approach of public sector workers involved in 
welfare reform implementation. New Labour emphasised individualism and personal 
responsibility, but “[did] not pursue the overtly individualistic model of straightforward 
market competition that was the keynote of Thatcherism and Majorism”, (Taylor-
Gooby, 2000, p. 333).  Thus, New Labour was said to operate in a more sophisticated 
social framework which stresses empowerment and the redistribution of opportunity, 
and builds on the individualist perspective.  Public sector workers, on the other hand, 
appeared to expect a more traditional socialist/social democratic approach to welfare 
such as generous indefinite universal benefits, rather than the US-based 
workfare/welfare-to-work programmes being advanced by New Labour.  New Labour’s 
approach was, therefore, out of step with the ‘state sector salariat’ and may explain 
why reformers found a ‘conservative force’ within the state sector, and a lack of 
enthusiasm for the reforms that were being implemented.  The state sector salariat, 
Taylor-Gooby argued, can be seen as being much closer to the working class than to 
the private-sector workforce in terms of their attitudes toward state spending, access 
to wealth, union power, self-respect and private enterprise.  According to Taylor-
Gooby these findings suggest that many public sector professionals did not embrace 
the new individualism or other attitudes held by the private sector middle class whose 
votes New Labour sought to attract. 
 
I would argue that Taylor-Gooby fails to fully explain what he believes the implications 
of this conflict are, and whether it was a case of deliberate politically motivated 
obstructionism, or simply an unwillingness to alter the conventions and working 
practices of the public sector, for example, the increasing amount of 
outsourcing/private commissioning.  Although his arguments are internally logical and 
convincing, it would be necessary to further examine the reaction of public sector 
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unions such as the UNISON, GMB and PCS to gain a better understanding of the 
public sector’s attitudes at the time. 
 
2.2.2.5. Support for the newly employed 
 
Criticism has also been made of the lack of support for the newly employed to develop 
their careers beyond entry-level positions (Hirsch & Millar, 2004).  Drawing upon a 
wide range of studies to evaluate welfare reform from 1997 to 2004, Hirsch and Millar 
claimed that the New Deal programmes were well-developed that have been very 
successful during implementation compared to previous welfare-to-work programmes. 
They have, however, suffered from some key problems; that although incentives for 
non-working households to return to work have been successful, they have not been 
matched by incentives and support for the same clients once within work to progress 
in their current or future roles.  This suggests that New Labour’s reforms were strongly 
motivated by the centrality of work as a route out of poverty (relative poverty being 
defined as less than 60% of median income). However, despite the positive rhetoric 
towards life-long learning by New Labour, their reforms do not appear to have looked 
beyond the unemployed gaining employment.  Hirsch & Millar also drew attention to 
the tendency of households without earnings seeing their benefits fall behind average 
incomes unless they had children.  The implied meaning of this argument being that 
those who do not work should still receive a high replacement rate level of benefits so 
as not to fall into poverty.  There was, however, little discussion of the possible 
negative incentive to work that a high replacement rate creates14.  It could be assumed 
that Hirsch and Miller would claim that both wages and benefits in the UK are too low. 
The structure of the benefits system, especially the high levels of Housing Benefit, 
may also have been important. 
 
Although largely positive about the New Deal and related programmes, Hirsch & Millar 
(2004) argue there were further issues that ought to have been tackled.  There needed 
to be more support for those unable to enter the job market immediately, ensuring that 
incentives for second earners were not diminished too much. Furthermore, New 
Labour needed to maintain the Tax Credits system in the long-term as a way of 
                                            
14 These may have been a consequence of the post-industrial nature of the UK economy as 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
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redistributing wealth and reducing poverty.  Hirsch & Millar conclude that “If work is 
the best form of welfare, public policy needs to pay close attention to the welfare for 
people in work” (p. 10). 
 
I agree with the sentiments of Hirsch & Miller that supporting individuals into work, 
helping them to sustain that employment and getting them out of poverty are part of 
the same journey.  However, it could be debated whether the earnings of the long-
term unemployed falling behind the earnings of those in employment was an issue at 
all, especially during years of positive economic growth when earnings had been 
increasing.  Although perhaps not always at the same pace as inflation.  This is not to 
say that earnings in many geographical areas such as former industrial areas did not 
remain depressed.  The economic slowdown post-2007 unfortunately created 
considerable involuntary unemployment.  This may have meant that the low 
replacement rates of Job Seeker’s Allowance and associated benefits were not 
enough to support the newly unemployed, especially if they had mortgages and other 
large financial commitments. 
 
Criticism has also been made of the ‘make work pay’ strategy from employers who 
suffered from increased costs and bureaucratic complexity (Brewer & Shephard, 2004. 
cited in Finn, 2005).  Brewer & Shephard claim that administrative failures in the 
payment and calculation of Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) 
blunted work incentives, and workers facing an effective marginal tax rate of over 50% 
increased by almost 900,000.  I would also add to this that New Labour frequently 
failed to increase the tax-free personal allowance in line with inflation, leading to 
bracket creep. This is the process by which inflation pushes wages and salaries into 
higher tax brackets.  At the bottom end, this means workers who would previously not 
have paid tax being subject to it.  This had a major negative impact upon the working 
poor as more were drawn into higher rates of taxation. 
 
2.2.2.6. Divesture of responsibility 
 
An overly pessimistic criticism of New Labour’s welfare reforms is that under New 
Labour, the state was systematically divesting itself of welfare state responsibilities by 
emphasising individual responsibility (Clarke, 2005). Clarke claims that New Labour 
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were enthusiastic about the notion of ‘activation’, drawing on their social democratic 
and communitarian conceptions of the citizen15, but debates have remained 
dominated by the neo-liberal concern to ‘liberate’ the citizen from the state.  Clarke 
further argues that New Labour inherited the views of Thatcherite conservatism; that 
the people required rescuing from an over-bearing, intrusive and dominating public 
power. As a result, there has been the “dismantling of the protections and defences 
constructed in post-war welfare capitalism against the rigours, vagaries, demands and 
iniquities of the market and the unconstrained powers of capital,” (ibid. p. 452).  Thus 
the language of ‘activation’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘responsibility’ act as a rhetorical 
smokescreen behind which New Labour is systematically divesting the state of 
responsibilities. This can again be linked to the individualisation and financialisation of 
welfare that appears to be running through many of these threads of argument.  As 
part of this divesting process, differentiation was taking place between different target 
groups of citizens: those to be rewarded, those to be aided to improve themselves, 
and those requiring continued surveillance and control. 
 
I would contend that Clarke (2005) presents his conclusions as self-evident, with few 
explicit examples of where this divesture of responsibility is taking place.  I would also 
be tempted to question why he assumes large-scale intervention in welfare provision 
is inherently desirable or that it represents the default position.  Subscribers to moral 
underclass discourse (MUD) could perhaps counter-argue that New Labour were in 
fact attempting to liberate individuals from welfare dependency, encouraging individual 
responsibility to individuals who had been denied it since the creation of the welfare 
state, as has been argued by Bartholomew (2006).  Workers interests may not in fact 
be best served by excessive interventions which can encourage dependency.  
Interventions by government may instead be better designed as a safety net, followed 
by a ladder of social mobility.  However, MUD ignores structural and social factors 
shaping individual choice and possible trajectories in life.     
 
Others have been less critical of New Labour’s motivations.  Towards the end of New 
Labour’s first term, the debate around welfare reform increasingly shifted towards 
Asset Based Welfare (ABW) as the third step in a trinity of welfare reform (Powell, 
                                            
15 See 2.1.2. for further discussion of New Labour’s evolving ideology.  
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2002; Watson, 2009).  Firstly, New Labour pronounced that all who can work should 
work (encouraging a work ethic), secondly, that all who can work and earn should then 
save, and thirdly, that individuals who have saved can take greater responsibility for 
themselves and their family’s future and retirement (a prudential ethic) (Powell, 2002).  
Proponents of labour market activation would claim this is highly commendable as it 
encourages independence from state support, individual responsibility and the 
development of an individual’s own reserve of assets/wealth which can be drawn on 
when required.  However, Watson (2009) argues that ABW is based on questionable 
assumptions: that ‘financialised economic agents’ would become active saver-
investors who accumulate assets to fund future welfare consumption.  The housing 
market, he argues, dominated asset accumulation over recent years therefore posing 
significant challenges when the mortgage and housing markets were no longer 
growing, reducing confidence and excluding many from private ownership.  Watson 
presents an important counter-argument to ABW and any movement away from social 
insurance schemes.  Watson’s argument links closely to the recurring claims of the 
individualisation of welfare.  This individualisation can perhaps most clearly be seen 
in the National Minimum Wage and Tax Credit programmes discussed in Chapter 9.  
  
2.2.2.7. Increasing numbers on Incapacity Benefit 
 
Despite improvements in all other measures of unemployment, there continued to be 
an increasing number of claimants for Incapacity Benefit (IB) (Finn, 2005), to such an 
extent that by 2009 IB was costing more than JSA.  The overall progress of New 
Labour’s welfare reform seemed positive between May 1997 and June 2004.  The 
number people in employment in the UK rose from just over 27 million to over 28.3 
million, and the unemployment rate (i.e. the unemployment rate as measured by the 
Labour Force Survey) fell from 8% to 4.7%.  Alongside this, the JSA Claimant Count 
fell from 1.6 million to just under a million.  By 2002, long-term continuous claimant 
unemployment had effectively disappeared for those under-2516.  Numbers of those 
over-25 and those unemployed for over 18 months had fallen to about 100,000.  Finn 
also draws attention to the working-age employment rate for men and women 
combined having increased to 74.6%, the employment rate for lone parents had 
                                            
16 However, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, this apparent statistical success for New Labour hides a 
more complex labour market situation for young people.    
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increased from 47% to 53.4%, and for people defined as disabled or those with health 
problems from, 43.5% to 49% (DWP, 2004a. cited in Finn, 2005). 
 
Even with such positive performance, there continued to be an increase in the number 
of IB claims. This increase was at a slower rate than the previous government 
However, it was fast approaching 2.7 million as of 2005 (Finn, 2005).  Although there 
was intense political discussion regarding the emergence of ‘sick note Britain’ by the 
media, Finn suggests a more complex explanation; that the collapse in the demand 
for unskilled labour was strongly linked to ‘social prescribing’ by medical ‘gatekeepers’ 
who take non-clinical circumstances into account and rely heavily upon the claims 
made by patients, and ultimately this had fed into increases in the overall figures 
(Wainwright, 2004. cited in Finn, 2005). There is a possible broader issue, i.e. that 
employers prefer young (cheap) and fit labour.  Those with minor impairments find that 
they cannot get work and may decide that ‘disability’ is the reason for this.  During 
periods of sustained high unemployment the market therefore expels those with 
physical and psychological problems leading to an increase those claiming disability-
related benefits17. 
 
Finn (2005) concludes that the effective implementation of the then second wave of 
welfare reform represented a significant achievement, but that a third term Labour 
government should have done more than consolidate its existing strategy.  Clarke 
further argues that it was unlikely the Jobcentre Plus could concentrate on 
employment assistance without a radical simplification of the benefit system, or the 
DWP would risk becoming mired in administrative complexity, exacerbated by 
continuing IT inadequacies.  It could be argued that Finn identified the important issues 
of structural and technological unemployment, skills mis-match, and de-
industrialisation (i.e. the changing nature of the UK economy) has left many workers 
without the skills needed18, often leaving them trapped in areas of high unemployment 
and with incapacity benefit presenting a more lucrative source of income than JSA. 
For example, Bartholomew (2006) provides an excellent discussion of this 
                                            
17 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 alongside how disability is defined and the New Deal 
for Disabled People (NDDP).  
18 Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1. 
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phenomenon focusing on former industrial areas such as South Wales, Liverpool and 
County Durham. 
 
Although Finn attempts to explain the reasons behind reductions in unemployment, he 
notes that they may simply reflect the strength of the British economy.  I would argue 
that this is a very important criticism and one that I intend to explore throughout this 
thesis. 
 
2.2.2.8. Internal contradictions of welfare capitalism 
 
There has been a strong wave of criticism from more traditional liberal writers.  The 
thrust of these criticisms is that unemployment is not a result of individual failure, as 
argued by advancers of Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD) such as Murray and Mead 
(1986; 1987), but a failure of the capitalist economic system and associated paradigms 
of welfare (King, 1995; Pierson, C. 1998, Coates, 2000).  King argues that far from 
being about reducing unemployment and social inclusion, welfare-to-work 
programmes are “constructed around categories of inclusion and exclusion rather than 
designed to transcend such divisions” (1995. p. 213).  According to King, these 
programmes are therefore more about social control than genuinely equipping the 
workforce with the skills necessary for inclusion in the workforce and thus wider 
society. However, as this thesis argues, New Labour’s reforms focused on the moral 
distinction between claiming groups, i.e. the ‘deserving’ versus the ‘undeserving’ poor. 
 
Pierson, C. (1998) argued that modern welfare states face a three-pronged attack from 
globalisation, societal ageing and the emergence of ‘new’ social risks such as family 
breakdown, de-industrialisation and de-standardisation of employment and the 
weakening of the position of low-skilled labour.  Pierson argued that New Labour’s 
‘Third Way’ was a reaction to these attacks and that it had some claims to success, 
for instance increasing childcare provision and in-work benefits.  Pierson concludes 
that despite these challenges, the welfare state may yet prove to be part of the solution 
in the face of challenging economic and social changes.   
 
Coates (2000), however, does not share Pierson’s optimism.  Coates is highly critical 
of what he calls “social ends [...] generated through market exchange and the clash of 
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individual self-interests” (ibid. p. 264).  He instead calls for “a fundamental resetting of 
the structure, distribution and rewarding of paid work” (p. 264).  For example, by 
increasing the tax on speculative capital, the democratisation of financial institutions, 
the re-imposition of capital controls, and a move back towards local self-sufficient 
production and state-directed manufacturing investment.   
 
2.3  Summary and critique of the literature focusing on the roots of 
New Labour’s welfare reform agenda 
 
This section will revisit the questions previously set out earlier in this chapter namely:   
 
 Where are the tensions/issues? 
 Where do gaps in knowledge exist?, and 
 Where does the research in this thesis fit in the field? 
. 
2.3.1. Where are the tensions/issues? 
 
I would argue that although there are a variety of strands to the debate on the roots of 
New Labour and their welfare reforms, none of these strands of debate are mutually 
exclusive.  In reality, the roots of New Labour and their welfare reform agenda would 
appear to lie in a combination of these strands coming together to create the New 
Labour phenomenon with its inherent ideological traits and policy agenda (Deacon, 
2000), and I would agree with this analysis. 
 
Issues remain, however, in that these arguments are all sufficient, but not necessary.  
The evidence advanced by academics, although internally logical, remains in many 
cases circumstantial rather than proving conclusively that a particular line of causality 
took place.  Only those within the Labour party, such as Blair and Mandelson had 
insights into the internal discourse at the time.  Unfortunately their subsequent 
autobiographies have not offered a complete story of exactly what took place at the 
time (Blair, 2010; Mandelson, 2010). 
 
There are methodological problems with the literature.  A large proportion of the 
literature adopts a positivistic approach, with works only occasionally drawing upon 
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qualitative sources of data.  Quantitative/statistical analysis is quite cursory and 
usually limited to comparisons of percentages.  Of those that use quantitative 
methodology, little discussion is made of welfare recipients’ experiences of the welfare 
state, or indeed the barriers they feel they face as the unemployed and what New 
Labour could have done to help.  Analysis therefore appears far removed from the 
day-to-day reality of life on welfare or the operations of the DWP. 
 
Reference is often made to programme-specific measures of success.  However, as 
some writers have acknowledged, it is difficult to establish a clear causal link between 
New Labour’s welfare reforms and rates/measures of unemployment.  The strong 
growth of the British economy between 1995 and 2007 (there was, however, a 
significant slowdown around the year 2000 due to the dot-com bubble collapse in the 
US and elsewhere) may therefore present a better explanation of reductions in welfare 
rolls than the ‘success’ of welfare-to-work programmes19.   
 
2.3.2. Where do gaps in knowledge exist? 
 
As mentioned above, the full internal discourses of the development of New Labour 
and their welfare reform agenda, i.e. thought processes and phases of policy 
development, are not in the public domain. 
 
Also, although all sources appear to be important, it is again unknown as to what the 
relative importance of each was.  Some sources may have been far more influential 
than others, such as the entire change in the language and rules of debate surrounding 
welfare reform (for example Murray & Mead, 1986).  What is important is how New 
Labour’s ideology informed New Labour’s labour market policy.   
 
There are a number of gaps in the current knowledge surrounding New Labour and 
their welfare reforms.  For instance, no writer has yet attempted to evaluate the entire 
labour market reform agenda, nor covered New Labour’s entire time in office.  No 
writer has clearly established a causal link between New Labour’s welfare reforms and 
                                            
19 This is explored in Chapter 4. 
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decreases in unemployment during their time in office, and therefore whether they 
were an economic and efficient use of public money. 
 
2.3.3. What does the research in this thesis add to current 
knowledge? 
 
This thesis attempts to fill the gaps within this field of research by asking the following 
research question: 
 
What were the effects of New Labour’s active labour market policy on 
rates of social dependency in the working age population during their 
time in office?  
 
The research of this thesis will allow for an understanding of what the ultimate 
implications of New Labour’s entire welfare reform agenda were, especially for 
different client groups, i.e. whether it had an effect, and the nature of any effect which 
occurred. The working age population (those aged between 16 and 64) was chosen 
as they were the subjects of New Labour’s ALMP.  
 
The following chapter outlines the methodology through which the research question 
will be answered.  Chapter 5 to 9 address the New Deal Programmes, Tax Credits 
and National Minimum Wage which made up the key programmes of New Labour’s 
labour market policy.  Chapter 10 summarises the arguments made and concludes 
this thesis.    
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CHAPTER 3 – THEORY AND METHODS 
 
Chapter 2 examined the literature seeking to explain the roots of New Labour and its 
welfare reform agenda, and also previous attempts to evaluate the outcomes of this 
agenda.  This thesis is an exercise in evaluation; it evaluates historical social policy 
but it also evaluates evaluation.  As Robson (1993. p. 174) argues: “[…] evaluations 
are essentially indistinguishable from other research in terms of design, data collection 
techniques and methods of analysis”.  
 
This chapter will introduce and explain the theoretical approach, Economics of 
Conventions (EC), adopted by this thesis.  EC represents an alternative and original 
approach to existing evaluations of New Labour’s labour market policy.  The remainder 
of this chapter explores relevant evaluation theory in relation to this thesis and outlines 
the research design used.   
 
3.1. Focal Theory 
 
Focal theory can best be defined as the theoretical model or paradigm used as a 
framework through which data is analysed and explained.  It is the lens through which 
the world is viewed and analysed.  EC is an interpretivist research paradigm which 
entails certain epistemological and ontological assumptions.  Interpretivism accepts 
that concepts within the social sciences are subjective; that meaning is socially 
constructed20, and relativism exists21. 
 
The following section outlines EC, the reasoning behind its adoption, and an 
evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses.   
 
                                            
20 Traditional epistemology (theory of knowledge), i.e. Plato’s tripartite conception of knowledge as 
‘justified true belief’ is no longer adequate (i.e. because of the Gettier counterexamples).  Instead, 
knowledge of real people in real communities is defined in terms of the beliefs that are generally 
accepted on the basis of the knowledge standards of criteria of a community (which may differ and 
develop historically).  This means that knowledge is not just a social psychological notion of ‘shared 
belief’, but also defined in the socio-cultural terms of epistemic communities and their specific criteria 
or standards (Dijk, 2008).  
21 An ontology (theory of meaning) of relativism argues that the constructed nature of social reality 
naturally leads to variations between societies.  Thus morality cannot be judged against any objective 
standard, i.e. there is no absolute truth or validity, only relative and subjective values.   
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3.1.1. L’économie des conventions 
 
After considering the wide range of available schools of thought, the Economics of 
Conventions (L’économie des conventions or EC for short) was chosen as an 
appropriate focal theory for this thesis.  EC was chosen as it would provide an 
enlightening and original approach to the study of New Labour’s labour market policy 
which would challenge some of the evaluative conclusions reached and complement 
some of the criticisms in the existing literature.   
 
Although the academic study of conventions goes back as far as David Hume (1738; 
1748)22, it re-emerged in the 20th Century with Convention by David Lewis (1969).  It 
is within this broader philosophical tradition that an approach to economic institutions 
and conventions emerged in France in the late 1980s called L’économie des 
conventions (The Economics of Conventions)23 (Dequech, 2011).  The definition of 
conventions has evolved as a result.  Hume first defined a convention as: 
 
“…a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, 
which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with 
others into a general plan or systems of actions, which tends to public utility” 
(1748. p. 257).  
 
Hume was clearly linking individual behaviour to wider systemic and perhaps 
institutional behaviour.  This is a link developed more recently in L’économie des 
conventions (Defalvard, 2002; Bessy & Favereau, 2003. cited in Dequech, 2011).   
 
Lewis more recently and succinctly defined conventions as: “a regularity in behaviour” 
(Lewis, 1969. p. 51).  Lewis developed his argument further by introducing the concept 
of ‘common knowledge’.  To quote the argument directly: 
 
“Let us say that it is common knowledge in a population P that ____ if and only 
if some state for affairs A holds such that:  
(1) Everyone in P has reason to believe that A holds. 
(2) A indicates to everyone in P that everyone in P has reason to believe that A 
holds. 
(3) A indicates to everyone in P that ____. 
                                            
22 Followed soon after by Adam Smith (1759).   
23 Key thinkers included Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereua, Andre Orlean, 
Robert Salais, Laurent Thévenot and Alain Desrosières. 
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We can call any such state of affairs A basis for common knowledge in P that 
____.  A provides the members of P with part of what they need to form 
expectations of arbitrarily high order, regarding sequences of members of P, 
that ____.  That part it gives to them is the part peculiar to the content ____.  
The rest of what they need is what they need to form any higher-order 
expectations in the way we are considering: mutual ascription of some common 
inductive standards and background information, rationality, mutual ascription 
of rationality, and so on” (pp. 56-57).  
 
 
To help understand how this works, one can substitute into the argument a reasonable 
and subtle convention.  For instance, how to greet friends: a kiss or a handshake, or 
another example may be what signs signify binding agreement prior to the signing of 
a contract.  Such signals also help to distinguish between those who are (or not) part 
of a given community and worthy of trust, which enables collective action to be 
coordinated.  Therefore, as a society we are able to solve problems of coordination in 
situations of uncertainty by following conventions with their associated expectations, 
and by assuming that such conventions are common knowledge.   
 
So, how does this link with evaluating New Labour’s labour market policy?  The 
important link is how social phenomena are problematised (identified as a problem), 
analysed, categorised and quantified to become social statistics which are then used 
for evaluation purposes.  Social scientists often appeal to the claimed ‘objectivity’ of 
social statistics.  As Centemeri argues:  
 
“Quantification and objectivity are strictly associated, since historically 
objectivity emerged in our societies as a fundamental category in the 
construction and organisation of modern politics, to quantify a knowledge 
produced according to conventions (rules and procedures) supposed to 
guarantee impersonality, impartiality and fairness” (2014. p. 1).   
 
However, as Centemeri goes on to argue, such conventions of quantification (or 
statistical conventions) are not value-free but in fact loaded with the social conventions 
of those who create them:   
 
“Quantification is guaranteed by ‘conventions of quantification’ that are the 
outcome of controversies about the good, or convenient, way to evaluate 
persons and things, according to desirable social goals aimed at” (Centemeri, 
2014. p. 1).   
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Therefore, according to Centemeri, ‘conventions of quantification’ are underpinned by 
the moral values and social expectations of those who then decide how to quantify 
social phenomena.  As this thesis will demonstrate, such moral judgements and 
expectations are important to the way individuals with certain features were 
categorised by New Labour and how such categories were defined.  Thus individuals 
are ‘counted’ and ultimately ‘treated’ in different ways by policy based on their 
statistical treatment.    
 
An excellent example of this process can be seen in Robert Salais et al (1986) in their 
work L’invention du chômage (The Invention of Unemployment).  Salais et al argue 
that ‘unemployment’ is a social and historical construction that emerged towards the 
end of the 19th Century and culminating in the 1930s in France.  ‘Unemployment’, they 
argue, was not a re-naming of a previously existent social reality, i.e. being out of work, 
but this category was created as a central pillar of Keynesian economic management, 
i.e. that not having work was a social problem requiring public action, and therefore 
measurement.  Therefore, “[…] unemployment is not the reflection of a pre-existing 
social problem but a quantified social object whose founding conventions are 
embedded in a specific form of regulation […]” (Gautié, 2002. cited in Centemeri, 2014. 
pp. 14-15).  More importantly, the emergence of the convention allows for the changing 
of behaviours. In this case French employers began to discharge surplus employees 
(who became ‘unemployed’) rather than re-distributing the available work between 
them.  Thus the emerging convention re-shaped both public and private manpower 
management strategies24.   
 
As a consequence of this process “To quantify is to reshape our world, introducing 
new entities that are clearly separated from us, and that, once created, have an 
independent life” (Centemeri, 2014. p. 16).  Once established, a convention of 
quantification becomes “the ‘natural’ way to measure a reality” (Centemeri, 2014. p. 
17) as these conventions stabilise and ultimately solidify in academic and wider 
nomenclature.  The emergence of New Public Management (NPM) (discussed later in 
                                            
24As discussed in this chapter, the legal/economic category of ‘unemployment’ emerged between the 
turn of the 19th Century and the 1930s.  
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this chapter) has also led to the financialisation of social issues and social policy (to 
gain value for money) further encouraging quantification.   
 
As will be seen in later chapters, New Labour appears to have adopted, co-opted and 
re-defined numerous statistical and social conventions surrounding labour market 
concepts and categories of ‘unemployment’ and ‘employment’, ‘youth’, ‘disability’, 
‘single-parenthood’, and ‘older workers’.   
 
3.2.5.2. The social construction of meaning within evaluations 
 
An important criticism of evaluation, and indeed any academic discourse which relies 
upon the use of statistics, is that meaning is socially constructed.  Walker (2001), for 
example, argues that all reality is contested and cannot be categorically defined in 
terms of the worldview of policymakers.  This is important because whose meanings 
do we adopt? What are the moral convictions driving those meanings? Who is to 
decide the measures/indicators used? These are all important questions as the 
decisions made at this stage may come to affect the statistical outcomes, i.e. the 
headline statistics.  To solve this problem, some have argued that evaluation must 
focus on understanding the meaning stakeholders ascribe in their use of language 
(Bezzi, 2006).  The evaluator should, according to Bezzi, not seek an ‘objective’ truth, 
but just the ‘truth’ surrounding the evaluand (those individuals who are the subject of 
evaluation).  
 
However, within political, practitioner and academic discourse it has been argued that 
no framework exists to explore the nature of policy ‘success’ in a comprehensive way 
(Marsh & McConnell, 2010).  There are, however, some attempts to develop a 
framework that is at least credible for making such judgements.  Hurteau et al (2009) 
argued that, for an evaluation to be considered credible, judgements made by 
programme evaluations must be not only legitimate but justified.  Hurteau et al drew 
their conclusions from a meta-analysis of 40 programme evaluations.  They found that 
only fifty per cent of these programme evaluations generated judgements, and that 
although they seemed legitimate, they were rarely justified.  They also suggest that 
perhaps a reason for judgements not being presented in written reports is that it would 
not serve the purposes of those running the programme, i.e. a critical judgement would 
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undermine the self-interest of those running the programme25.  This is a very 
compelling argument, and it links well with the idea of ‘dysfunctional bureaucracy’ 
advanced by Mieczkowski (1991)26.  Mieczkowski argued that dysfunctional 
bureaucracy occurs when there is the creation and growth of a self-serving elite who 
recruit new members, not on the basis of their functional excellence, but based on 
their usefulness to other bureaucrats. This raises some useful questions for looking at 
programme evaluations conducted by others: who is conducting the evaluation?  What 
is their relationship to the organisation/programme/individuals being evaluated? If the 
research was funded, who funded it? Have they made a judgement?  If not, why not?27  
 
More recently, attempts have been made to develop a more heuristic28 approach for 
practitioners and academics to utilise when approaching the question of whether 
public sector improvement is, or was successful (Marsh & McConnell, 2010).  The 
authors note that previous works, such as Bovens et al (2006), have distinguished 
between two approaches: a rationalist, positivist approach versus an argumentative, 
interpretative or constructivist approach, and thus they seek to develop a middle 
ground drawing on Bovens et al (2001) to argue that success is defined within three 
dimensions: process, programmatic and political.  This is demonstrated in table 3.1 
which shows the dimensions, indicators and evidence of ‘policy success’: 
  
                                            
25 More importantly, it would also challenge the policy behind the programme which was implemented 
by a democratically elected government, thereby challenging the validity of democracy as the basis 
for policy-making.  It might also block future employment/contracts on evaluation programmes.  
26 Max Weber writing in 1922 similarly argued that bureaucracy had the potential to become corrupt 
and almost an oligarchy.  
27 However, it should be noted that to make a judgement about the success of an intervention is to 
accept it on its own terms, i.e. to accept its conventional assumptions.   
28 Pertaining to or based on experimentation or trial-and-error methods. 
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Table 3.1 Dimensions of policy success  
Dimension Indicators Evidence 
Process Legitimacy in the formation of 
choices: that is, produced through due 
processes of constitutional and quasi-
constitutional procedures and values 
of democracy, deliberation and 
accountability. 
Legislative record, executive minutes, 
absence of legal challenges, absence of 
procedural challenge (for example, 
Ombudsmen), absence of significant 
criticisms from stakeholders. 
Passage of legislation: was the 
legislation passed with no, or few, 
amendments? 
Analysis of legislative process, using 
legislative records, including 
identification of amendments and 
analysis of legislative voting patterns. 
Political sustainability: did the policy 
have the support of a sufficient 
coalition? 
Analysis of support from ministers, 
stakeholders, especially interest groups, 
media, public opinion. 
Innovation and influence: was the 
policy based on new ideas or policy 
instruments, or did it involve the 
adoption of policy from elsewhere 
(policy transfer/diffusion)? 
 
Government statements and reports (for 
example, White/Green Papers), 
academic and practitioner conferences, 
interest group reports, think tank reports, 
media news and commentary, 
identification of similarities between 
legislation and that in other jurisdictions 
and that in other jurisdictions 
identification of form and content of 
cross-jurisdictional meetings/visits by 
politicians and/or public servants.  
Programmatic Operational: was it implemented as 
per objectives? 
Internal programme/policy evaluation, 
external evaluation (for example, 
legislative committee reports, audit 
reports), review by stakeholders, 
absence of critical ports in media 
(including professional journals). 
Outcome: did it achieve the intended 
outcomes? 
 
Internal programme/policy evaluation, 
external evaluation (for example, 
legislative committee reports, audit 
reports), review by stakeholders, 
absence of critical ports in media 
(including professional journals). 
Resource: was it an efficient use of 
resources? 
Internal efficiency evaluations, external 
audit reports/assessments, absence of 
critical media reports. 
Actor/interest: did the 
policy/implementation benefit a 
particular class, interest group, 
appliance, political party, gender, 
race, religion, territorial community, 
institution, ideology, etc? 
Party political speeches and press 
releases, legislative debates, legislative 
committee reports, ministerial briefings, 
interest group and other stakeholder 
speeches/press releases/reports, think 
tank reports, media commentary. 
Political Government popularity: is the policy 
politically popular? Did it help 
government’s re-election/election 
chances? Did it help secure or boost 
its credibility? 
Opinion polls, both in relation to 
particular policy and government 
popularity, election results, media 
commentary.  
Source: Marsh & McConnell, 2010. p. 571.  
 
It could be argued that table 3.1 above is quite comprehensive in defining the 
dimensions of evaluation in the context of the public sector.  It also presents some 
potentially useful indicators and supporting evidence that would be required to make 
such judgements.  Table 3.2, also developed by Marsh & McConnell (2010), suggests 
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the important choices that need to be made during the process of assessing policy 
success.    
 
Table 3.2. Critical choices to be made in assessing policy success  
1. Form of political success Which form or forms of success is/are being assessed?  Process? 
Programmatic? Political? 
2. Timeframe What time period(s) is/are being assessed?  Short-term? Medium-
term? Long-term? 
3. Interests In relation to whose interest is success being assessed, for example, 
target group? Stakeholders? Institution? Interest group? Individual? 
Collective? 
4. Reference points What is the standard by which success is being judged? Compared to 
intentions? Compared to policy domain criteria, for example, efficiency 
and effectiveness? Compared to the past? Compared to ethical or 
moral principles? Compared to another jurisdiction? 
5. Information Is there sufficient and credible information to assess the extent of 
success? 
6. Policy isolation With what degree of certainty and credibility is it possible to isolate and 
assess the impact of a policy from other factors such as other policies 
or media influences? 
7. Conflict and ambiguity What significance should be given to conflicts and ambiguities, and 
how should they be weighted in the overall judgement of success? For 
example: 
- Process vs. programmatic vs. political success 
- Short-term vs. long-term 
- Interests benefiting vs. interests losing 
- One reference point vs. another, for example, moral principles 
vs. stated intentions 
- Availability of information vs. lack of information 
- Certainty in isolating the ‘policy effect’ vs. uncertainty in being 
able to do so 
- One formal objective vs. another formal objective 
- One informal objective vs. another informal objective 
- One formal objective vs. another informal objective 
- Unintended consequences vs. actual or intended 
consequences 
- Foreseeable shocks vs. unforeseeable shocks. 
Source: Marsh & McConnell, 2010. p. 580.  
 
These tables provide a broad outline that could allow an evaluator to define what it 
means for a policy to be ‘successful’.  As other authors have suggested, however, the 
nature of ‘success’ remains highly contestable. As Marsh & McConnell (2010) also 
note, there are significant methodological difficulties posed by lack of information and 
attempting to identify the causal chain of the policy compared to other overlapping 
policies, exogenous influences and economic forces, etc.29.  Therefore, any attempt 
at making a judgement regarding ‘success’ or ‘failure’ is inherently normative. 
  
                                            
29 This difficulty is demonstrated in the following chapter.  
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3.1.1.1. Strengths of ‘The Economics of Conventions’ 
 
It can be argued that the Economics of Conventions (EC) has a number of strengths.  
Firstly, it is able to offer an analytical framework for the underlying behaviour of 
individuals, and thus the behaviour of institutions, social and political groups.  This was 
found to be useful when trying to explain how and why New Labour formed their 
policies and evaluative constructs.   
 
Secondly, it offers a greater depth of explanation than a simple positivist statistical 
analysis would be able to offer.  While a positivist analysis would merely observe and 
count what it claims to be ‘social objects’, EC asks how statistics are constructed 
including the social expectations and moral values which become intertwined with the 
definitions used and are used to encourage conformity towards what could be called 
conventional behaviour30.  This was important in de-constructing the statistics 
surrounding New Labour’s work-first labour market policy which emphasised the 
importance of work and flexibility supporting the traditional liberal view that the role of 
the welfare state should be to create a sustainable independence from state support. 
Headline statistics, such as a falling Claimant Count, may therefore tell us very little 
about what is occurring in individuals lives as they interact with the UK labour market.         
 
3.1.1.2. Limitations of ‘The Economics of Conventions’ 
 
The Economics of Conventions is not without limitations.  While positivism claims to 
be able to ‘objectify’ the world and reach conclusive answers, EC accepts that any 
findings remain contestable due to their subjective nature.  This is unlikely to be viewed 
as a limitation by readers within social sciences.  However, it may be viewed as such 
by readers from positivist disciplines who claim that statistical objects are sufficiently 
external from the observer to not remain contestable.       
 
Similarly, EC would suffer criticism from those who subscribe to traditional definitions 
of ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’, i.e. given that EC argues that statistical realities are 
                                            
30 Such moral judgements have been made since the introduction of the Poor Laws to discern 
between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.  New Labour, for example, introduced Lone Parent 
Obligations (LPOs) in 2008 because of changing moral judgements made of their family structure and 
the ‘proper behaviour’ expected of lone parents.   
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constructed, would other academics examining the same social issue using EC 
consistently reach the same conclusions?  These limitations could simply be ignored 
as a reflection of the dominant positivist paradigm.  It could also be said that 
constructivism is not static or located, i.e. it changes with place and time.  It could also 
be said to exist in a reflexive relationship in that there is a bidirectional relationship 
between cause and effect and self-reference such that any claim of objectivity is false.  
 
Therefore, a more constructive approach may be to overcome the limitations through 
strong inductive reasoning where compelling propositions are posited that leads to the 
most probable conclusion.  As mentioned earlier, it is accepted that the conclusions 
will remain, by their nature, contestable.   
 
3.1.2. Conventions of employment and unemployment  
 
It is important to understand the key terminology or conventions adopted by New 
Labour to both define and measure social problems.  Employment and unemployment 
are both definitions of central importance to New Labour’s labour market policy.   
 
The existing academic literature suggests that New Labour adopted the administrative 
definitions already in use by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) when they entered 
office.  The definitions used by the ONS for the Labour Force Survey (LFS) are the 
international standards agreed in Resolution 1 of the 13th International Conferences of 
Labour Statisticians (1982) held by the International Labour Organisation.    
 
According to the ONS LFS classifications, the ‘employed’ comprised all persons above 
a specified age (16 years old) who during a specified brief period, either one week or 
one day, were in ‘paid employment’ or ‘self-employment’.  Employed and self-
employed individuals were ‘at work’ during the reference period when they performed 
‘some work’ for wage or salary, in cash or in kind (ONS, 2006).  It is very interesting 
to note that the for ONS ‘operational purposes’, the notion of ‘some work’ was 
interpreted as an individual working for at least one hour per week31.  It could be 
argued that with such a minimal work requirement the ONS classification of who is in 
                                            
31 As was discussed in Chapter 1, the emergence of ‘flexibility’ requires that the category of 
‘employment’ be as broadly defined as possible.   
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employment is overly generous about who could be counted; the result being a 
potentially higher number of individuals counted as being in employment.     
 
In the area of unemployment there is not a single clear definition/measure but a range 
of definitions/measures used.  Juxtaposed with who is classified as ‘employed’, these 
‘measures’ may only be indicative of labour market activity. However, as we will see 
later in this chapter and in Chapter 4, these limitations did not deter New Labour from 
continuing the use of the Claimant Count as a measure unemployment once they 
entered office.  Therefore, despite attempts at the objectification of employment and 
unemployment, the definitions/measures used by New Labour suffer serious 
weaknesses.  The consequence being that definitions/measures mask far more 
complex labour market dynamics than headline figures would otherwise suggest.   
 
The following chapter explores relevant quantitative macroeconomic and 
administrative data to understand what the statistical impact may have been according 
to such ‘headline figures’.  These statistics are discussed in the context of relevant 
qualitative sources through the focal theory of EC.   
 
Chapter 9 argues the New Labour’s labour market reforms were a catalyst to further 
casualisation of ‘employment’ in the UK labour market.  New Labour not only adopted 
existing neo-liberal conventions of ‘employment’ with its claimed virtuous nature, and 
‘unemployment’ with its associated vice-like nature, but, through the introduction of the 
New Deal programmes, Tax Credits and the National Minimum Wage went further 
than previous Conservative administrations by moving the line between notions of the 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.   
 
The ‘work first’ proposition of the majority of New Deal programmes appears to have 
pushed many into work while often failing to tackle underlying barriers to long-term 
sustained employment in full-time work.  Only the New Deal for Musicians appears to 
have adopted a serious approach to improving the human capital of participants 
(Cloonan, 2002; 2003).  In the place of full-time, permanent and secure employment, 
many of the formerly ‘unemployed’ were pushed towards self-employment32.  These 
                                            
32 It could be argued that self-employment is in reality a form of under-employment as hours and pay 
are not guaranteed.  This is demonstrated in this thesis’ findings in Chapter 9.  
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individuals survived only thanks to the introduction of Tax Credits and the National 
Minimum Wage.  The neo-liberal virtue of ‘work’ was progressed to the point at which 
ANY small amount of work supported by in-work benefits was preferable to out-of-
work benefits.   
 
These reforms were introduced under the guise of Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs) in conjunction with the mantra of ‘flexibility’.  It has been argued that labour 
market flexibility broadly conceived has led to the emergence of a new class of 
precarious employed working class individuals, ‘the precariat’33 (Standing, 2011). This 
chapter presents evidence that links welfare-to-work policies to this emerging group. 
  
3.1.3. Economics of Conventions and Statistics 
 
As Bovens et al so eloquently argued:   
 
“Policy evaluation is an inherently normative act [...] it is only a slight 
exaggeration to say, paraphrasing Clausewitz, that policy is nothing more than 
the continuation of politics by other means” (2006. pp 319-321).   
 
It could be argued this claim is true because the process of social policy evaluation is 
not a simple case of counting physical objects.  Unlike the physical world, the evaluator 
must make decisions about the very nature of the social ‘object’ or social problem they 
wish to evaluate, i.e. what is the object/problem, what is to be counted and how?  In 
the case of this thesis, who is to be counted as ‘unemployed’?   
 
Within these conventions are also attitudes: social expectations and moral values 
inextricably tied with these counted objects which positivism neither can nor does not 
seek to explain.  For example, the 1834 Poor Law Commission created within social 
policy discourse the moral judgements between those benefit recipients perceived as 
‘deserving’, and those perceived as ‘undeserving’.  The elderly, the young and 
disabled have traditionally been perceived as ‘deserving’ while the able bodied who 
do not work, and the voluntary unemployed have been judged to be ‘undeserving.  EC 
                                            
33 A combination of ‘precarious’ and ‘proletariat’.    
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has therefore been adopted to better explore these issues and associated moral 
judgements.   
 
 “Politicians use statistics in the same way that a drunk uses lamp-posts – for 
support rather than illumination” (Lang, 1900).    
 
Lang’s observation identifies the common mistrust of politicians using statistics; not to 
inform policy making, but to legitimise policy decisions already reached by other 
means.  As Desrosières (1998) highlights, the genesis and history of statistics is tightly 
interwoven with that of modern political economy: “As the etymology of the word 
shows, statistics is connected with the construction of the state, with its unification and 
administration” (p. 8).  Desrosières outlines how both statistics and political economy 
emerged from the enlightenment where scientific method led to a belief in the 
‘objectification’ of the social.  Inevitably, that which must be recorded for statistical 
analysis and use by policy makers must first be defined.  The social construction and 
definition of ‘social problems’ and use of statistical measures is therefore of great 
importance. 
 
Concepts such as ‘unemployment’ and the belief that ‘it is a problem’ can be argued 
to be social conventions which emerged as a result of industrialisation and modern 
employment relations (Desrosières, 1998).  New Labour’s development and 
appropriation of these and other conventions, and how they impacted their policy 
decisions and implementation, are the foci of this thesis.  EC is therefore appropriate 
as the focal theory of this thesis.    
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3.2. Evaluation theory  
 
3.2.1. Defining evaluation 
 
In the literature there exist a number of contrasting and often overlapping definitions 
as to what evaluation means (Dye, 1987; Parsons, 1995; Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996; 
Gerston, 1997; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Hill, 2005).  A helpful departure point is the 
definition by Dye that evaluation is “the objective, systematic, empirical examination 
of the effects ongoing policies and public programmes have on their targets in terms 
of the goals they are meant to achieve” (1987, p. 351).  This definition, however, does 
not appreciate the fact that many evaluation studies are ex ante (formative) or ex post 
(summative).  Ex ante studies are often used by policy makers during the development 
phase of the policy cycle to decide which course of action will maximise ‘outputs’ and 
‘outcomes’, for example, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is used extensively for 
infrastructure projects such as HS2 to ensure that the project’s benefits exceeds cost 
by a given margin or ratio.  Ex post evaluation, on the other hand, is carried out after 
a project or programme has been implemented to study the effects against the desired 
goals.   
 
Dye’s claims that evaluation is “objective” is very strong and difficult to support.  True 
objectivity is impossible, and as this thesis and its focal theory contends, language, 
meaning and significance are socially constructed by the policy maker and evaluator.  
This thesis argues that the conventions that policy makers assume/adopt in their 
definition of social problems and client groups determine the significance of specific 
social statistics as well as the methods underpinning their compilation.   
 
Perhaps a broader and more inclusive definition could be that evaluation is made up 
of two interconnected components:  
 
 The evaluation of policy and its constituent programmes; and  
 The evaluation of people who work in the organisations responsible for 
implementing policy and programmes (Parsons, 1995). 
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This definition is similar to those of others (Garston, 1997; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003).  
However, as has been warned; “the absence of fixed criteria for success and failure, 
which apply regardless of time and place, is a serious problem for anyone who wants 
to understand policy evaluation” (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996, p. 4, cited in Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003).  This lack of fixed success criteria is an important point as this thesis 
seeks to evaluate New Labour’s ALMP.  The conclusions reached, however well-
argued and supported by evidence, will inevitably remain contestable.  
 
3.2.2. The purpose of evaluation  
 
The purposes of evaluation, like attempts to define it, are also highly contested.  
Evaluation has traditionally been focused on assessing the achievement of the ‘three 
E’s’: economy, efficiency and effectiveness34 (HM Treasury et al, 2001; Micheli & 
Neely, 2010).  Under New Labour, however, there was also concern given to a fourth 
‘E’, equity, which addresses equality of access to services (Flynn, 2007).  
Nevertheless, it has been argued that areas of the public sector in which market-based 
strategies have been adopted have ‘economy’ and ‘productive efficiency’ innate within 
them, and that there was no need for any independent measurement or analysis of 
their costs (Flynn, 2007).  The belief being that using New Public Management and 
applying private sector principles the project would automatically deliver the three Es.  
I would be critical of any such an assertion and posit the numerous criticisms pitted 
against Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI).  These 
policy financing vehicles have been highly criticised for undermining the public service 
ethos, being used to keep borrowing off the public sector balance sheet, costing more 
due to private sector demands for high returns despite the very low exposure to risks, 
suffering scope and cost escalation requiring subsidy from the commissioning public 
body and creating a two-tier workforce in the public sector.  It has also been argued 
that: “The private sector borrows at higher rates than the public sector since 
governments can borrow at much lower rates. Audit Scotland has calculated these 
costs as adding £0.2-£0.3 million each year for every £10 million invested” (Unison, 
2012).  This is perhaps an excellent example of the accounting conventions which 
                                            
34 Economy is related to the cost of inputs and their economic use.  Efficiency relates to the cost of 
producing outputs.  Effectiveness relates the production of ‘results’, either outputs and/or outcomes.  
All three of which involve subjective judgement, especially about relevance and time spans included.   
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dominate public sector finances and which have a significant impact upon what is 
portrayed to the reader of accounts, i.e. what ‘counts’ on the books, the timespan35, 
the underlying and consequent judgements made.  This allows for alternative 
portrayals as the debt is profiled in a more favourable way.  Therefore, there is no 
evidence to suggest PPPs/PFIs are more efficient36 or offer value for money, but there 
are suggestions that the private companies involved in such relationships make 
unacceptably high profits37 (Unison, 2012).  There have also been a number of high 
profile PPP/PFI failures including Tube Lines, Metronet BCV and Metronet SSL38, RAF 
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft, National School of Government refurbishment, 
Norfolk and Norwich Hospital and the provision of military accommodation at 
Colchester Garrison (The Telegraph, 2011).  Based on this evidence, it can be 
concluded that ‘economy’ and ‘productive efficiency’ are not innate in any programme 
within the public or private sector and evaluation remains an important process for 
policy makers.  
 
During New Labour’s tenure in office, HM Treasury developed their own framework 
for the explaining the raison d’être of collecting information for evaluative purposes.  
HM Treasury argued that collecting performance information for evaluation fulfils a 
number of important purposes:  
 It can be indicative of organisational performance against the organisation’s 
aims and objectives39; 
 Good performance helps identify which policies work, which do not, and why.  
This permits policy makers to use available data and knowledge40 better which 
is critical to improving the performance of government as a whole; 
                                            
35 Time is very important: a five year government programme is portrayed very differently to one year 
public accounts. The same thing appears differently, and can be made to appear differently 
depending on the underpinning conventions adopted by those constructing the accounts.  
36 For example, the MOD Main Building PFI saved only an estimated £100,000 out of a total project 
cost of £746.1 million (NAO, 2002).  
37 For example, “At Fazakerley prison the National Audit Office reported that the net result is that the 
rate of return for the initial shareholders has tripled from 12.8% at the start to 39%.” (Unison, 2012). 
38 Three PPPs were created to modernise London Underground’s infrastructure. London Underground 
Limited was forced to buy 95% of Metronet’s outstanding debt obligations rather than paying over the 
30 years of the contract.  The Department of Transport (DfT) made a £1.7 billion grant available for 
this purpose (NAO, 2009).  
39 Usually expressed as performance against targets under New Public Management. 
40 However, NPM and performance management encourages those faced by targets to push at the 
margins, leading to a slow re-definition of meaning underpinning statistical appraisal.   
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 Such information can be used to support effective management, including 
business planning, monitoring and evaluation; and,  
 It also supports effective accountability by external stakeholders.  For instance, 
with appropriate performance information, Parliament and members of the 
public, etc. are able to demand performance improvements (HM Treasury et al, 
2001). 
 
The driving force behind such frameworks was the hegemony of New Public 
Management (NPM) which emerged in the 1980s and was encouraged by 
organisations such as the OECD (Noordegraaf, 2015)41.  Noordegraaf claims that 
NPM arose in reaction to feeling that government was no longer the agent of change.  
It was instead bureaucratic, insular and in fact a contributor to some economic 
problems.  Therefore, NPM, despite being a mishmash of ideas and theories rather 
than a single coherent strategy, sought to make public management more ‘business-
like’ and entrepreneurial leading to a more efficient use of resources and the 
emergence of empowered citizen-consumers (Noordegraaf, 2015).  The OECD claims 
that evaluation as performance management is a central part of NPM: 
 
“Over the past two decades, most OECD member countries have implemented 
reforms to modernise their public administrations with the aim of increasing 
efficiency and quality in service delivery. A cornerstone of these reforms has 
been the implementation of performance-oriented management of public 
organisations, including the use of performance assessments for individual 
staff, work groups and the entire organisation.  Performance assessment can 
allow for the recognition of individual and collective efforts in an objective and 
transparent manner.  Such practices can also clarify organisational goals for 
staff so that they can gain a better understanding of their role within the 
organisation (OECD, 2014. cited in Noordegraaf, 2015. p. 35).   
 
New Labour’s commitment to evidence based policy making (EBPM) where ‘what 
matters is what works’ (Labour, 1997) appears to fit firmly within their NPM narrative42.   
 
                                            
41 NPM has also allowed the Treasury to exercise strong central control of other government 
departments and reinforcing the significance of collective measurement to assess performance. 
42 In the academic literature, evaluation is also increasingly being linked to issues of democratic 
accountability due to the rise of New Public Management (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Hill, 2005).  
NPM, it is claimed, allows the electorate to better hold public bodies to account by providing 
numerical/quantitative measures of success.  
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However, despite its hegemony, some have argued that New Public Management had 
significant internal contradictions.  For instance, while stressing strong accountability, 
at the same time NPM attempts to reject traditional forms of top-down control (Hill, 
2005).  This top-down control became strongly linked with New Labour’s obsession 
with target setting43.  
 
Similar arguments have been made by Freidson (2001 cited in Noordegraaf, 2015) 
who highlights the multiple management logics of NPM:  
 
“On the one hand [NPM] favours top-down managerial control, with clear 
targets, cost-conscious decisions and predictable production.  On the other 
hand it favours bottom-up consumer-based incentives, with flexible production 
and dynamic innovation, including market development. […] On the one hand, 
it embodies managerial control, on the other hand consumer44 control 
(Noordegraaf, 2015. p. 34).   
 
It has been argued that towards the end of New Labour’s time in power the 
management and evaluation public services provision was trending away from NPM 
towards concepts of ‘governance’ within a citizen-driven45 provision of public services 
(Bovaird & Löffler, 2009).   
 
Boaz et al (2008) argued that evaluation is closely linked with the increased use of 
evidence-based policy and practice.  With this in mind “it is both desirable and practical 
to ground policy and practice in reliable knowledge about social problems and what 
works in tackling them” (Bovaird & Löffler, 2009. p. 327).  They also note that there 
are four main uses of evaluation research being used to improve public policy and 
practice: 
 
 to design and develop policy (also referred to as ‘ex ante evaluation’ or ‘option 
appraisal’; 
                                            
43 Target setting during New Labour’s time in office has been argued to result in excessive 
managerialism (Flynn, 2007), ‘gaming’ (Hood, 2005; 2006), unintended consequences and constant 
organisational change (Fielding, 2006), and overwork (Bunting, 2005).    
44 This is derived from market-based principles that stress the significance of rational individual 
behaviour. Economics of Conventions stresses the opposite, i.e. that the formation of rational 
behaviour is based on convention.  
45 However, it is important to distinguish between citizens (who is a voter that declares political 
preferences) from a consumer (who is a client who declares market preferences).   
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 to assess the impact of policy interventions (also referred to as ‘ex post 
evaluation’); 
 to improve policy implementation (referred to as ‘on-going evaluation’ or 
‘monitoring’); 
 to identify tomorrow’s issues (Bovaird & Löffler. 2009. p. 328). 
 
However, as with all evaluation it has been highlighted that “unlike a sausage factory, 
the output of public agencies are not so well-defined and quantified – or ‘evaluated’ – 
and what actually counts as success and failure is a matter of controversy and conflict” 
(Parsons, 2005. p. 461).   
 
3.2.3. Summative evaluation (Ex post evaluation) 
 
Although evaluation can occur at various points of the policy cycle, such as during 
policy formulation (ex ante evaluation) and during implementation (ex nunc 
evaluation).  This thesis focuses on ex post evaluation due to the subject matter’s now 
historical nature.  Ex post means literally means ‘from after’ and is therefore based on 
actual historical results rather than forecasts. Summative, or ex post evaluation 
focuses on evaluating the outputs/outcomes46 of a course of action after the course of 
action has been implemented, for example, following the end of a project or 
programme47.   
 
Just like evaluation conducted at other stages of the policy cycle, there is no 
consensus as to an ‘ideal’ methodology.  Some writers have argued, however, that 
evaluation carried out at this stage of the cycle has gained prominence because it is 
increasingly seen as part of the process of policy learning, i.e. actors involved in 
evaluation discovering the lessons about which policy instruments have ‘succeeded’ 
or ‘failed’ and in what circumstances, which have enjoyed public support, and an 
examination of the goals of programmes including the underlying assumptions that 
informed policy goals (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). It has also been argued that ex post 
evaluation can also include a multiplist approach, i.e. because there is no ‘correct’ 
policy option or evaluation, we should seek to use multiple measures from several 
                                            
46 Outputs are usually direct changes, e.g. achieving x GCSEs, while outcomes are considered to be 
broader effects, e.g. less time spent unemployed.  
47 Although effects are rarely immediate, evaluation should occur when it is expected that positive 
effects will be realised. 
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different approaches and methods (Cook, 1985).  This seems plausible and seems to 
echo the Value for Money (VFM) Framework used by the National Audit Office and 
reflects a more business-oriented government48.  
 
More recently, the move toward social experimentation (including comparative 
analysis with other countries acting as control groups) has been noted. This includes 
the use of meta-analysis, and Monte Carlo simulation in Cost Benefit Analysis49 
(Carlson, 2011).  Meta-analysis is the arguably rigorous, systematic collection of all 
studies in an area that estimate the effects of a specific policy on a particular outcome.  
Evaluators then standardise the impact estimates (i.e. ensure that measures are in a 
similar format) presented in each study, and then systematically analysing the effect 
sizes50 (Carlson, 2011).  However, as this thesis argues, the definitions adopted and 
their underlying social and statistical conventions will carry through to any results, i.e. 
different interpretations of behaviour will generate different measures. For example, 
the desirability of female employment varies between Roman Catholic and Protestant 
countries and whether it is measured, how it is measured and the social policy aimed 
to promote will vary as a result.   
 
3.2.4. Measures and indicators 
 
Evaluation methodology generally has a number of main approaches.  These can 
include techniques which measure the costs of a policy in relation to benefits and 
utility, techniques which measure performance, and techniques which use 
experiments to evaluate policy and programmes (Parsons, 1995).  
 
The use of target setting and evaluation in NPM tends to necessitate the use of 
‘measures’ and ‘indicators’ of performance.  However, across the literature there is no 
widely accepted definition and the two terms seem to be often used interchangeably.  
Measures often refer to quantitative variables, for example, in the area of education, 
                                            
48 Recent shifts towards market-based forms of evaluation appear to focus less on the public good 
(perhaps even denying its existence) and instead assuming a liberal rational-choice basis to the 
development and thus evaluation of policy.  
49 Layard & Glaister (1994) Cost Benefit Analysis offers a useful and thorough discussion of the uses 
and limitations of Cost Benefit Analysis. 
50 Discussed at great depth in Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Cooper, Hedges & Valentine, 2009.  
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the percentage of school leavers at a particular school achieving 5 GCSEs grades A*-
C.  Indicators on the other hand appear broader and are instead suggestive of change 
that may be occurring, i.e. they are ‘indicative’ of what may be occurring.  An example 
of this may be the qualitative responses from the employers who employ the same 
school leavers when asked about their work-readiness51.      
 
It has been argued that performance measures provide an excellent proxy for profits 
as a measure of success when evaluating public sector outputs/outcomes (Jackson, 
1998)52.  However, Jackson clarifies that to work well, performance indicators (PIs) 
should ideally have nine characteristics.  They should be consistent over time and 
between units, be comparing like with like, be clear and well defined, not be 
independent of the environment in which the decisions are made, be comprehensive 
and reflect important areas of concern, be limited to key areas of performance, be 
relevant to the specific needs and conditions of the organisation, and, be realistic in 
the targets they set (Jackson, 1988)53.  It could be argued that indicators also offer the 
same utility to the public sector manager so long as the same nine requirements would 
also apply.  
 
This thesis draws upon a range of measures and indicators including:  
 
 Measures of economics growth; 
 Percentage rates of unemployment (as measured by the Claimant Count); 
 Percentage rates of Labour Force Survey unemployment;  
 Percentage rates of unemployment vs targets; 
 Percentage participation rates, inflows and outflows rates on the various New 
Deal programmes;  
 Percentage rates of unemployment amongst key client groups, such as young 
people, those over 50, lone parents, etc. including inflows and outflows; 
 Percentage rates of long-term unemployment (LTU), especially amongst key 
client groups; 
 The costs of various welfare reforms including programme costs; 
 Rates of Incapacity Benefit claims, including inflows and outflows; 
 The percentage rates of claims of other benefits aimed at the working-age 
population, such as Tax Credits. 
 
                                            
51 Assuming this is the objective of education.  
52 Assuming that market mechanisms happily transfer across from the private to the public sector.   
53 However, behaviour often changes in response to a requirement and/or definition is reframed to 
force a profile of improvement.  
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The methods of analysis of these measures and indicators is set out in the research 
design section later in this chapter.  
 
3.2.5. Criticisms of evaluation 
 
Despite its prominence in informing current and future social policies, evaluation has 
been subject to a number of related and strong criticisms.  These range from the 
misuse of evaluation to the validity and reliability of evaluation findings.  These 
criticisms have important implications for this thesis and will be discussed in greater 
depths within Chapters 4 to 10.   
 
3.2.5.1. Lack of trust and demoralisation of professions 
 
It has been argued that far from pushing up standards within public services, 
evaluation of the ‘untrustworthy professions54’ has had the opposite effect by severely 
damaging morale (Power, 1997; Barton, 2008).  While New Labour was in power it 
has been argued that they were attempting to colonise the professions and introduce 
organisational isomorphism through the use of audit and evaluation as tools to ensure 
the ‘right’ type of professional development takes place (Barton, 2008).  There was 
also a demonstrable lack of trust in the public sector professions to self-regulate, and 
that explicit threats were made against professionals to ensure their acquiescence55.  
This, it was argued, will ultimately limit the vision, scope and confidence of the 
professions and that service users will suffer (ibid).   
 
This presents a very strong argument that central control through evaluation 
processes can, in due course, damage the professions, and especially their ability to 
develop their professional knowledge and competences without being continually 
micro-managed or undermined.  As others have rightly argued:  
 
“From time to time it may be desirable for government to intervene and try to re-
align the way a group of social professionals perform their services, on the grounds 
of national interest, such as cost to the public exchequer, or perceived future 
predicaments.  But such intervention should be cautious and short-lived, for 
                                            
54 i.e. teachers, Doctors, nurses, social workers, emergency services, etc.  
55 “If you are unwilling or unable to work the modern agenda, the government will have to look to other 
partners to take your role” (Blair, 1998. cited in Barton, 2008. p .5).  
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inevitably it distorts the ways in which the social professionals relate to those whom 
they seek to serve and weakens their capacity to make their own decisions” 
(Bassey, 2005. p. 7).       
 
Bassey continued that intervention in education, and especially an obsession with 
target setting under New Labour, reached the point of restricting children’s 
development and was especially destructive for teacher morale.   
 
The arguments advanced by Bassey (2005) and Barton (2008) are especially 
convincing.  There is a reasonable expectation that members of any profession should 
be given a certain level of trust, independence and respect due to the training they 
have received and the hard-won experience they have gained.  It is, therefore, 
interesting to compare the levels of audit and evaluation between professions such as 
teaching and nursing under New Labour with professions such as medicine and law56 
which were also commissioned to provide services at public expense.  It can also be 
said that there are competing value structures underpinning the evaluation process 
following the introduction of NPM, i.e. market judgement versus a social judgement.   
 
3.2.5.2. The symbolic use of evaluation 
 
In addition to the claimed motive of improving public service delivery, and linked to the 
social construction of meaning, it has been argued that evaluation has been used to 
fulfil a more symbolic role (White & De Charrnatony, 2008).  It has been claimed that 
the extensive use of evaluation formed part of New Labour’s re-branding and 
promotion of being seen as the party of ‘competence’, an explicit break from the image 
of ‘Old Labour’ (ibid).  This symbolic use of policy making and evaluation appears well 
supported by other authors over a number of years.  Harrop (1992), for instance, 
argues that the symbolic nature of policies should be considered; it may be that policy 
outcomes are best understood as involving ‘symbolic’ rather than purely ‘substantive’ 
outcomes.  As Dye (1987) echoes regarding the use of symbolism more generally: 
 
“Policies do more than effect change in societal conditions; they also hold people 
together and maintain an orderly state.  For example, a government ‘war on 
poverty’ may not have any significant impact on the poor, but it reassures moral 
                                            
56 Through Legal Aid.  
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persons, the affluent as well as the poor that government ‘cares’ about poverty.” 
(p. 355).   
 
A related criticism of evaluation is advanced by Hanberger (2001); evaluators must be 
aware that evaluation can be used ‘strategically’ to legitimise a certain course of action 
being advanced by politicians.  A good way to be aware of this, Hanberger advises, is 
to pay attention to the rhetoric, as well as the views, goals and solutions presented in 
official documents used in public policy-making to see whether legitimacy57 is being 
sought.  Taylor & Balloch (2005) similarly claim: “Evaluation research should be 
understood as inherently political [...]. While most commentators recognise that 
evaluation operates within political constraints, we go further and suggest that 
evaluation itself is socially constructed and politically articulated,” (p. 1).   
 
Therefore, when researching for and writing this thesis, care has been taken to be 
aware and critical of the symbolic use of evaluation by others.  Where assertions have 
been made, data has been sought to judge whether such claims are valid and 
justifiable.  The motives of writers have been assessed wherever possible.   
  
3.2.5.3. Establishing cause and effect 
 
A very strong and frequent criticism is that cause and effect cannot be adequately 
established between, for example, a government programme and its intended 
consequences58.  This is especially so given the complex and multi-dimensional 
nature of modern society (Virtanen & Uusikyla, 2004).  Virtanen & Uusikyla continue 
that a clear linear causal process between programmes and perceived effects cannot 
be established.  We can, at best, argue that a programme interferes with a complex 
‘intervention field’ whose reactions produce effects.  This point is strongly supported 
by evidence from Walker (2001) who examined attempts to evaluate NDYP, NDLP, 
NDDP and Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA).  There was, according to 
Walker, extensive ‘policy contamination and externalities’ such as the introduction of 
the National Minimum Wage and Working Families Tax Credit which overlapped with 
the objectives of the aforementioned programmes.  All of which were introduced within 
                                            
57 i.e. Policy makers are trying to convince the electorate of the necessity of their decisions.  
58 Also known as the fallacy of Post hoc ergo propter hoc (after and therefore because of it). Just 
because two events occur concurrently, even if on a regular basis, it does not mean the two have or 
share a causal link.    
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a broader environment of increasing economic growth and falling unemployment.  
Walker argues that only through experimentation and formal impact analysis can 
effective evaluation take place.  This did not occur under New Labour, leading to 
evaluation that was cumbersome, costly, inefficient, slow and scientifically ineffectual 
(Walker, 2001).   
 
These are all strong criticisms but, as Bovens et al warn, “policy evaluation is an 
inherently normative act” (2006. p. 319).  Therefore, any statistical analysis attempting 
to establish cause and effect between New Labour’s reforms and effects on the UK 
labour market will inevitably be tainted by the social and statistical conventions 
adopted by the evaluator.  This thesis fully accepts this and that any conclusions 
reached will remain contested.   
 
3.2.5.4. The poor use of evaluation  
 
Finally, it has been argued that evaluation has been poorly used by policy makers.  
Often previous evaluations have not been the starting point for new policy decisions 
(Weiss, 1999).  According to Weiss, policy makers face the conflicting pressures of 
special interests, ideologies, excessive amounts of information and strict institutional 
constraints.  Overall, Weiss is full of praise for evaluation: “it challenges old ideas, 
provides new perspectives and helps to re-order the policy agenda” (p. 468), but 
equally he warns, “evaluators will never take the politics out of policy making” and “[...] 
for evaluators to interpose their reading of the issues and their preferences into the 
system would re-kindle the old debate about the incompatibility of democracy and 
expertise” (p. 483)59.  The sentiments of Weiss are echoed by Radnor & McGuire 
(2004) who argued that performance management (which includes evaluation) in the 
public sector was closer to fiction than fact.  Evaluation has often had excessive focus 
on measurement and diagnosis with no room for interaction and ownership of the 
evaluation process by those within it (ibid, 2004).   
 
                                            
59 Weiss appears to be appealing to evaluation as offering an objective view of the world. As this 
thesis argues, this is impossible.  Evaluation is inherently political and driven by social and statistical 
conventions, moral expectations and interpretations of behaviour.  
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In light of these criticisms, this thesis exposes how evaluation interacts with policy 
processes to reshape both the ‘problem’ and its ‘solution’ driven by the underpinning 
social and statistical conventions of policy makers.  This thesis seeks to make a 
contribution to policy learning for both academia and makers of social policy.  
 
3.3. Research Design and Methodology   
 
Being mindful of the body of research, this thesis attempts to answer the research 
question: What were the effects of New Labour’s active labour market policy on rates 
of social dependency in the working age population during their time in office?60   
To answer the research question, this thesis adopted predominately quantitative 
research methods.  Quantitative data was collected to observe the statistical history 
and statistical effect of New Labour’s labour market reforms.   
 
Given that economic/labour market statistics are the current way that New Labour’s 
record has typically been evaluated, this thesis explores the same social and 
administrative statistics from the time.  This also made sense due to the now historic 
nature of the New Labour period in government.  The remainder of this chapter lays 
out this research design.   
 
3.3.1. Data collection 
 
Secondary quantitative data was collected from various administrative data sets, 
including those held by the Office for National Statistics (ONS)61, The Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the 
Low Pay Commission (LPC).  Many government departments collect data and feed 
this data directly to the ONS who compile the statistical returns and also provide 
summary analysis.  For international comparison, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank also collect appropriate datasets and these were accessed for 
this thesis.  As most of the data used includes the entire UK population being studied, 
not just a sample, it can be said to be highly representative.  
                                            
60 However, as this thesis will show, an important supplementary question emerges: Is it possible 
evaluate the effect of New Labour’s labour market policy? Especially using social statistics where 
categories depend on social conventions.  
61 A number of government agencies feed their own data into the ONS.  
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Administrative data sourced from independent governmental organisations, such as 
the ONS, can be argued to have data which is standardised, has integrity and can be 
used with confidence.  Data from the DWP and HMRC should also be regarded as 
being of equal quality and consistency as their statistical returns to the ONS must 
conform to their standards.  Data collected from organisations such as, for example, 
outsourced providers of welfare-to-work programmes, will also be required to conform 
to ONS standards in their statistical returns.  Some ONS datasets are, by their nature, 
averages of each month’s measure of indicators/measures.  It could be argued that 
this averaging creates only minimal loss of data.   
 
The use of secondary data that is pre-anonymised and aggregated and already in the 
public domain negates the vast majority of ethical considerations that would have 
arisen through primary data collection.    
 
Data was collected as early as possible in the research process.  There was 
insufficient time to conduct primary research collection.  In addition, primary research 
would also not have been appropriate given the historic nature of the topic being 
researched62.   
 
When it came to the collection of qualitative data, a range of collection methods were 
considered, such as surveys of service users, interviews with Job Centre staff, and 
elite interviews with key New Labour policy makers to gain first-hand accounts of the 
development and implementation of New Labour’s welfare reform agenda.  However, 
these methods proved difficult to operationalise: Labour left office in May of 2010, only 
7 months after this Doctoral project was started. Therefore, it no longer made sense 
to interview service users at the point this project reached the stage of data collection.  
Equally, when the Job Centre was approached, few staff remained who had worked 
there at the time of New Labour’s due to high rates of staff-turnover.  Finally, despite 
a number of approaches to the Labour Party, individual Labour MPs and the 
Department for Work and Pensions, no interviewees were willing to be interviewed.  It 
                                            
62 However, analysis conducted of secondary data was of an original nature.  
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has, therefore, been necessary to rely upon a systematic review of secondary 
qualitative data.   
 
Qualitative data was collected from existing academic research, non-academic 
research and research reports conducted by the DWP, HMRC and LPC.  Databases 
such as Google Scholar, Sage Journals, Wiley Journals and Oxford University Press 
Journals were searched between September 2009 and July 2016.  Key search terms 
included “New Labour”, “Welfare reform”, “Active Labour Market Policy”, “New Deal”, 
“Tax Credits”, and “National Minimum Wage”.  Initial literature searches allowed for 
the snowballing of related research to ensure that the systematic review as was 
comprehensive as possible.   
 
3.3.2. Quantitative data analysis  
 
3.3.2.1. Data preparation  
 
Data was downloaded in Excel format.  Analysis was done in Excel 2013 which had 
been upgraded to include the ‘Analysis ToolPak’.  No weighting is required as it is 
assumed that, for example, the measures of ‘unemployment’ were taken from entire 
UK Labour Force63.     
 
To provide a prima facie analysis of the quantitative data collected a range of statistical 
tests were employed to test causality, and the strengths of causal relationships.  
Analysis included standard descriptive statistics such as percentages and proportions, 
rates and ratios, and where appropriate measures of central tendency (mean, mode 
and median) and measures of dispersion (range, inter-quartile range and standard 
deviation).   
 
Tests of Correlation measure the strength of association between defined variables.  
In the case of a perfect positive correlation, a value of +1 would be calculated 
                                            
63 In this case this was defined by the ONS as those aged between 16 and 64 who are economically 
active, i.e. in work or seeking work.  However, the label ‘economically active’ is replete with 
conventional assumptions/normative conventions of what is appropriate/expected behaviour. These 
categories change as the underpinning conventions change. For example, the abolition of the 
compulsory retirement age in 2011 has since changed who is to be counted by this 
category/definition.  
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demonstrating a perfect relationship between two variables, i.e. for every increase in 
X there is an equal increase in Y.  A perfect negative correlation or inverse correlation 
would be a value of -1 and demonstrate a perfect inverse relationship between two 
variables, i.e. for every increase in X there is an equal decrease in Y.  A positive or 
inverse correlation suggests causation between one variable and another.     
 
Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient is the most commonly used test of 
correlation.  The value of the correlation coefficient is called ‘r’.  For the purposes of 
this thesis this was calculated using Microsoft Excel.  Figure 3.1 below shows 
graphically what various correlations look like.  
 
Figure 3.1: Examples of Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient 
 
 
Using the Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient, a hypothesis test can be 
carried out to determine whether, given the available data, the result is statistically 
significant.  This hypothesis test is conducted using 4 steps:  
 
Step 1 
State the hypothesis and null hypothesis (H₀ and H₁).  
Step 2 
State the level of significance and critical value.  
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Step 3 
Calculate the test statistic. 
Step 4  
Compare the test statistic to the critical value and conclusion.  
 
3.3.2.1.1. Time series decomposition 
 
Time series decomposition is the statistical process of deconstructing a time series 
into its notional components.  Quarterly economic data is usually composed of: 
T = the trend component, which reflects the long term progression of the time series 
S = the seasonal component, called seasonal variation or deviation depending on how 
it is calculated 
C = cyclical component, reflecting non-periodic fluctuations, explainable as the 
economic/business cycle.  
R or I = Residual, error or irregular component, describes random or residuals after 
other components have been removed.  
 
Time series decomposition can be usefully applied to labour market data, for example, 
to estimate to what extent there is seasonal unemployment or to estimate long-term 
trends.  
 
3.3.2.2. Qualitative data analysis 
 
Qualitative data analysis was done through a systematic review.  A systematic review 
is defined as:  
“A review of a clearly formulated question that uses systematic and explicit 
methods to identify, select and critically appraise relevant research, and to 
collect and analyse data from the studies that are included in the review,” 
(Cochrane Collaboration, 2014. cited in Siddaway, n.d. p. 1).   
 
A systematic review, therefore, aims to identify, critically evaluate and integrate the 
findings of all relevant, high-quality individual studies within the field the study.   
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3.3.3. Research ethics  
 
There were few potential ethical issues relating to the research conducted in this 
thesis.  The secondary data used was already anonymised ensuring no potential 
harm64 to the subjects of the research used.  The majority of data and research used 
was also already in the public domain therefore requiring no informed consent from 
individuals or organisations.  Where additional data was required, this was gained 
through Freedom of Information Requests and the due process that this entails.  Given 
the anonymity of the data, The Data Protection Act 1998 requirements for the 
processing of personal information did not apply.  Care was taken to maintain 
copyright and all sources were referenced appropriately in accordance with academic 
convention.  
 
Research stakeholders were considered as part of the ethical considerations of thesis.  
According to Kumar (2011) research stakeholders usually fall into three broad 
categories: 
 
• The research participants or subjects. All those with direct or indirect 
involvement in a research study are considered research participants. This can 
include individuals, groups or communities; 
• The researcher. Anyone who collects information for the purpose of 
understanding, consolidation, enhancement and development of professional 
knowledge, adhering to the accepted code of conduct is a researcher; 
• The funding body. This provides funds for the specific research project.   
 
According to Kumar, each category of stakeholders may have different interests, 
perspectives, purposes, aims and motivations that could affect the research activity.  
Because of the use of secondary data, there were no direct research participants who 
could be considered research stakeholders.  As the researcher, I have conducted the 
research of this thesis alone, but recognise the importance of this thesis for my own 
career progression within academia.  I do not foresee any conflict of interest emanating 
                                            
64 Harm includes: “not only hazardous medical experiments but also any social research that might 
involve such things as discomfort, anxiety, harassment, invasion of privacy, or demeaning or 
dehumanizing procedures” (Bailey, 1978. p. 384. cited in Kumar, 2011. p. 245). 
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from this thesis. Research will be disseminated in accordance with University of 
Warwick regulations.  I do not perceive any other conflicts of interest as I am employed 
by an organisation external to organisations that are the subject of this thesis, i.e. 
Labour Party, The Department for Work and Pensions, HMRC and the Low Pay 
Commission.   
 
3.4. The structure of this thesis 
 
The next chapter, Chapter 4, outlines the UK Labour market in historical context.  It 
looks at macro-economic statistical trends and also emerging issues in the UK labour 
market that New Labour inherited.  These trends include de-industrialisation and the 
emergence of ‘flexibility’, phenomena which appear to have had a dramatic effect on 
the UK labour market and people’s experience of it.  Chapter 4 is a broad examination 
of the UK labour market once New Labour had entered office to establish the broad 
effect of New Labour’s labour market policy from 1997 to 2010 using the methodology 
outlined in this chapter.  It considers macro-economic statistical trends such as 
Claimant Count/ILO Unemployment, long-term unemployment, levels of economic 
activity/inactivity.  These labour market measures/indicators are examined using the 
quantitative methodology outlined in this chapter against other macro-economic 
measures/indicators to clarify whether any causal link can be established as 
suggested by traditional economic theory.  These measures and indicators are 
discussed with relation to their construction, the process by these categories are 
constructed and how they have changed over time.   
 
Chapters 5 examines New Labour’s active labour market policy (ALMP) aimed at the 
‘young people’ client group65, specifically the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) and 
the New Deal for Musicians (NDfM).  The category of ‘young people’ which underpins 
these and previous policies is discussed, especially how changes to out-of-work 
benefit conditionality has altered how many are counted by this category.  The NDYP 
and NDfM receive quantitative and qualitative evaluation to examine their effect on the 
‘young people’ client group and, perhaps most importantly, how the structure of these 
programmes alters how young people are categorised.   
                                            
65 Defined by New Labour as those aged 18-24 years old.  
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Chapter 6 discusses New Labour’s ALMP aimed at the long-term unemployed not 
included in either the NDYP or the New Deal for Over 50s (ND50+), specifically the 
New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed (NDLTU) also known as the New Deal for 
25 plus (ND25+).  This programme is evaluated using quantitative and qualitative 
methods to determine what effect it had on this client group.  The latter part of this 
chapter examines the short-lived successor to all New Deal programmes, the Flexible 
New Deal (FND).  The FND was important in that it removed the artificial barriers 
between client groups and was aimed at all individuals categorised as long-term 
unemployed.  However, its termination in 2011 prevented it having time to embed and 
begin to deliver cost-effective labour market activation. 
 
Chapter 7 is aimed at two closely related client groups, the ‘disabled’ and those aged 
over 50.  New Labour’s ALMP aimed at these two groups included the New Deal for 
Disabled People (NDDP) and the New Deal for the 50 plus (ND50+).  Of key 
importance in this chapter is how the definition of the category ‘disabled’ has been 
constructed over time, but changes to conditionality of/eligibility to benefits like 
Incapacity Benefit and its successor Employment & Support Allowance (ESA) have 
changed who is categorised as ‘disabled’.  Those aged over 50 are also closely linked 
to the ‘disabled’ group due to age-related illnesses, but also other forces encouraging 
changes to the category of ‘disabled’ to facilitate early-retirement.  The effect of de-
industrialisation on this process is also particularly important.  
 
Chapter 8 explores New Labour’s ALMP aimed at client groups who are defined by 
their family structure, specifically lone parents and their unemployed partners.  New 
Labour’s ALMP aimed at these groups included the New Deal for Lone Parents 
(NDLP) and the New Deal for Partners (NDP).  Underpinning these two programmes 
were important moral judgements (social conventions) about the correct behaviour of 
lone parents and their unemployed partners.  This chapter explores how these 
judgements also changed over the course of their time in office.  
 
Chapter 9 examines New Labour’s policies designed “To encourage work and reward 
effort” (Labour, 1997. p. 11). These include the National Minimum Wage (NMW) and 
the various Tax Credit programmes New Labour deployed as part of their ALMP and 
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anti-poverty strategies.  As this chapter shows, the NMW and Tax Credit programmes, 
as part of New Labour’s efforts to support labour market flexibility, can be linked to 
increasingly insecure employment and underemployment.    
 
Chapter 10 summarises the key findings of this thesis, proposes conclusions and 
explores a range of policy implications. 
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CHAPTER 4 – The UK labour market under New Labour 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and examines UK labour market statistics before and during 
New Labour’s time in power.  This chapter argues that these statistics do not reflect 
social objects or an objective world, but instead reflect the social and statistical 
conventions adopted by policy makers to both evaluate and design social policy.  
However, given their use by policy makers it is still important to try and see the picture 
policy makers saw in these statistics.     
 
4.2. Rates of ‘Unemployment’ 
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, ‘unemployment’ exists only as a social 
construct underpinned by a set of social and statistical conventions with associated 
moral judgements/expectations.  New Labour continued the administrative definitions 
of unemployment they inherited in 1997.  These include The Claimant Count and ILO 
Unemployment, and are discussed below.  
 
The Claimant Count has been used as an indicator of labour market activity since the 
1970’s (DETINI, 2014; ONS, 2014).  The Claimant Count differs from ILO 
Unemployment in that it counts those, and only those, individuals claiming the main 
unemployment-related benefits.  Since October 1996 this has been the monthly 
number of people claiming Jobseeker's Allowance.  This data is collected by the DWP 
through the Job Centre network and subsequently passed to the ONS for collation and 
further analysis.  The existing academic literature suggests that New Labour continued 
the administrative definitions already in use by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
when they entered office in 1997.  Graph 4.1 below shows the Claimant Count during 
New Labour’s time in office.  The graph indicates that from the date of New Labour’s 
entering office in Q2 1997 the Claimant Count decreased with number of claimants 
falling from over 1.6 million to a low of 815,167 in Q1 2005, and a record low of 782,967 
in Q1 2008 (ONS, 2014).  However, the Claimant Count increases rapidly to a peak of 
1.607 million in Q4 2009 following the 2007 Credit Crunch, ensuing financial crisis and 
recession.   
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Taken that individuals are only included in the Claimant Count when they claim JSA, 
the issue of recycling is also important. This is where individuals leave JSA to enter 
short-term and/or insecure work66 only to be ejected from employment again. The job 
was temporary and they lacked the skills/qualifications/experience/attitude to maintain 
employment (Carpenter, 2006; Hill, 2012). Carpenter found many individuals who 
would cease to be counted by the Claimant Count, but never found well-paid and/or 
full-time positions which would allow them to escape financial insecurity.  This issue is 
discussed further in Chapter 9.    
 
 
                                            
66 And/training schemes.  
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Graph 4.1: Quarterly Claimant Count (Thousands) 
Source: ONS (2014) 
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However, as a measure of individuals without work it could be argued that the Claimant 
Count is not a measure of unemployment at all, but an example of categorical data.  
As was discussed in the previous chapter, a category is defined by certain conventions 
of quantification which are underpinned by social convention and moral 
expectations67.  It can be argued, therefore, that the Claimant Count was conceived to 
focus on what was felt to be important to policy makers, i.e. the number of individuals 
in receipt of Job Seeker’s Allowance.  It does not directly ‘count’ an individual’s relation 
to work, but counts an individual’s relation to claiming welfare benefits68.  
 
There are other important boundaries to the Claimant Count category.  For instance, 
it does not include those ineligible, unable or unwilling to claim unemployment-related 
benefits, even though they may be out of work69.  Examples may be recent immigrants, 
individuals who have not made sufficient National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and 
individuals living off savings while out of work.  These are groups who are potentially 
at the precarious margins of the UK labour market and are yet not recognised as 
unemployed when out of work, and may be not able to claim sufficient out-of-work 
benefits to survive.  Changes to eligibility/conditionality can also dramatically change 
who can claim, and therefore be counted by the Claimant Count.  Such changes in 
conditionality can, therefore, radically alter the statistical outcome over time, 
undermining any claim that the Claimant Count accurately reflects labour market 
conditions.   
 
It could also be argued that the Claimant Count has moral judgements interwoven with 
social conventions; moral judgements reinforced since before the 1834 Poor Law.  
JSA equally draws a sharp distinction between those who are categorised as the 
‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor.  This can be seen in the eligibility requirement 
that claimants of JSA must be actively seeking work, which was policed through the 
monitoring of job search activity.  As outlined in the 1997 Labour Party Manifesto, there 
is a clear expectation that those who are capable of work should actively seek it as 
                                            
67 i.e. What is felt to be the appropriate behaviour of those who do not work 
68 The key ‘social problem’ appears to be that the individual is a claiming welfare rather than, more 
directly, their lack of work.   
69 There is also a strong gender difference in who is counted in the Claimant Count. Women, and 
especially female lone-parents, have different benefit eligibility and therefore may be without work, 
actively seeking work, but living off other out-of-work benefits like Income Support and Housing 
Benefit.  This is discussed further in Chapter 8.  
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part of their labour market activation70 (Labour, 1997).  Conversely, the ‘deserving 
poor’ were individuals who were in need of welfare support, but had been judged by 
policy makers as worthy of financial support without the same expectation of finding 
and staying in work.  For instance, lone parents with children below a certain age71 
were eligible for Income Support (IS) while the long-term sick and/or disabled were 
eligible for Incapacity Benefit (IB).   
 
It seems clear that, rather than questioning the social and statistical conventions and 
the moral judgements inherited from the preceding Conservative government72, New 
Labour adopted them wholeheartedly, maintained them, and in some cases tightened 
conditionality over the course of their time in office.    
 
An alternative claimed measure of ‘unemployment’ used by New Labour was that 
collected through the Labour Force Survey (LFS)73, and often referred to as ILO 
Unemployment.  The LFS asked individuals within the sample if they feel that they 
meet the ILO internationally agreed definition of the unemployed.  The survey defined 
the unemployed as:   
 
 Being without a job, and have actively sought work in the last four weeks and 
are available to start work in the next two weeks; or, 
 Being out of work, have found a job and are waiting to start it in the next two 
weeks (ONS, 2014). 
 
                                            
70 Explained in Chapter 1. 
71 As discussed in Chapter 9, this age changed over time reflecting increasing obligations placed on 
lone parents.  Once the child reached the age set by policy makers the expectations placed on lone-
parents changed and they were expected to actively seek work and gain some form of employment.  
Poorly paid and/or part-time employment was then subsidised through the tax credits system.     
72 Given claims that the Third Way was a radical departure from Neo Liberalism it would have been 
expected that New Labour would have challenged these moral judgements and conventions.  
73 The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is the main source for information on the labour market in the UK. It 
is a survey of a nationally representative sample (selected at random) of approximately 120,000 
people aged 16 and over in around 53,000 households.  Each household is interviewed five times, at 
three monthly intervals by the Office for National Statistics. The survey covers people resident in 
private households, National Health Service (NHS) accommodation and student halls of residence. It 
does not cover any other communal establishments. LFS interviews are conducted continuously 
throughout the year (ONS, 2014).  
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Using the LFS participant responses, the ONS calculated the unemployment rate by 
dividing the unemployment level74 for those aged 16 and over by the total number of 
economically active people aged 16 to 6475.  This age bracket has since had its upper 
age limit removed with the abolition of the compulsory retirement age.  
 
ILO Unemployment, although potentially more inclusive than the Claimant Count, still 
reflects a statistical construct underpinned by particular social conventions.  Firstly, 
the LFS is based on sample data.  Although it is claimed that is a randomly selected 
representative sample, it is not explicit in ONS literature how this claim is supported.  
How does the ONS know that it is truly representative of the population as a whole?  
The ONS also does not explain from what database they draw the random sample or 
how randomisation takes place.  Population data drawn from Census data, for 
example, can be up to ten years out of date.  The electoral roll and National Insurance 
database also suffer time delay issues and problems in defining the population when 
faced with immigration, births and deaths.  It is always in a state of flux.  The very idea 
of ‘a population’ from which a sample is drawn can be therefore only notional.   
 
The ILO definition itself is also vague.  What does it mean to have ‘actively’ sought 
work?  Would a cursory glance in the jobs page of a newspaper suffice or does one 
have to have applied for positions? Also, why four weeks and two weeks?  Are these 
time periods of specific importance or just arbitrary?  None of this is made explicit by 
the ONS.  To calculate the unemployment rate, the ONS divides the number of ILO 
Unemployed by the total number of economically active people aged 16 and over.  
However, how is ‘economically active’ defined? Equally what would constitute 
‘economically inactive’?  Again, these supposedly objective social measures are 
vague, and apparently arbitrary.  Perhaps most importantly is what about individuals 
who do work of social importance such as caring for children or elderly/disabled 
relatives but who are not in paid employment?  This ‘measure’ therefore excludes a 
large proportion of the labour force who are physically capable of paid work but are 
engaged in other, arguably socially important, activities.   
 
                                            
74 The number of individuals who met the definition of ‘unemployed’.  
75 Economically active is defined as those who meet the definition of being in employment plus those 
who meet the definition of being unemployed (ONS, 2014). 
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Therefore, it could be argued that this definition was potentially politically helpful for 
New Labour.  ‘Unemployment’ thus defined would be ‘counted’ lower than it could 
otherwise have been.  This low figure could be reported positively in the media, and 
those excluded from the definition could be effectively ignored by policy makers.  
Those individuals not in work were therefore no longer a ‘social problem’76.   
 
‘Long-term unemployment’ (LTU) was defined by the OECD as individuals who had 
been on the Claimant Count as unemployed for 12 months or longer (2007; 201377).  
Policy makers focus on LTU because once individuals become detached from the 
labour market for any length of time their ability to re-enter employment decreases.  
Graph 4.2 below shows the annualised Claimant Count alongside rates of long-term 
unemployment between the years 1997 and 2010.  In a similar way to Graph 4.1., the 
Claimant Count appears to have been declining when New Labour came to power in 
1997.  The graph also shows long-term unemployment as a percentage of the 
Claimant Count declined until reaching its lowest level in 2004.  Here LTU is expressed 
as a percentage of the Claimant Count.  Therefore, it indirectly reflects the same 
statistical and social conventions, and the results demonstrate an individual’s 
relationship to benefits rather than paid work.  
 
Traditional economic theory would suggest that during a tight labour market78 firms 
would have had no option but to hire the LTU, who they may normally have avoided.  
It could therefore be argued that New Labours ALMP created churn by pushing the 
LTU and others onto the labour market79.  This included encouraging short-term and 
other forms of flexible employment.  Coming off JSA for just a day would re-set the 
clock and existing long-term claimants would not be counted as LTU for another 12 
months80.  As will be seen later in Chapter 5, some of the New Deal programmes had 
                                            
76 As was also noted in Chapter 2, the Literature Review, there has been a tendency for some writers 
to take both the Claimant Count and ILO Unemployment at face value with little regard for the issues 
raised in this or the previous chapter. 
77 Although the category appears to have first emerged in 1988 (OECD, 1988).   
78 Where there is a limited number of workers to fill available vacancies.  However, the lowest number 
of unemployed people per vacancy was in Q3 2004-Q1 2005 when it reached 2.2 unemployed people 
per vacancy (ONS, 2012b).  
79 It has also been argued that Tax Credits, a key component of ALMP, represented a subsidy to firms 
(McLaughlin, Trewsdale & McCay, 2001). 
80 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this re-categorisation occurred with the NDYP.  The structure of 
the NDYP dramatically reduced the number of young people counted as LTU as they were placed 
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a dramatically distorting effect on long-term unemployment statistics.  The mandatory 
New Deal for Young People, for example, made it effectively impossible for young 
people to be ‘counted’ as long-term unemployed.  
 
 
                                            
onto the NDYP after being unemployed for 6 months, thus taking them off the Claimant Count, and re-
setting the clock when they returned to JSA after the NDYP.      
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Graph 4.2: Rates of unemployment and long-term unemployment in the United Kingdom 1997-2010 
Sources: ONS. (2011). Claimant Count. ONS. (2012). CLA02: Claimant Count by age and duration.  
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4.3. ILO Employment 
  
The category of those counted as ‘employed’, like those counted as ‘unemployed’, is 
underpinned by particular social and statistical conventions.  The ONS LFS 
classification includes persons over 16 years old who were in employment during a 
defined period, i.e. a week.  Individuals were “at work” during the reference period 
when they performed “some work” for wage or salary, in cash or in kind (ONS, 2006).  
The LFS definition was so broad, in fact, that the question asked of recipients is if they 
did “any paid work in the 7 days ending Sunday the [date81] either as an employee or 
as self-employed” (ONS, 2007. p. 22).  What this means in practice is that because 
the definition included “any work”, the LFS would count the largest number of 
individuals possible as being ‘in employment’82.  This is in contrast to the ILO 
Unemployment ‘measure’ whose exclusive conditionality minimises the number who 
could be counted as ILO Unemployed.  This combination of minimising those counted 
as unemployed and maximising those counted as employed would have been 
incredibly helpful politically.  However, it does not appear to have been done for 
political reasons.  Instead, this combination is a consequence of the judgements made 
by those who constructed these statistical objects: that individuals without paid work 
should be available for and actively seeking it, and that some work, indeed ‘any work’, 
is better than nothing.  Thus, the definition appears to be deliberately defined in such 
a way as to include all possible forms of work, including part-time and temporary 
employment (i.e. precarious forms of employment).   
 
Graph 4.3 below shows recorded rates of ILO Unemployment and Employment rates 
from 1997 to 2010.  Interestingly, when a test of Pearson’s correlation coefficient test 
is carried out there is a statistically significant -0.89 (2.d.p) correlation between ILO 
Unemployment and Employment rates.  What this means is that, when there is an 
observed statistical decline in ILO Unemployment, most, but not all of this decline can 
                                            
81 The reference period. 
82 Just a single hour of work per week would be counted as ‘employment’.  Therefore, in the context of 
a ‘flexible’ labour market where there is potentially no stability to the amount of work some individuals 
will have each week the statistical definition is broad and unstable.  It can be argued that this is jarring 
to what the average lay person would perhaps have as their conventional understanding of what is 
meant by being “employed”.    
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be associated with an increase in ILO Employment rates83.  As Chapter 5 and later 
chapters will demonstrate, the way individuals are categorised, counted and treated 
depends on any number of factors, e.g. age, gender (family structure), closeness to 
retirement age, and so on.  
 
 
 
                                            
83 There was a larger decrease in the rates of unemployment than increases in the rates of 
employment.  However, as this chapter is demonstrating, this is simply an interaction of statistical 
constructs rather than a representation of an objective labour market reality.  
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Graph 4.3: ILO Employment and Unemployment, 1997-2010 
Sources: ONS. (2011).
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4.4. Labour force participation (Rates of economic activity and 
inactivity) 
 
Rates of ‘economic activity’ and ‘inactivity’ were used as measures of labour force 
participation during New Labour’s time in office.  To be counted as economically 
active, an individual must be counted as in ILO Employment or Unemployed (but 
actively seeking work) (ONS, 2007).  To be counted as economically inactive, an 
individual must be neither in ILO Employment nor Unemployed (and therefore not 
actively seeking work). 
 
In stark contrast to rates of ILO Employment and Unemployment between 1997 and 
2010, there was remarkable stability in rates of those counted as active or inactive.  
As can be seen in Graph 4.4. below, the activity rate was 76.3% in Q2 1997 and again 
76.3% in Q2 2010.  The maximum was 77.6% in Q4 2001 and the minimum was 75.8% 
in Q1 and Q2 1998.  Given the binary nature of economic activity/inactivity definitions 
it is no surprise that there is a perfect negative correlation between the categories, i.e. 
a 1% decrease in economic activity occurs at the same time as a 1% increase in 
economic activity.   
 
If rates of economic activity was the indicator adopted to evaluate New Labour’s record 
of labour market activation, then it could be argued that New Labour failed in their 
attempts to increase labour market participation overall.  Labour activity/inactivity by 
gender is discussed in Chapter 8.   
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Graph 4.4: Rates of activity versus inactivity for those aged 16-64 years old: 1997-2010 
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4.5. The Importance of Economic Growth 
 
A positivist and prima facie analysis of the Claimant Count would lead us to conclude 
that New Labour’s labour market policy had a positive impact on the Claimant Count: 
reducing it to historically low levels, only to be reversed by the Anglo-American 
financial crisis.  Indeed, the ‘success’ of New Labour’s labour market reforms (such as 
the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, the New Deal programmes and Tax 
Credits) in reducing ‘unemployment’ has been a popular narrative in existing literature 
(Toynbee & Walker, 2005; Giddens, 2007; Powell, 2008).  Notwithstanding the socially 
constructed nature of these statistics, the allegedly self-evident causal relationship is 
not as clear cut as has been portrayed and has not convinced the present author.   
 
For example, the Claimant Count had peaked at 10.3% in Q1 1993 and begun to 
decrease over four years before New Labour entered power. The Claimant Count 
reached a low of 2.3% in Q4 in 2007.  The causal relationship suggested by Toynbee 
& Walker (2005), Giddens (2007) and Powell (2008)84 appears fallacious.  It felt, 
therefore, necessary to understand the impact other factors may have had upon the 
Claimant Count.  
 
After collecting and reviewing GDP data from 1990 onwards, it was immediately 
noticed that between Q1 1991 and Q1 2008 the UK economy experienced positive 
and mostly sustained GDP growth: This growth was especially strong from Q2 1993 
to Q1 200185 and GDP growth averaged 3.62% during this period86.  There was a 
slowdown in growth around the late 1990s as can be seen in Graph 4.5.  The impact, 
however, was only limited with growth slowing to a low of 2% in Q1 2002.  Growth 
appears to have soon recovered, reaching peaks of 4.4% in Q1 2004 and 3.8% in Q4 
2005 and 4.6% in Q3 2007.  Therefore, between Labour assuming office and the credit 
crunch, GDP growth in the UK averaged 3.12%.    
                                            
84 Discussed in Chapter 2, the Literature Review. 
85 Traditional economic theory may explain this as an economic recovery following the recession of 
the early 1990s when Britain was pushed out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
86 As measured by Gross Domestic Product: Quarter on Quarter previous year (ONS, 2012). 
116 
 
 
Graph 4.5: Gross Domestic Product Growth: Quarter on quarter previous year 
Source: ONS (2012)
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Therefore, data suggests a statistical relationship between economic growth variables, 
such as the GDP growth rate, and a decreasing Claimant Count rate.  This suggests 
a causal relationship where strong economic growth draws/supports unemployed 
individuals into employment (or at least off Job Seeker’s Allowance). This would 
suggest that Claimant Count Unemployment from the 1990s to the 2000s was largely 
cyclical unemployment rather than structural87.  These possible relationships therefore 
raise the question to what extent could decreases in unemployment be better 
explained by the strong economic growth during the same period?  Does the causal 
link go both ways? 
 
An examination of relevant economic theory found that Okun’s Law may explain the 
observed relationship.  Okun’s law is the often empirically observed inverse 
relationship between a country’s GDP or GNP and rate of unemployment.  In his 
original study, Okun (1962) found that in the US between the Q2 1947 and Q4 1960 
for every extra 1% of GNP, unemployment was 0.3% lower.  He found a very strong 
linear relationship (r = 0.79) with few remaining residuals88.  This relationship has been 
found in many countries, although with slightly different figures.    
 
A simplified version of Okun’s statistical model was developed for this thesis to see 
whether a relationship exists between UK GDP growth during New Labour’s time in 
office, and whether this relation was statistically significant.  The model measured the 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between quarterly changes in GDP 
and quarterly changes in unemployment89.  Data from Q2 1997 to Q1 2008 was used 
to construct the model.   
 
A strong relationship (an r value approaching -1) would suggest that other factors, 
such as welfare-to-work programmes, had little effect or were possibly even 
                                            
87 Cyclical, or “demand-deficient” unemployment can be defined as “Unemployment that occurs 
because aggregate desired expenditure is insufficient to purchase all the output of a fully employed 
labour force” (Lipsey & Chrystal, 2007. p. 638).  Structural unemployment can be defined as 
“Unemployment that exists because of a mismatch between the characteristics of the unemployed 
and the characteristics of the available jobs in terms of region, occupation, or industry” (Lipsey & 
Chrystal, 2007. p. 650).  
88 i.e. there were other variables at play, but growth had the strongest impact on reductions in 
unemployment.  
89 Interestingly there is no discussion in Okun (1962) of a time lag. Simply that in quarters of strong 
growth, unemployment fell.  
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inconsequential for rates of unemployment.  A weak relationship (an r value close to 
0) on the other hand would suggest that other factors, such as welfare-to-work 
programmes or other external macro-economic factors, were more important. 
Using this model, a statistically significant value of r = -0.502 was estimated for this 
time period.  The results found may therefore ‘explain’ 50% of observations in terms 
of Okun’s law.  This result is very much in line with other estimates summarised below:  
 
Table 4.1: Other estimates of Okun’s Coefficient in the UK 
Study Okun’s Coefficient 
Estimate (r) for UK* 
Years 
Moosa (1997) -0.37 1960-1995 
Sogner L. and A. Stiassny 
(2000) 
-0.58 1960-1999  
Lee (2000) -0.72 1955-1996  
Candelon B. and A. W. 
Hecq (1998) 
-0.26 1960-1994  
Perman R. and Ch. 
Tavera (2004) 
0.64 1970-2002  
Perman R. and Ch. 
Tavera (2004) 
-0.24 1970-2002  
Schnabel (2002) -0.50 1963-2000  
Schnabel (2002) -0.75 1991-2000  
*Various methodologies and data frequencies 
Source: Petkov, B. (2008).   
 
When attempts were made to include Q2 2008-Q2 2010 in the model, the relationship 
broke down completely suggesting strong external macro-economic shocks to the UK 
economy.  This could possibly be explained by the concurrent Anglo-American 
financial crisis.  It may, however, have been the case that the relationship between 
GDP and unemployment continued to occur, but due to the unprecedented events of 
the financial crisis, Okun’s law temporarily broke down.  Therefore, it could be inferred 
from the statistical evidence that other factors besides GDP/output were influential 
upon rates of unemployment.  The result being large drops in both GDP growth were 
followed (with around a two quarter time lag) by large increases in unemployment as 
can be seen in Graph 4.6 below.     
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Graph 4.6: Unemployment and GDP growth (Q2 1997-Q2 2010), quarterly rate (%) 
Sources: ONS (2012). CLA02. Claimant Count by age and duration. ONS (2012). Quarterly National Accounts. Q2 2012.  
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When a more simple test for correlation between the UK unemployment rate and 
quarterly GDP growth rate was conducted, a value of r = -0.29 (2.d.p.) was returned, 
again suggesting a weak, but statistically significant, relationship between the two 
economic variables.   
   
The results in this section suggests that economic growth may have had an effect in 
reducing unemployment during New Labour’s time in office, possibly explaining up to 
50% of all reductions in unemployment.  The results, however, are not conclusive, i.e. 
they do not explain all reductions in ‘unemployment’, nor is the direction of causality 
clear: i.e. did growth reduce unemployment or did Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) 
help to provide cheap labour which supported economic growth.  This means there is 
still scope for New Labour’s labour market policy to have had an impact on measures 
of labour market activity such as the Claimant Count.  Further analysis follows to 
establish greater clarity as to this impact.      
 
4.5.1. Calculating Cyclical Employment: Time Series Decomposition 
 
Another approach to try and calculate the relative importance of various factors on the 
Claimant Count is to use time series decomposition.    
 
Time series decomposition involves separating observed values into their several 
components: 
 
 Trend component (T) 
 Seasonality (S) 
 Cyclical behaviour (C) 
 Randomness/Residual (R) 
 
Two models are most commonly used. The Additive model represents seasonal 
swings as constant differences from the trend.  The Multiplicative model represents 
seasonal swings as a constant percentage of the trend.  The equations for both are: 
Additive model: 𝑌 = 𝑇 + 𝑆 + 𝐶 + 𝑅 
Multiplicative model: 𝑌 = 𝑇 × 𝑆 × 𝐶 × 𝑅 
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An MS Excel model was developed to examine the Claimant Count and calculate each 
component using both models.  However, as Oakshott warns, “The cyclic component 
can only be isolated when values of the variable Y are available over many years (at 
least 20), which is rare” (2012. p. 343).  It was, therefore, only possible to calculate a 
combined value of the cyclic and residual components of the time series.   
 
4.5.1.1. Results of time series decomposition 
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Graph 4.7: Claimant Count Decomposition 
Notes: 4QMA means four quarter moving average.
y = -0.3997x + 1134.2
R² = 0.0055
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Graph 4.7 shows the Claimant Count plotted against the trend (T) component (the four 
quarter moving average centred).  The T component is the same for both the additive 
and multiplicative models.  The decline in the Claimant Count up until Q1 2008, which 
had begun before New Labour entered power, is clearly visible.  A regression line (in 
red) of the Claimant Count for May 1997 to May 2010 has also been plotted and its 
equation given.  The regression line suggests that, even with the credit 
crunch/recession, there was still a long-term decline in the Claimant Count.   
 
Comparing the observed values and the four quarter moving average (T) with the long-
term trend line provides an indication of the extent of the cyclical component of the 
Claimant Count, i.e. the difference between the observed values and the long-term 
trend.  From Q1 2000 to Q4 2008 the Claimant Count appears to have been below the 
long-term trend line. 
 
4.5.1.2. Additive Model Results  
 
Table 4.2: Claimant Count (thousands) – Adjusted Seasonal Differences (S) 
Quarter 1 2 3 4   
1997       -21.6042   
1998 -18.0625 -10.925 -0.69167 1.829167   
1999 7.920833333 9.316667 3 -7.6125   
2000 6.945833333 -2.6125 -9.2625 3.325   
2001 -3.30833333 -8.9 -14.35 4.0875   
2002 -0.19583333 1.079167 1.258333 -5.84583   
2003 0.558333333 7.495833 7.295833 3.7375   
2004 3.833333333 -4.95417 -10.5417 -7.10417   
2005 -14.6333333 -0.4875 -3.86625 0.178083   
2006 2.776708333 11.95175 12.08667 17.66583   
2007 2.817208333 -9.63083 2.275 -0.35417   
2008 -45.8291667 -53.5083 -52.875 -43.7792   
2009 44.50416667 80.10833 43.73333 30.89583   
2010 26.43333333 -18.4375       
Average 
SD 
1.05850641 0.038147 -1.82816 -1.89085 -2.62236 -0.65559* 
Adjusted 
SD 
1.71409602 0.693737 -1.17257 -1.23526 0  
Note: * adjustment required 
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Table 4.2 above shows the adjusted seasonal differences for the four quarters.  
Adjusted seasonal differences are shown in the bottom-most row.  The results show 
that, on average, the Claimant Count is above trend in Q1 and Q2, and below trend in 
Q3 and Q4 of each year.  It is interesting to note that within the total of the Claimant 
Count, the seasonal component is proportionately quite small.    
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Graph 4.8: Cyclical + Residual Error (C+R) Components of Additive Time Series Decomposition 
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Graph 4.8 above shows the Cyclical (C) and Residual (R) components of the Claimant 
Count time-series following decomposition using the Additive Model.  It is not possible 
to decompose the residual error from the C + R found owing to a lack of longer-term 
data. Due to the nature of time series decomposition residual error could be expected 
to be a much smaller component than C.  The results would therefore suggest that, as 
could be expected, the credit crunch and recession had a strong negative impact on 
the Claimant Count. This adds further weight to the evidence found earlier in section 
4.1.1.1., i.e. that economic growth has a strong impact on the Claimant Count.  
 
4.5.1.3. Results of time series decomposition – Multiplicative Model 
 
Table 4.3: Claimant Count (thousands) – Adjusted Seasonal Deviation (S) 
Quarter 1 2 3 4   
1997       103.2993619   
1998 102.5786 101.3335 100.8131 100.3325598   
1999 99.88279 100.1861 100.5152 102.5600937   
2000 100.1825 101.1777 102.3382 100.340648   
2001 101.2186 101.8684 101.8973 98.87696155   
2002 100.5519 99.97762 100.1598 100.8211256   
2003 99.91943 98.82492 99.79227 100.4336829   
2004 100.6735 102.0098 101.4698 101.2150466   
2005 101.1685 98.82076 99.78308 98.98563851   
2006 98.4719 98.19766 98.46719 99.11421651   
2007 101.3027 102.092 100.4648 101.3151169   
2008 106.4606 102.7581 100.9989 96.75647222   
2009 90.3161 93.13092 96.60392 98.94172838   
2010 100.101 102.99       
Average 
SD 
100.2175 100.259 100.2753 100.230204 400.9821 -0.24552* 
Adjusted 
SD 
99.97203 100.0135 100.0298 99.98468556 400  
Note: * adjustment required 
 
Table 4.3 above shows the adjusted average seasonal deviation.  The number shows 
each quarter’s Claimant Count as a percentage of the trend T.  The results suggest 
that, on average, Q1 and Q4 had a Claimant Count below the four quarter moving 
trend, while Q2 and Q3 had a Claimant Count above the four quarter trend.  However, 
this seasonality as estimated by the multiplicative model is very marginal in 
comparison to that estimated by the additive model. 
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Graph 4.9: Cyclical + Residual Error (C + R) Components of Multiplicative Time Series Decomposition 
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Graph 4.9 shows the combined cyclical and residual error components of the time 
series Claimant Count.  Whereas graph 4.8 suggested quite a clear cyclical 
component, the results of graph 4.9 are less conclusive.  Graph 4.9 appears to show 
a repetitive pattern with a diminishing cyclical and error component towards 2007, both 
of which then increased between 2007 and 2010. This may be due to a consistently 
occurring error component in each quarter and a varying cyclical component over the 
course of the time series, i.e. the business cycle is statistically affecting the Claimant 
Count.   
 
4.5.1.4. Conclusions of time series decomposition results 
 
Although no strong conclusions can be drawn, the results of additive and multiplicative 
time series decomposition of the Claimant Count appear to suggest that, to some 
extent, the business cycle has an impact on the Claimant Count.  This appears more 
evident in 2008 where there was a steep increase in the Claimant Count coinciding 
with the credit crunch and global financial crisis.  This also supports the findings of 
previous sections of this chapter: that this does not necessarily rule out New Labour's 
labour market reforms having a statistical impact.  Instead, these results suggest much 
more complex labour market landscape where unemployment and employment are 
impacted by exogenous as well as endogenous factors. 
 
Therefore, it was felt necessary to try and further untangle the competing forces and 
influences affecting the labour market between 1997 and 2010. The following section 
examines to what extent changes in the UK labour market may have been influenced 
by increasing cyclical convergence between United Kingdom and its European 
neighbours. 
 
4.5.2. The impact of cyclical convergence 
 
In the context of an increasingly inter-connected global economy with ever-more 
mobile labour and capital, and increasing trans-national policy convergence, it could 
be argued that there may be an increasing convergence between the UK and foreign 
economies.  The strength of these external macro-economic factors was examined for 
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evidence of cyclical convergence90 which would suggest that these economies are 
becoming increasingly interdependent.   
 
Data was drawn from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 
Database for the EU15 (the countries which made up the EU in 1995)91.  It was felt 
that as the UK was a member of the European Union these nations would represent 
the ones most likely to have strong links with the UK economy.  These were analysed 
graphically to see if a convergence of GDP growth, employment and unemployment 
had occurred.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
90 “A tendency towards a uniform pattern of cyclical fluctuations” (Matkowski & Próchniak, 2004. p. 7). 
91 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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Graph 4.10: EU15 Annual % GDP Growth 
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Graph 4.10 shows the annual percentage change in GDP between the years 1990 
and 2010.  The graph shows that in 1990 the range between the country with the 
highest growth rate and the lowest was 7.86% (2 d.p.).  The range peaked at 13.62% 
(2 d.p.) in 1991. This range narrowed then to a low of 3.42% (2 d.p.) in 2004 but 
widened only slightly as countries’ growth rates dropped in 2007 and 2008.  Growth 
rates diverged in 2010 to a range of 8.42% (2 d.p.) as countries such as the UK 
recovered while countries such as Greece experienced further declines in growth.   
 
It could be argued, therefore, that there are signs of some convergence in growth 
rates/business cycles between the members of the EU15.  This conclusion is 
supported by a limited but emerging range of existing literature (Matkowski & 
Próchniak, 2004; Christodoulakis, 2009; Petrakos et al, 2011) who suggest that EU 
accession, European Monetary Union and regional growth have all been important 
drivers of cyclical convergence within the EU.  There has also been a gradual 
convergence of incomes, industrial production and increasing inter-EU trade 
(Matkowski & Próchniak, 2004).  Hence, it would be expected that this would lead to 
a convergence of unemployment and employment rates across the EU.  This has been 
drawn in the following two graphs 4.12 and 4.13.  
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Graph 4.11: EU15 Unemployment rate as % of total labour force 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
U
n
em
p
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l l
ab
o
u
r 
fo
rc
e
Year
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
133 
 
Graph 4.11 shows rates of unemployment across the EU28 from 1990 to 2010 sourced 
from the IMF (2010) World Economic Outlook database.  The rate of unemployment 
was measured using ILO Unemployment.  Unlike graph 4.10 which suggested a strong 
convergence of business cycles across the European Union, this does not appear to 
be reflected in rates of unemployment across the same member states. The ranges 
between nations with the highest and lowest rates of unemployment have varied, but 
tended to remain around 15% across the entire time period. The years 1993, 1994 
and 1995 had rates around 20%. This gradually returned to around 15% from the year 
1998 onwards. The narrowest range in rates of unemployment occurred in the years 
2006, 2007 and 2008 with a low of 8.26% in 2007. Following the financial crisis the 
range again returned to around 15%.  A visual analysis of the graph also suggests 
little in the way of convergence between member states throughout this period. The 
only event that appears to affect all economies simultaneously appears to have been 
the financial crisis around the years 2008/2009.  
 
The evidence for convergence from this data is far less clear than GDP growth rates. 
Although there was an evident narrowing of the range from 2004 to 2007, the disparity 
in rates of unemployment quickly returned and it would, therefore, be difficult to draw 
any firm conclusions regarding statistical relationships.  However, it should be noted 
that different members of the EU15 may have used the definition of ILO 
Unemployment, but the actual methodologies used to collect the data and other 
assumptions will have differed.  The use/abuse of labour laws to minimise numbers 
counted as ILO Unemployed may account for some of the differences, as would 
differences in cultural expectations regarding work for some groups (such as mothers) 
may also have played a part.  
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Graph 4.12: EU15 Employment rate as a % of labour force 
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Graph 4.12 shows rates of employment across the EU15.  Within the data, the range 
varies between the maximum rate of employment 19.29% (2 d.p.) in 1990 and 10.22% 
(2 d.p.), with the average hovering around 13% from 1995 onwards.  Although there 
does appear to be a general increase in rates of employment across the EU if 
analysing the graph visually92, there does not appear to be any significant 
convergence between member states.  This would be more in line with Fingleton 
(1999) who argued that at current rates of convergence in measures, such as per 
capita income, it would take more than a further two centuries for a full convergence 
to occur.  
 
4.5.3. The impact of the European Union Employment Strategy 
 
Despite the weakness of the conclusions found in the data in the previous section, 
there is an emerging range of literature which supports an increasing convergence 
across the European Union in both labour market and welfare state policy.   
 
A number of authors have argued that the European Employment Strategy (EES) (a 
policy strategy decided by the European Council in Lisbon in 2000) was a new and 
important step regarding pan-European labour market policy (Caminda et al, 2010).  
This strategy has resulted in convergence in a range of welfare state indicators 
(Casey, 2004; Caminda et al, 2010; Rie & Marx, 2012; Van Vliet, 2010).  These studies 
analysed to what extent σ-convergence (the dispersion between indicators) and β-
convergence (the convergence of regions with lower levels of social protection, the 
laggards, tend to converge on regions with higher social spending, i.e. the leaders) 
exist.  From their analysis they claim that there was statistically significant 
convergence across the European Union with minor divergences, especially around 
the time of the financial crisis93.   
 
There is, however, a limited range of writers who argue that social policy convergence 
was occurring prior to the year 2000 (Greve, 1996; Cornelisse & Goudswaard, 2002; 
                                            
92 Perhaps explained by the widespread adoption of ALMP across EU member states, impacting the 
activation of women especially.   
93 This they consider to be a convergence of labour market activity rather than a convergence in how 
socially defined phenomenon is measured.  
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Bouget, 2003).  This, therefore, raises the question as to what extent this convergence 
was due to the EES and what was due to general policy convergence caused by 
European integration and the single market. There is evidence that this convergence 
was more widespread than just the European Union with writers within this field 
making comparisons against the OECD and finding similar, but less strong results 
(Casey, 2004; Caminda et al, 2010; Rie & Marx, 2012; Van Vliet, 2010).   
 
These studies are limited in that they focus entirely on statistical indicators and 
measures to reach their conclusions94. Some, however, have attempted to move 
beyond this by examining to what extent there has been an ‘Europeanisation’ of social 
and labour market policies (Van Vliet, 2010).  This is in addition to the important 
influence of monetary integration due to the Maastricht convergence criteria of the 
EMU members (ibid, 2010).  Van Vliet suggests that the EES, with its use of the ‘open 
method of coordination’ has been used to share best practices but unlike other 
measures “the OMC is a set of non-binding instruments, like the adoption of 
guidelines, indicators, recommendations and national action plans” (Van Vliet, 2010. 
p. 271)95.  Van Vliet argues that the EES places much emphasis on Active Labour 
Market Policies which was aimed not only at reducing unemployment, but also 
increasing employment and combating social exclusion.  It could be argued that these 
are phrases, themes and conventions which are clearly observable in New Labour’s 
own labour market policy, e.g. references to life-long learning appearing in EES policy 
documents and New Labour’s 1997 manifesto (Labour, 1997).  References can also 
be found in both EES and New Labour documents to ‘making work pay’ (Labour, 1997) 
and in later documents of ‘flexicurity’96 (European Commission, 2007).  From the 
existing documents in the public domain, it is not clear to what extent this crossover of 
language was due to New Labour adopting European policy goals and language, New 
Labour feeding into the European policy making process through EU institutions both 
prior to and after 1997, or a general convergence in European social policy.  
Regardless of the exact source of the policy, it can be argued that there are 
suggestions of an influence on New Labour’s own ALMP agenda.  
                                            
94 Claiming them to be measures of an objective social reality rather than social constructs 
underpinned by social and statistical convention.  
95 It is very much a tool of New Public Management.  
96 Although New Labour were never explicit in their support of the term Flexicurity, they were fully 
supportive of flexibility, as discussed in Chapter 9 of this thesis.  
137 
 
 
4.6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored a range of UK labour market statistics from before and 
during New Labour’s time in office.  This included Claimant Count Unemployment, ILO 
Unemployment, long-term unemployment and ILO Employment.  This chapter, along 
with the preceding chapter, has shown that these evaluative ‘measures’ do not reflect 
an objective and universally accepted understanding of labour market activity.  These 
measures are constructed by policy makers to reflect conventions of measurement 
and their underpinning social values (social conventions).  Such social values appear 
to include a belief in the intrinsic virtue of paid work and a disapproval of not having 
paid work and claiming out-of-work benefits.   
 
A great deal of focus was given by policy makers to unemployment measured by the 
Claimant Count.  As was discussed earlier, this statistic counts how many individuals 
claim the out-of-work benefit Job Seeker’s Allowance.  Here the important issue for 
policy makers is not necessarily that an individual is out of work but that they are 
claiming benefits.  As a result, the Claimant Count has become the ‘headline figure’ 
reported by government to the media, and over which opposing political parties contest 
the effectiveness of each other’s labour market policy.  The New Deal programmes 
instituted by New Labour were, therefore, very important to this narrative that a 
reducing Claimant Count was evidence of effective labour market policy.  As will be 
seen in the next chapter, the New Deal programmes helped to reduce the number of 
individuals counted by the Claimant Count by temporarily counting them elsewhere 
(on the New Deal programmes).  When individuals returned to the Claimant Count 
they were counted as new claimants, thus also reducing the number counted as long-
term unemployed.  This is important to this thesis as using social statistics for 
evaluation purposes appears increasingly futile if these statistics are fickle reflections 
of the conventions of measurement which were adopted at the time, and which can be 
changed at the whim of policy makers.   
    
This chapter went on to examine ILO Employment.  It was found that to be counted in 
this category an individual was only required to do one hour of work per week.  This 
was so broad as to have included any form of paid work as long as it met this simple 
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time criteria.  This again reflects the moral judgement that some work, indeed any paid 
work of any duration and time is to be sought.  However, it could be argued that this 
is not true: what about paid work which is damaging to an individual’s physical or 
mental health as in the case of many jobs in heavy industry?  What about paid work 
which pays so little that it could be judged exploitative? There also appears to be a 
disconnect between what was required to categorise an individual as being in work 
according to ILO Employment with what a lay person would hold as their conventional 
understanding of ‘being employed’.  A lay person may consider ‘being employed’ to 
include regular hours of work (although not necessarily full-time) being paid a 
reasonable wage under reasonable working conditions.  Increasingly precarious forms 
of employment such as zero hours contract are an excellent example of this 
disconnect between the conventions of policy makers and those of lay people.  This 
is discussed further in Chapter 9.   
 
Rates of labour force participation were examined next.  This section of the chapter 
demonstrated the binary nature of these statistics: an individual is either ‘economically 
active’ or ‘economically inactive’.  Once more, paid work is at the centre of these 
categories with those counted as economically active either already being in paid 
employment or able to demonstrate that they are ‘actively seeking work’.  Those who 
do not meet these criteria are ‘economically inactive’.  However, individuals falling into 
this category include stay-at-home-mothers and unpaid carers.  To define these 
individuals as ‘economically inactive’ appears to ignore the considerable contribution 
these individuals make to the economy.  This is what Hazel Henderson (1982 cited in 
Henderson, 2008) has termed “The Love Economy” or the “Non-Monetised Productive 
half of the cake” which is not taken into consideration by economic measures such as 
GDP/GNP, but upon which rests the productive of the layers of the economy above 
(as shown in figure 4.1. below).  As with ILO Employment there appears to be a 
disconnect between the categories adopted by policy makers, underpinned by their 
social conventions and the conventions of wider society which place a higher moral 
value on motherhood and care-giving compared to paid work.  As Bezzi (2006) argued 
in Chapter 3, evaluators of social policy should not be seeking an ‘objective truth’ but 
the truth surrounding the evaluand.  This appears to be a strong example to support 
that argument.  
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Figure 4.1: The Love Economy. 
 
Source: Henderson (1982) 
 
This chapter went on to study the theorised statistical relationship between economic 
growth and ILO Unemployment known as Okun’s Law.  It is important to make the 
point that this is a relationship between two statistical constructs97: economic growth 
as measured by quarter on quarter GDP growth and unemployment, in this case 
defined by ILO Unemployment.  The theory is therefore underpinned by the 
conventions of measurement used by economists. The model claims to show that 
economic growth helps to reduce unemployment.  However, the reality is that only 
50% of reductions in unemployment could be explained in terms of economic growth.  
Estimates by others vary wildly from between r =0.26 and r =0.7598.  Even if we accept 
the conventions adopted, there is still a considerable amount of this change in 
unemployment which goes ‘unexplained’, and indeed without any effort on the behalf 
of theorists to explain.   
 
                                            
97 Okun’s Law assumes that the measures measure something objective. This thesis argues that this 
is not the case.  
98 If we accept that economic growth contributes to reductions in ‘unemployment’, to what extent can 
New Labour claim credit for the economic growth which occurred under their watch?  Light touch 
regulation was perhaps of their doing, but the sustained low-interest rates of the 2000s was the 
responsibility of the newly independent Bank of England.  
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Analysis of Okun’s Law was followed up by time-series decomposition which explored 
to what extent changes in Claimant Count Unemployment could be explained by the 
business cycle.  According to these models, there was a small but perceptible 
seasonal change to the Claimant Count.  For example, Q4 was below trend in both 
the additive and multiplicative models. The generally accepted explanation being that 
in the run up to Christmas retailers and others will hire additional staff to cope with 
increased demand for their goods and services.  According to these models, the 
business cycle played a strong and important role in increasing/decreasing the 
Claimant Count.  This supports the conclusions of the Okun’s Law section.  However, 
just because this model is internally logical it is still a statistical analysis of the Claimant 
Count with its associated statistical and social conventions.  
 
The final section of this chapter explored the convergence of various measures across 
the EU15.  By measuring the range between the ‘best’ performing and ‘worst’ 
performing EU15 countries there did appear to be a narrowing or convergence of these 
countries through the 2000s.  This appeared especially strong after 2000, when the 
Euro was introduced and is supported by an emerging range of academic literature 
(Matkowski & Próchniak, 2004; Christodoulakis, 2009; Petrakos et al, 2011).  
However, when examining rates of unemployment and employment across the EU15 
the evidence for convergence is far less clear than that apparently occurring with GDP 
growth rates.     
 
Despite this apparent lack of convergence in statistical evidence, an emergent theme 
within the literature suggests a convergence of labour market and welfare state policy 
(Casey, 2004; Caminda et al, 2010; Rie & Marx, 2012; Van Vliet, 2010).   
   
Although the European Union Employment Strategy (EES) is identified as a key 
milestone in that convergence process (Caminda et al, 2010), others have suggested 
that it has been occurring since before 2000 (Greve, 1996; Cornelisse & Goudswaard, 
2002; Bouget, 2003).  A perhaps more open interpretation is that contributed by Van 
Vliet (2010) who has advanced that, due to the ‘open method of coordination’ of the 
EES, there is an increasing Europeanisation of social policy focusing on ALMP.  This 
is clearly relevant to New Labour’s own ALMP.  
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Therefore, this chapter has demonstrated the increasing challenges of studying and 
evaluating labour market and welfare policy statistically.  The statistical and 
underpinning social conventions which were adopted by policy makers and policy 
evaluators must be understood and explored, but perhaps more importantly these 
should also be contrasted with the social conventions held by the evaluand.  Surely it 
is important to see the world through the eyes of those social policy aims to help?  
 
The following chapter begins to explore in greater depth New Labour’s ALMP by 
looking at the New Deal programmes which were at the centre of this policy. The next 
chapter focuses on the policies specifically aimed at the ‘youth’ client group in whom 
New Labour invested a considerable amount of focus99.   
  
                                            
99 Indeed they were one of the key client groups identified in their 1997 manifesto.     
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CHAPTER 5 – The impact on young people (The NDYP and 
NDfM) 
 
This chapter discusses the impact of New Labour’s labour market policies on the client 
group defined as ‘young people’.  New Labour made an explicit policy commitment 
that they sought to reduce unemployment amongst young people through what 
became known as the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) funded by a one-off 
Windfall Tax on the privatised utilities companies (Labour, 1997).    
 
The first part of this chapter discusses the origins of ‘youth’ labour market policy before 
exploring the structure of the NDYP.  Available data is then examined to ascertain 
what the prima facie impact on the labour force there may have been before 
progressing to a discussion of what other intended or unintended impacts these 
programmes may have had on ‘young people’.  The last part of this chapter examines 
the New Deal for Musicians (NDfM), a programme originally aimed at the younger 
people client group before being rolled out to the 25+ client group.  
 
5.1. Defining the ‘young people’ client group  
 
How a client group is defined is of great importance in the development and 
implementation of social policy.  It determines which group an individual is placed into, 
how they are labelled, and thus whether they are to be made subject to the ‘treatment’ 
of government programmes to correct the perceived ‘social problem’ by which they 
were originally defined.   
 
In the case of ‘youth unemployment’, it did not appear to emerge as a social problem 
until the 1970s when an increasing number of school leavers and young people in 
general were failing to enter employment (Sinfield, 1981; Dolton et al, 1994).  The end 
of full-employment as an achievable macro-economic objective may have contributed 
to this.  Concurrent events such as the raising of the school leaving age (ROSLA) in 
September 1972 are likely to have had minimal impact on youth 
employment/unemployment as the age was only raised from 15 to 16 and this would 
only have delayed entry into the labour market.  Previous legislation, such as the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and 1963 or the Factories Act 1961 concerned 
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themselves with seeking to restrict the employment of children so as to encourage 
their continuation in compulsory education.  It appears that as ‘youth unemployment’ 
began to be defined or indeed recognised as an issue, labour market programmes 
were developed in response.   
 
1975 saw the introduction of the Recruitment Subsidy for School Leavers (RSSL) 
which was aimed at school leavers who did not yet have employment upon leaving 
school (Bell & Jones, 2002).  RSSL provided a £5 a week wage subsidy to employers 
who recruited unemployed school leavers.  The Job Creation Programme was also 
introduced in 1975 to create 15,000 temporary jobs for young people.  RSSL and the 
Job Creation Programme were followed shortly after by the Youth Employment 
Subsidy in 1976 aimed at those under 20 who had been unemployed for longer than 
6 months.  This subsidy paid £10 per week directly to employers.  In 1978, the Youth 
Opportunities Programme (YOP) was introduced for 16-18 year olds providing an 
allowance of £19.50 per week alongside training opportunities.  At the time YOP was 
described as ‘a new deal for the young unemployed’ by Albert Booth, Secretary of 
State for Employment in the then Labour government (Bell & Jones, 2002).   
 
1982 saw the introduction of the Young Workers Scheme.  This scheme provided 
financial incentives for one year to employers recruiting unemployed young people 
who, for the purposes of this programme, were defined as under 18 years of age.  This 
was followed shortly afterwards in 1983 by the Youth Training Scheme (YTS).  YTS 
was initially a year-long scheme for participants aged under 18, although this was 
extended to 2 years in 1986.  In 1989, YTS was renamed Youth Training (YT) but the 
allowances to participants remained unchanged.  YT was renamed again in 1995 as 
Youth Credits.  According to Dalton et al (1994), the motivation for this succession of 
schemes was that young people would gain from work experience and training 
provided by firms.   
 
Therefore, from the existing literature it appears that the NDYP was the next in a long 
line of labour market policy aimed at ‘young people’.  It could perhaps be argued that 
this particular client group, by virtue of their age, may have had other intertwined 
defining features which tend to present barriers to employment.  For example, a lack 
of work experience and job-based skills and their attitudes towards work.  In addition 
144 
 
to this, young people may also suffer from a lack of qualifications due to prior 
educational failure and limited financial resources independent of their parents.  This 
may result in occupational and geographical immobility, further reducing their chances 
of employment.       
 
The NDYP 18-24 year old age group definition of ‘young people’ could be explained 
in a number of ways.  Although ROSLA had increased the school leaving age to 16 
years old in 1972, in 1988 income support was withdrawn from 16-17 year olds.  Youth 
unemployment at 16-17 years old was therefore no longer an issue as it had no cost 
implications in terms of unemployment benefits.  From the age of 18, however, young 
people were eligible for income support and JSA when it was introduced in 1996.  They 
would at this point be counted in the Claimant Count.  Reducing and minimising the 
Claimant Count was an explicit social policy amongst such ‘young people’ and was an 
explicit policy goal (Labour, 1997) and this may explain the 18 year old lower age limit.  
The upper age limit of the NDYP may be explained in that 25 years old is the point at 
which workers become “adult” according to the International Labour Organisation 
definitions of “youth” and adulthood used for the purposes of measuring youth 
unemployment (ILO, 2011).     
 
Examining available data and press releases from the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) it is apparent that ‘Young People in the Labour Market’ has also received 
considerable attention by statisticians (ONS, 2014).  ‘Youth unemployment’ and the 
number of young people not in full-time education or employment (NEETs) has been 
measured on a regular basis since at least 1984 (ibid, 2014).  The only minor 
difference being that the ONS’s definition of ‘young people’ extends down to those 
aged 16 years old so as to encompass the age at which school-leavers enter the 
labour market.  This reflects the ILO’s definitions of the labour market.    
 
5.2. The structure of The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) 
 
The New Deal for Young People began operating in April 1998 as a national 
programme with the intention of assisting young people (those aged 18-24 years old) 
into sustained employment and increasing their long-term employability (White & 
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Riley, 2002).  The NDYP was superseded by the ‘Flexible New Deal’ from October 
2009.   
 
NDYP participation was mandatory for those of the relevant age group who had 
claimed JSA continuously for six months, had claimed NI credits, or had been claiming 
JSA under the ‘Severe Hardship rules’100 (Bivand & Holyfield, 2004).   
 
NDYP had first operated in so-called ‘Pathfinder areas’ since January of 1998 (ibid, 
2002).  Once young people had been unemployed for six months they would enter the 
‘NDYP Gateway period’ in which they were given intensive support in finding a job.  
This Gateway period would last for up to four months.  If a NDYP participant was 
unable to find a job within the Gateway period they then progressed to one of the four 
‘Options’: 
 
 Employment Option, a job with a wage subsidy and training provision; 
 Full-time Education and Training Option (FTET), leading to a vocational 
qualification  
 Voluntary Sector Option (VS) 
 Environment Task Force Option (ETF)  
 
The ‘Option’ could continue for up to six months, and up to a year for those on a full-
time education or training course.  Failing to start or failure to complete an Option 
without good cause, or being dismissed due to misconduct resulted in participants 
facing sanctions of up to 26 weeks101 (Bivand & Holyfield, 2004). 
 
Arguably the most important of the options was the employment option; a six month 
spell of subsidised employment.  The employer who takes on a NDYP participant 
receives a £60 per week wage subsidy for the first six months of employment plus an 
additional £650 contribution to finance a required minimum amount of job training 
equivalent to one day per week (Hasluck, 1999; Blundell et al, 2004).  
                                            
100 Outlined in Section 16 of the Job Seeker’s Act (1995). These rules allows the Secretary of State, 
or a person acting on his behalf, to make a discretionary award of Jobseekers Allowance to those 
Young People who do not fall into a Prescribed Group but can satisfy him that they would suffer 
Severe Hardship were they not to receive Jobseekers Allowance.  
101 Sanctions on the NDYP was managed in accordance with existing JSA sanctions regulations so 
that benefits could be sanctioned (cut) for 2, 4 or 26 weeks depending on the severity of the ‘offence’.  
These including losing a place on an Option due to misconduct, giving up or failing to attend an 
Option (1 JSA Regs, reg 75(1)(a)(iv).   
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Those still unemployed at the end of the Option Period then had a ‘Follow-through 
period’ in which to consolidate the training and experience gained during the Options 
Period (White & Riley, 2002).    
 
Participants who were unable to find a job following the follow-through period were 
returned to Job Seeker’s Allowance as new claimants.  The impact of this on the 
statistics is discussed later.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. A simplified flow diagram of the New Deal program.  
Source: Blundell et al (2004) 
 
5.2.1. The impact of the NDYP on young people 
 
Given the historic nature of the NDYP, it was not possible to collect primary data from 
participants.  Therefore, using the DWP Tabulation Tool, all available administrative 
measures were collected that would measure or indicate the statistical impact of the 
NDYP (DWP, n.d.).  This data was analysed using descriptive statistics and is 
discussed with links made to relevant research where appropriate.   
 
These measures included:   
 
New Deal Young People Starters – Spells contains the number of starts to the 
programme. If an individual has started more than once, each start will be included.  
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New Deal Young People Starters – Individuals contains the number of people 
starting the programme. If an individual has started more than once, the last start will 
be included.  
 
New Deal Young People Participants contains the number of active participants on 
the programme.  
 
New Deal Young People Leavers – Spells contains the number of completed spells 
on the programme and the immediate destination of that spell. If an individual has left 
more than once, each spell and immediate destination will be included.  
 
New Deal Young People Leavers – Individuals contains the number of people 
leaving the programme and their immediate destination. If an individual has left more 
than once, the last time they left, with associated immediate destination, will be 
included.  
 
New Deal Young People Jobs – Spells contains the number of jobs gained through 
the programme. If an individual has had two spells, and gained a job in each of those 
spells, both jobs will be included. However, only one job per distinct spell on the 
programme will be included.  
 
New Deal Young People Jobs – Individuals contains the number of jobs gained 
through the programme. If an individual has had two spells, and gained a job in each 
of those spells, only one job will be included. This job will be the best job across all 
spells (in the order: 1. Unsubsidised sustained, 2. Subsidised sustained, 3. 
Unsubsidised un-sustained, 4. Subsidised un-sustained). For cases where there is 
more than one best job, the latest of these is recorded. 
 
A positivist would argue that these measures/indicators are important as they suggest 
what the labour market impact of the NDYP may have been.  However, this thesis 
argues that the impact of the NDYP on the statistics was due to the statistical 
construction of the measures used rather than some objective social reality.   
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5.2.1.1. Claimant Count, Youth Long Term Unemployment (LTU) and 
ILO Youth Unemployment 
 
The Claimant Count, ILO Youth Unemployment and Long Term Unemployment are 
arguably three important measures/indicators of the statistical impact of the NDYP.  
The Claimant Count measures the number of people claiming benefits principally for 
the reason of being unemployed (ONS, 2012).  Youth LTU is defined as those who 
have been Claimant Count Unemployed for longer than 12 months.    
ILO Youth Unemployment on the other hand is measured by the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) and defines the young unemployed people as:  
 
 Persons aged 15 to 24 years old; 
 Being without a job, have been actively seeking work in the past four weeks 
and are available to start work in the next two weeks; or 
 Being out of work, have found a job and are waiting to start it in the next two 
weeks (ILO, 2014).  
 
The construction of these measures/indicators is important to the perceived impact of 
the NDYP.  For instance, soon after its introduction it was realised that as a 
consequence of its structure, the NDYP had the potential to radically distort not only 
the Claimant Count but other labour market statistics (Wood, 1998).  Wood outlines in 
Table 5.1. the number of ways he thought this distortion could occur.  This is discussed 
in more detail after the table.  
 
No further research has been conducted since Wood (1998) or White & Riley (2002) 
to test whether these statistical effects did occur over the course of the NDYP.  The 
following sections of this thesis fills that gap in knowledge.   
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Table 5.1. Labour market classification of participants on the New Deal for 18-
24-year-olds 
 Employment  Unemployment  Inactivity 
 Labour Force 
Survey 
Workforce 
jobs 
Labour Force 
Survey 
Claimant 
Count 
Labour 
Force 
Survey 
New Deal 
Gateway 
     
Gateway 
participants 
continue as 
 JSA claimants.  
Majority will 
also be ILO 
Unemployed. 
Adjacent 
columns show 
circumstances 
in which 
individuals 
could be 
classified in 
other labour 
market states. 
 
Could be LFS 
employee or self-
employed if meets 
the ILO definition.  
Would then be a 
JSA claimant but 
not ILO 
Unemployed.  
Could be WJ 
employee if 
working and 
picked up 
through 
employer 
survey.  Could 
be WJ self-
employed if 
pick up 
through LFS.  
Could be LFS 
unemployed if meets 
ILO definition of 
unemployment. 
Would then be ILO 
Unemployed and a 
JSA claimant.  
Participants 
remain JSA 
claimants 
while on the 
Gateway.  
Could be LFS 
inactive if not in 
work and does 
not meet ILO 
definition of 
unemployment.  
Would then be a 
JSA claimant but 
not ILO 
Unemployed.  
Unsubsidised 
jobs 
 
Should be counted 
as LFS employee 
or self-employed.  
Should be 
counted as WJ 
employee job 
or self-
employed. 
If began as ILO 
Unemployed, should 
leave ILO 
Unemployment.  
Leaves JSA 
unless hours 
of work 
means 
eligibility for 
benefits 
retained.  
If began as LFS 
inactive should 
leave inactivity.  
New Deal 
Options 
     
New Deal 
employment 
option 
 
Should be counted 
as LFS employee 
or self-employed 
Should be 
counted as WJ 
employee job 
or self-
employed 
If began as ILO 
Unemployed, should 
leave ILO 
Unemployment.  
Leave JSA If began as LFS 
inactivity, should 
leave inactivity.  
ETF or 
voluntary 
sector option 
 
Should be counted 
as LFS employee 
as participant of 
government-
supported training 
or employment 
programme.  If 
receiving a wage, 
should be counted 
as LFS employee 
Should be 
counted as WJ 
employed as 
government-
supported 
training job.  If 
receiving a 
wage, should 
be counted as 
a WJ 
employee job.  
If began as ILO 
Unemployed, should 
leave ILO 
Unemployment.  
Could remain ILO 
Unemployed 
depending on 
responses to LFS 
questions. 
Leaves JSA If began as LFS 
inactive should 
leave inactivity.  
Could remain 
inactive 
depending on 
responses to 
LFS questions.  
FTET option 
 
Should not 
generally be 
counted as LFS 
employed.  Could 
be counted as LFS 
employed if 
undertaking some 
work in free time.  
Should not 
generally be 
picked up as 
WJ employed.  
Could be 
counted as WJ 
employed if 
undertaking 
some work in 
free time.  
If began as ILO 
Unemployed, should 
generally leave ILO 
Unemployment.  
Could be counted as 
LFS unemployed if 
undertakes job-
search activity in free 
time which is 
sufficient to meet ILO 
definition.  
Leaves JSA If began as LFS 
inactive should 
remain inactive.  
If began as LFS 
employed or 
unemployed, 
should generally 
become LFS 
inactive.  
Source: Wood, 1998. p. 239.  
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As a result of the NDYP ‘Options’ young people would not have been counted in the 
Claimant Count during the time on which they were on the NDYP.   
 
Examining the available data the overall Claimant Count for those aged 18-24 years 
old (young people as defined by New Labour) showed only a moderate decline from 
a high of 409,900 in May 1997 to a low of 239,200 in February 2008.  This data has 
been drawn in Graph 5.1.  Rapid declines in the Youth Claimant Count appear to have 
effectively stalled by May 2001 with only minor declines in the following years before 
the recession/credit crunch of the late 2000’s led to a rapid increase in the youth 
Claimant Count.  This slow-down in declines of the Youth Claimant Count also 
coincided with the dot.com bubble.  However, it may also be indicative of the NDYP 
having helped the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of easy-to-help clients while failing to help clients 
with more complex barriers to employment.    
 
It could be argued that a young person may no longer have been counted in the 
Claimant Count while still not having found employment as defined by the ILO.  Wood 
does suggest, however, that Participants of the Employment, Environmental Task 
Force and Voluntary Sector Option would leave the Claimant Count but could 
potentially be entered as ‘Labour Force Survey Employed’ depending on how they 
responded to the LFS.   
 
It could also be argued there are issues with the definition of an essentially temporary 
subsidised job with an employer for six months on the ‘Employment Option’ as being 
‘employed’.  Participants would also still be in receipt of other out-of-work benefits such 
as housing benefit in addition to a wage subsidy.  This does not seem to match 
commonsensical social conventions of what it means to be ‘employed’, but again, it is 
the outcome of the socio-political construct of ‘in employment’ used by New Labour in 
the LFS.  It would be hard to deny that a lower Youth Claimant Count and a higher 
number of young people counted as being in employment was politically helpful as 
these are the two measures most commonly used by the media to discuss the labour 
market.     
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5.2.1.1.1. Youth LTU 
 
As a result of the distortion to the Claimant Count, there would be a masking of 
significant amounts of youth LTU (White & Riley, 2002).  This distortion occurs 
because during the Gateway period NDYP participants remain on JSA and are thus 
included in the Claimant Count.  However, once they enter the Option phase they are 
no longer eligible to claim JSA.  They may then be classified in a number of other ways 
(Wood, 1998; White & Riley, 2002).  During the Follow-through period, participants 
may then make a new JSA claim, effectively re-setting the clock on the period for which 
they are ‘counted’ as being ‘unemployed’ according to the Claimant Count.  The result 
being:   
 
“After the New Deal it no longer makes much sense to compare claimant 
unemployment of more than one year’s duration between 18-24 year olds and 
other groups.  The structure of the NDYP makes it nearly impossible for any 
18-24 year old to reach one year of unemployment” (White & Riley, 2002. p. 9).     
 
If participants complete the NDYP programme but are unsuccessful in finding 
employment they return to claiming out-of-work benefits.  However, this becomes a 
new JSA claim, not a continuation of the original claim.  Thus, it becomes effectively 
impossible for a young people to be counted as LTU.   
 
Youth LTU data which became available in 2011 has been plotted in Graph 5.2. This 
graph shows youth LTU effectively collapsing from over 90,000 when New Labour 
entered office to a low of 3,700 in August 2001.  It then remained almost consistently 
low (below 10,000) until September 2009 when it rose steeply to above 10,000.  This 
appears to prove White & Riley’s (2002) theory that due to the structure of the NDYP 
it would be almost impossible for young people who had been without work to be 
counted as Youth LTU.   
 
5.2.1.1.2. ILO Youth Unemployment  
 
ILO Youth Unemployment differs from the Youth Claimant Count and LTU in that it 
relies upon the self-reporting of survey participants of the Labour Force Survey.  
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Participants are expected to read the criteria and self-report which criterion they feel 
they meet.   
 
The ILO Youth Unemployment rate from April 1997 to June 2010 is drawn in Graph 
5.3.  The data suggests that ILO Youth Unemployment rose by an average of 0.22% 
per quarter.  The lowest rate was 17.2% in April-June (Q2) of 2001 with a peak of 
37.6% in July-September (Q3) of 2009.  A trend line and linear regression equation 
has been added.   
 
Although seasonal variation has been left in, there appears to be an overall increase 
in the numbers of young people self-reporting as unemployed.  As is discussed in 
section 5.2.1.4. later in this chapter, this increase in ILO Youth Unemployment 
coincides with an increasing number of young people who were defined as NEETs 
(Not in education, employment or training), a commonly used measure of economic 
inactivity.   
 
The picture of labour market activity painted by this data is very different to that 
portrayed by the Youth Claimant Count and LTU data.  This adds further weight to the 
claim that the NDYP distorted the other measures of youth labour market activity.   
 
These results in 5.2.1.1. all raise the question as to whether this distortive effect of this 
blurred line was an unintended consequence of administrative definitions, or an 
intentional attempt to reduce headline labour market figures. It could easily be argued, 
for instance, that a consistent underestimation of the Youth Claimant Count and LTU 
would undoubtedly have helped New Labour politically.  These measures/indicators 
therefore appear to be portraying the nature of their socio-political construction rather 
than some objective social reality.  
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Graph 5.1: Youth Claimant Count (seasonally adjusted) 
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Graph 5.2: Youth Long Term Unemployment (seasonally adjusted) (thousands) 
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Graph 5.3. ILO Youth Unemployment % rate 1997 - 2010 (not seasonally adjusted)  
Source: Office for National Statistics, (2011a)
y = 0.2247x + 16.538
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5.2.1.2. Jobs found 
 
According to the available administrative data, it is claimed that between January 1998 
and November 2009 a total of 935,630 young people ‘found jobs’ through the NDYP 
programme out of a total of 1,483,070 young people who started during the same 
period.  This suggests an average ‘success rate’ of 63% over this time period.  
However, a total of 1,559,990 individuals had started the NDYP when New Labour left 
office in May 2010, as can be seen in Graph 5.4. 
 
An important limitation of the available data is that there is a complete lack of detail 
regarding the type of work/jobs participants left the NDYP for.  It could be argued that 
this is important because not all jobs have an equally positive impact on an individual’s 
welfare.  For instance, a well-paid full-time job with prospects of training and promotion 
would have a very different impact on a person’s welfare compared to a poorly-paid 
or part-time job with no training or promotion prospects.   
 
The only information available about the type of job is in the definition of the measures 
provided by the DWP (n.d.):  
 
“New Deal Young People Jobs – Individuals contains the number of jobs 
gained through the programme. If an individual has had two spells and gained 
a job in each of those spells only one job will be included. This job will be the 
best job across all spells (in the order: 1. Unsubsidised sustained, 2. Subsidised 
sustained, 3. Unsubsidised un-sustained, 4. Subsidised un-sustained). For 
cases where there is more than one best job, the latest of these is recorded.”  
 
The “best job” is defined as one which is unsubsidised by the NDYP and sustained 
(which was defined as lasting longer than 13 weeks).  Other types of employment are 
prioritised hierarchically according to amount of subsidy and sustainability.  However, 
it could be said that such ordering of data makes such data an ‘ordinal scale’ in that it 
“has order, but the interval between measurements is not meaningful” (Oakshott, p. 
82), i.e. it is an arbitrary numerical scale where the exact numerical quantity of a 
particular value has no significance beyond its ability to establish a ranking over a set 
of data points.  From available literature no justification or rationalisation of this ranking 
is made.  It is only implicit that a job which is unsubsidised and lasts longer than 13 
weeks is better than progressively more subsidised and less sustainable jobs.     
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It should be noted that NDYP participants finding jobs and thus leaving the NDYP for 
work would not have substantially impacted the Claimant Count.  By participating in 
the NDYP Options stage participants would already have ceased to have been 
measured through the Claimant Count.  On the other hand, it may have impacted the 
British Labour Force Survey’s measure of ‘Youth Unemployment’.  This is important 
because the Claimant Count is the primary measure used by politicians and the media 
when discussing unemployment.  Individuals leaving the NDYP for reasons other than 
work may have impacted the Claimant Count if they were doing so to return to claiming 
JSA.    
 
As can be seen in Graph 5.4. there were significant numbers leaving the NDYP for 
unknown destinations.  This is also important as it may be indicative of participants 
leaving to become self-employed, leaving the labour market altogether or becoming 
‘economically inactive’.  Section 5.2.1.4. below discusses the extent that this may be 
linked with an increased incidence of NEET’s under New Labour.   
 
The available data also lacked information about the gender of leavers.  This is 
important because young females may leave the NDYP to have children.  
Unaffordable childcare then leads to their exclusion from the labour market (Lloyd et 
al, 2008).  As a result of caring responsibilities, female workers are also more likely to 
need flexible or part-time employment.  Add to this that females are also more likely 
to suffer discrimination (ibid, 2008) and the available data is all the more inadequate 
to discuss the impact of the NDYP on female participants.   
 
When trying to gain insight into the impact of individual ‘Options’ of the NDYP upon 
unemployment it was found that more explicit data showing the route of individuals 
through the New Deal was only available for the period May 2009 to May 2010, as can 
been seen in table 5.1.  During this period the programme appears to have the vast 
majority of participants on the ‘Full-time education and training Option’.  The 
Employment Option had the fewest participants during this period.  It is also interesting 
to note that even in May 2009, when a high figure of 76,590 individuals began the 
gateway, the numbers making it to the Follow-through stage were consistently low.  
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Without data prior to this period it is difficult to draw any stronger conclusions about 
the impact of the Options across the whole programme.   
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Graph 5.4: NDYP Leavers and Jobs Found (spells) (thousands) 
New Deal Young People Leavers – Spells contains the number of completed spells on the programme and the immediate destination of that spell. If an 
individual has left more than once, each spell and immediate destination will be included.  
New Deal Young People Jobs – Spells contains the number of jobs gained through the programme. If an individual has had two spells and gained a job in 
each of those spells both jobs will be included. However, only one job per distinct spell on the programme will be included.  
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Table 5.2. Stage of participation at the end of the month 
Date Total 
 
Gateway Options – 
Employme
nt  
Options – 
Full  
Time 
Education 
and 
Training 
Options – 
Voluntary 
Sector 
Options – 
Environmen
t  
Task Force 
Follow-
Through 
Participant
s 
(thousands
) 
Participant
s 
(thousands
) 
Participant
s 
(thousands
) 
Participant
s 
(thousands
) 
Participant
s 
(thousands
) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participant
s 
(thousands
) 
May-
09 
116.32 76.59 1 14.18 7.99 3.16 13.39 
Jun-09 108.73 67.07 1.03 14.97 8.84 3.49 13.33 
Jul-09 97.79 57.67 1.02 14.03 8.21 3.29 13.57 
Aug-
09 
89.85 53.71 0.95 12.26 6.61 2.75 13.57 
Sep-
09 
80.11 49.58 0.78 9.72 4.37 2 13.67 
Oct-09 74.46 45.17 0.76 9.59 4.12 1.82 12.99 
Nov-
09 
72.81 43.92 0.75 9.47 4.2 1.78 12.68 
Dec-
09 
73.96 45.4 0.72 9.09 3.99 1.68 13.07 
Jan-10 76.95 49.32 0.61 8.67 3.79 1.54 13.01 
Feb-10 77 49.75 0.52 8.64 3.8 1.53 12.76 
Mar-10 75.97 49.53 0.49 8.24 3.76 1.48 12.46 
Apr-10 67.68 44.98 0.39 7.53 3.55 1.36 9.87 
May-
10 
58.4 38.6 0.32 7.13 3.48 1.27 7.6 
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5.2.1.3. Re-tread  
 
The DWP measured a total of 1,559,990 individuals who had started the NDYP when 
New Labour left office in May 2010.  During the same period there were 2,224,170 
NDYP separate programme starts.  Both of these measures are drawn in Graph 5.3.  
The gap between these two plots suggests that a significant level of ‘re-tread’ or ‘re-
cycling’ by NDYP participants102.  Further analysis of the data suggests that in an 
average month, 4,458 participants were passing through the programme for at least 
their second time.   
 
More accurate data of the level of re-tread did not become available until after New 
Labour had left office.  Table 5.2 shows the total number of starters each year, and 
also the number of starts.  From 1999 onwards an average of around 25% of 
participants had started NDYP twice.  Rates of re-tread remained consistently high 
throughout the NDYPs operation.  Although only very small numbers made it to seven 
or more starts, this data undermines claims to efficacy of the NDYP in reducing youth 
unemployment and re-tread.  
 
Table 5.3. Number of people starting the New Deal for Young People, and the 
number of times they have joined the programme 
 Total 
starters 
Number of People who started on NDYP 
Two 
Times 
Three 
Times 
Four 
Times 
Five 
Times 
Six 
Times 
Seven 
or more 
times 
1998 214,060 1,450 10 - - - - 
1999 223,240 24,930 370 - - - - 
2000 201,920 55,670 3,650 90 - - - 
2001 186,150 52,880 13,200 670 30 - - 
2002 185,470 46,650 18,100 2,880 170 10 - 
2003 191,310 45,030 18,540 5,110 590 40 - 
2004 175,050 39,640 15,920 5,140 950 90 10 
2005 173,740 39,420 15,160 4,990 1,070 110 20 
2006 196,780 44,110 16,570 5,370 1,230 170 10 
2007 185,510 44,330 17,450 5,770 1,350 200 20 
2008 180,520 44,360 18,460 6,480 1,580 250 30 
2009 223,340 43,540 17,440 6,030 1,580 220 30 
2010 82,580 16,930 6,490 2,530 720 150 10 
                                            
102 ‘Recycling’ or ‘re-tread’ can be defined as those “who repeatedly claim JSA without finding 
sustained employment between claims” (Carpenter, 2006. p. 7).  
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Data Source: DWP (2011) 
 
High levels of re-tread/recycling between benefits and work is an important problem 
as it suggests multiple barriers to employment which are not being fully addressed by 
the welfare-to-work programme (Carpenter, 2006; Hill, 2012).  These barriers include 
a lack of qualifications due to prior educational failure, financial insecurity, alcohol and 
substance abuse, physical and mental health problems, discrimination based on 
features other than age, poor job-search behaviour/skills, and a lack of financial 
incentives (Hill, 2012).  The structure of the NDYP, especially the Gateway period, 
appears to focus mainly on search behaviour with little concern for these other 
barriers.  Only when participants reach the Options period do some of the other 
barriers begin to be addressed, for example, the ‘Full time education and training 
Option’ may address a lack of qualifications and prior education failure.  Issues such 
as alcohol and substance abuse or physical and mental health problems would have 
fallen under the NHS and are therefore not within the scope of this thesis.  Issues such 
as the lack of financial security in low-skilled low-paid work are also unlikely to be 
solved by the NDYP.  The National Minimum Wage and the Tax Credits system made 
some impact upon this issue, and this will be discussed in Chapter 9 of this thesis.   
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Graph 5.5: NDYP Starters (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
 New Deal Young People Starters – Spells contains the number of starts to the programme. If an individual has started more than once, each start will be 
included.  
New Deal Young People Starters – Individuals contains the number of people starting the programme. If an individual has started more than once, the last 
start will be included.  
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5.2.1.4. NEETs 
 
Another statistical measure used by New Labour is that of ‘NEETs’.  NEETs are 
defined as ‘young people’ (in this case those aged 16-24) who are not in employment, 
education or training.  The term NEET rose to prominence when it featured repeatedly 
in a report Bridging the Gap by the Social Exclusion Unit (1999) (Gonan et al, 2008).  
It has been argued that it was this report that led to the introduction of the Connexions 
as a means of monitoring and controlling the transitions of young people from 
education into the labour market (Furlong, 2006).   
 
NEETs are often not counted in the Claimant Count because often they do not claim 
JSA, but could potentially be included in the ILO Youth Unemployment measure if they 
meet the criteria and self-report as such.  This means, therefore, that many NEETs 
would never have entered the NDYP because they were not claiming JSA and so 
would not have met the pre-entry criteria.  
 
Although it was only possible to find data for England, administrative data suggests 
that the number of individuals counted as NEETs rose by an average of 30,300 per 
year between Q3 2000 and Q1 2010.  It reached a peak of 1,074,000 in Q3 2009 as 
can be seen in Graph 5.4.  This is arguably important because it suggests that an 
increasingly large number of young people were not only not working, but also not 
close to the labour market or engaged in formal activities that would eventually return 
them to employment.  This is not to say, however, that NEETs could not have been 
simultaneously involved in informal labour market activity such as working cash in 
hand in the so-called ‘black’ or ‘shadow economy’.   
 
This apparent failure of the NDYP has been highlighted by other writers such as Field 
& White (2007) who also observed an increasing number of NEETS alongside 
decreasing levels of economic activity.  Evidence presented here corroborates their 
claims beyond 2007 and casts further doubts upon whether the NDYP had an overall 
positive effect upon youth employment.     
 
An additional reason for the increase in the number counted as NEETs may be that 
young people were avoiding claiming JSA as this would have necessitated them 
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joining the NDYP after 6 months.  By avoiding JSA they were thus able to avoid any 
such conditionality obligations.   
 
However, some writers have focused their concerns on the use of the ‘NEET’ concept 
(Furlong, 2006; Yates & Payne, 2007).  By classifying some young people as NEETs, 
New Labour identified those requiring targeted support and intervention.  The NEET 
concept however failed to capture important details about their lives and did not 
propose the right support (ibid, 2007).  Instead, New Labour placed emphasis on 
moving young people into an EET (in employment, education or training) status 
without an understanding of the reasons for their ‘NEET’ status and often without 
appropriate support (ibid, 2007).  As one Connexions Team Leader so persuasively 
stated: 
 
 “It’s a sad fact that what gets measured gets done” (ibid, 2007. p. 340).   
 
It could be argued, therefore, that the statistical convention of NEETs was not as useful 
a concept as it may first appear.  Connexions were tasked with reducing the number 
of NEETs.  As Yates & Payne found, this led to one-on-one interviews and support 
being focused on the ‘low-hanging fruit’, i.e. those young people who were easiest to 
help.  Those with more complex barriers were found to be less likely to even be called 
in for an initial interview (ibid, 2007).   
 
It could perhaps be argued that a failure to take a more holistic approach to tackling 
the underlying problems of all young people in the labour market ultimately led to 
increasing numbers of young people being counted as NEETs.  This argument could 
be further developed with the important concept of social exclusion. 
 
Social exclusion has been defined as “the dynamic process of being shut out [...] from 
any of the social, economic, political and cultural systems which determine the social 
integration of a person in society” (Walker & Walker, 1997. p. 8).  Levitas took this idea 
further by saying that social exclusion is a deeper idea than just poverty and 
subsistence, but is about an individual’s ability to participate in the customary life of 
society (1999).  It could therefore be argued that the NEET concept is too narrow to 
encompass the multiple social problems and barriers faced by some young people.  
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These young people are not merely excluded from the employment and/or the labour 
market, but excluded from participating in society at large.  This argument appears 
especially important in light of the weight given to social exclusion discourse by New 
Labour (Hutton, 1996; Levitas, 1996; 1999; Byrne, 2005).  The target setting and 
performance management driven nature of NEETs may therefore have displaced a 
focus on social exclusion and broader efforts that would have reduced social 
exclusion. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it could be countered that despite NEETs being excluded from 
mainstream society and its labour market they may have participated in the informal 
economy and have developed their own social networks and activities.  Social 
exclusion is therefore only ‘a problem’ in this context if one is concerned with 
individuals avoiding their tax obligations.  
 
Others such as Furlong (2006) make a similar claim that the NEET category is 
extremely heterogeneous: it includes young people who are available for work and are 
actively seeking work (meeting the ILO Unemployed definition), but also includes 
those who are not available or seeking working (the long-term sick, the disabled, those 
with caring responsibilities).  Those not seeking work may have been pursuing other 
interests, resting, developing new skills through voluntary work or going travelling (ibid, 
2006).  The NEET category is therefore seriously compromised by its inclusion of 
young people who are disadvantaged and struggling to navigate transitions or exercise 
choice alongside privileged young people who are able to exercise much more choice 
(ibid, 2006).   
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Graph 5.6: Number of NEETs in England, 2000-2010 
Source: ONS, 2010. 
y = 7577.1x + 638469
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5.2.1.5. Deadweight loss and additionality  
 
An important consideration when evaluating the impact of the NDYP is whether 
additional numbers of young people found employment, or were supported into 
employment than would otherwise have been the case (known as ‘additionality’).  
 
Of related importance is whether a significant number of those who found employment 
or were supported into employment would have found employment without the 
‘treatment’ of the programme (known as ‘deadweight loss’).   
 
Writing of the NDYP, Riley & Young argued:  
“Inevitably, some of these people would have found a job anyway because of 
natural labour market turnover and the general expansion of employment in the 
economy” (2000. p. 1).   
 
There appears to be strong evidence to support this claim.  As was shown in Chapter 
5, a considerable proportion of those entering employment under New Labour appear 
to have done so as a result of strong economic growth.   
 
Between 1998 and February 2000, Riley & Young argue that there appeared to be 
stronger outflows from unemployment amongst the 18-24 year old age group 
compared to 25-29 and 30-49 year old groups.  Riley & Young were not able to identify 
the characteristics of the NDYP that led to this greater outflow compared to other age 
groups.  It could be argued that this greater outflow was a result of self-removal from 
the programme.  However, without appropriate longitudinal and cross-sectional data 
covering the entire period of operation it is impossible to draw strong valid conclusions. 
 
Attempts were made early in the history of the NDYP to estimate levels of additionality 
and deadweight loss:   
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Table 5.4: Estimates of NDYP deadweight loss 
Research Estimated deadweight 
loss 
Estimated employment 
additionality 
NIESR (1999) 50% 6% 
Blundell et al (2002) - 5% 
Blundell et al (2004) - 5.7% 
Average estimate 50% 5.57% 
 
Blundell et al (2002) and Blundell et al (2004) both note that they did not consider the 
long-term effects of the New Deal.  
 
Longer-term effects of the NDYP can be examined using available data.  This data is 
shown in Graph 5.5, and appears to suggest that over time there was declining 
employment additionality.  This means increasing numbers of NDYP participants 
leaving for unknown destinations.  Graph 5.6. further substantiates declining 
additionality as the gap between numbers of NDYP starters (spells) and numbers of 
jobs found (spells) can be seen to gradually increase over the course of the 
programme.    
 
These results may reflect a declining positive impact of the NDYP, or perhaps a 
tightening of the youth labour market as both Claimant Count and ILO Unemployment 
had been declining strongly since 1993.  However, the decline in employment 
additionality seems to continue during the financial crisis following very much a similar 
seasonal pattern before beginning a sharp increase in July 2009.    
 
Estimates of deadweight loss are limited to a single piece of research by the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research (1999).  Although the deadweight loss of 
the NDYP is estimated to be 50%, McEldowney (1997) argues:  
 
“A high level of deadweight by itself does not necessarily imply a policy failure.  
It could well be the case that high deadweight runs alongside a continuous 
stream of benefits arising from the scheme” (p. 185).      
 
What McEldowney omits is that the opportunity-cost of public money spent on 
programmes like the NDYP is arguably still important, i.e. whether the money could 
have been better spent elsewhere; especially with such high levels of deadweight and 
such low sustained levels of additionality.   
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Despite the arguments presented here, whether deadweight loss and additionality are 
the most useful concepts for evaluation remain contested.  The greatest difficulty in 
assessing deadweight loss and additionality is that such concepts are difficult to 
measure without a ‘control group’ to compare ‘experimental’ groups to.  Others have 
raised similar concerns about use of these evaluation concepts such as an over-
simplification of additionality and deadweight to simple counterfactual questions, a lack 
of ‘scientific rigour’ (small sample sizes and non-generalizable results), a negative 
attitude towards deadweight loss (and subjectivity more broadly), and an argument 
that these concepts represent a “crude tool to use in evaluation” (McEdowney, 1997. 
p. 185).   
 
It could be argued that there was the potential for the subsidised NDYP Employment 
Option to have had a positive impact on the supply of jobs to the market.  However, 
without data showing the uptake of the jobs subsidy it was not possible to assess this 
impact.  
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Graph 5.7: % of NDYP leavers gaining employment 
y = -0.0084x + 377.58
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Graph 5.8: NDYP Starters (Spells) and Jobs Found (Spells) (thousands) 
New Deal Young People Starters – Spells contains the number of starts to the programme. If an individual has started more than once, each start will be 
included.  
New Deal Young People Jobs – Spells contains the number of jobs gained through the programme. If an individual has had two spells and gained a job in 
each of those spells both jobs will be included. However, only one job per distinct spell on the programme will be included.  
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5.2.1.6. The impact of the NDYP on non-participants 
 
In addition to impacting participants of the NDYP, it has been argued that the 
programme may have had an impact on non-participants of the programme.  For 
example, Riley & White argue:  
 
“It is also possible that the help received by NDYP participants disadvantages 
short-term unemployed people not qualified for the programme.  This would be 
the case if for example fewer Employment Service resources are available to 
non-participants or if employers substitute New Dealers with subsidised wages 
for other young people” (2000. p. 12).   
 
A range of phenomenon have been defined for the potential impact of the NDYP on 
non-participants: substitution and displacement/crowding out.   
 
Substitution can be defined as “the proportion of assisted individuals who are recruited 
instead of (and thus substitute for or replace) individuals in the same company” 
(Hasluck, 1999).  
 
Displacement can be defined as “the proportion of employment change in participating 
firms that results from the programme giving such firms a competitive advantage over 
non-participating firms” (Hasluck, 1999). 
 
Beale et al, including several previous evaluations, found no evidence to support either 
substitution or displacement occurring under the NDYP (2008).  Others have argued 
that the relatively small proportion of the overall labour market accounted for by young 
workers means that any substitution effect would be small (Select Committee on 
Education and Employment, 2000).   
 
Prof. Richard Layard, the architect of the New Deal programmes, goes further by 
saying that displacement and substitution are fallacious.  These concepts, he argues, 
derive from the ‘lump-of-labour fallacy’ which claims that there are only a set number 
of jobs within an economy (Layard, 2001).  The reality, he argues, is that if there is an 
increase in employable individuals in the market place, this creates a downward 
pressure on wages, making it possible for higher levels of employment at the same 
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inflationary pressure (ibid, 2001).  However, in making this argument, Layard appears 
to forget the possible impact of the National Minimum Wage (NMW) creating a price 
floor for the cost of labour (though young people were only given the ‘Development 
rate’ of the NMW).  Thus, wages can only drop so far and firms may be artificially 
limited in the amount of labour they are able to employ.  At this point it could be argued 
that substitution and displacement may come into play, especially when workers 
supplied through the NDYP are subsidised.      
 
Despite Layard’s arguments, displacement and substitution were widely hinted at in 
the press although in less technical terminology (The Guardian, 1997; Local 
Government Chronicle, 1998; The Sentinel (Stoke), 1998; West Morning News 
(Plymouth), 1998).  In these articles, the eagerness of firms to sign up to take 
subsidised NDYP participants is highlighted.    
 
Upon examining available administrative data, no evidence could be found of 
displacement or substitution occurring.  However, given that these phenomena occur 
within firms, it is unlikely that any administrative data would exist unless deliberately 
gathered at the time.  This is supported by Hasluck (1999) who suggested appropriate 
data for collection focusing heavily on the behaviour of firms.  Proxy measures or 
indicators would if anything be more likely to suggest a causal relationship.  However, 
no suitable proxy measures or indicators of substitution or displacement could be 
found.  
 
5.3. New Deal for Musicians (NDfM)  
 
The New Deal for Musicians was officially launched in October 1998.  The programme 
was piloted between August 1999 and November 2002 (Somerville & Brace, 2004), 
and could be argued to represent a consequence of the Cool Britannia trend of the 
late 1990s where British groups such as Blur and Oasis were globally popular bands.  
The NDfM was originally targeted at those who were also eligible for the NDYP, but 
was extended to incorporate the ND25+ when the programme became permanent 
from November 2002 (Ibid, 2004).  The aim of the NDfM was to help unemployed 
musicians into sustainable careers in the music industry as either artists under contract 
or as self-employed artists (ibid, 2004).   
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The NDfM offered participants a range of support in the form of: 
 
 A full-time education and training open learning pack from a Music Open 
Learning Provider (MOLP); 
 Access to specialist Music Industry Advisers (MIA); and, 
 Self-Employment Flexibilities.   
 
Just like other New Deal programmes, there is ‘Follow-through support’ and advice for 
those unable to find work at the end of the NDfM period. 
The NDfM came to an end in October 2009 when it merged with the Flexible New 
Deal.  
5.3.1. The impact of the NDfM 
 
Assessing the impact of NDfM is perhaps the most challenging out of all the New Deal 
Programmes.  The niche nature of the programme and its comparatively small size 
has perhaps led to only a limited number of small-scale evaluations being carried out 
mainly during the early years of operation (Cloonan, 2002; 2003; Kazimirski, 2001; 
Thomas et al, 2000; 2001).  These evaluations have focused mainly on Scotland in 
the case of Cloonan, and Northern Ireland in the case of the Department for 
Employment and Learning Northern Ireland (DELNI) (2007).  However, UK wide 
evaluations were carried out by Thomas (2000; 2001) and Kazimirski (2001).   
 
Cloonan’s qualitative evaluations of the NDfM were, on the whole, very positive.  He 
argues that the NDfM especially was built around notions of employability, i.e. 
enhancing human capital as part of New Labour’s support for lifelong learning 
(Coffield, 1999. Cited in Cloonan, 2003).  The MOLP provision of open-source learning 
materials received mixed reviews but was an important part of increasing employability 
(Cloonan, 2003).  However, the importance of cultural, and perhaps social capital, 
were also identified as key factors in the success of the NDfM, especially the role of 
MIAs who provided confidence and validation to those who wanted to become 
professional musicians, but who had previously received a cynical response from 
Employment Service staff (ibid, 2003).   
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DELNI’s (2007) own comparative evaluation of the performance of the NDfM in 
Northern Ireland and mainland Great Britain suggests a very mixed impact: 
 
Table 5.5: Leavers Progressing into Employment 1999/2000 to December 2005 
 Percent entering employment (%) 
NDfM DEL Database 11.5 
NDfM 1st Destination of Leavers 33.0 
NDfM Current Destination of Leavers 37.0 
ND25+* 20.2 
NDYP 31.9 
NDYP average and ND25+ 25.4 
ND Full Time Education and Training** 28.0 
ND Education and Training 
Opportunities** 
21.0 
Source: DELNI, 2007 
* based on leavers progressing into unsubsidised employment 
** based on leavers progressing into unsubsidised employment 1998/99 to December 2005 
 
DELNI found that the NDfM performed better than both NDYP and the ND25+ 
participants in terms of leavers entering employment and staying in employment 
during the period 1999 to December 2005.  This perhaps supports the claims of 
Cloonan (2002; 2003) that the NDfM places more emphasis on employability i.e. 
human capital, and may therefore lead to better outcomes in the long-run.   
 
A comparison between the implementation of the NDfM in Northern Ireland versus 
mainland GB however suggests wide disparities between administrative areas: 
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Table 5.6: Recorded Destination* of leavers DEL & Jobcentre Plus 
 NDfM DEL Database NDfM Jobcentre Plus 
Database 
Employment 12% 31% 
Benefits 37% 7% 
Other known 32% 12% 
Unknown Destination 19% 50% 
Total 100 100 
Source: DELNI, 2007 
* Destination on leaving to end Dec ‘05 
 
Table 5.7: First destination upon leaving NDfM 
 NI% GB% 
Entered employment; of which kind: 
- Full-time 
- Part-time 
- Self-employed 
 
24 
5 
4 
 
42 
13 
5 
Those in employment from above employed within the 
music industry 
(5) (16) 
Entered education/training 7 2 
New Deal Option 2 17 
Returned to unemployment 53 15 
Other 5 5 
Total 100 100 
Source: PEER Consulting Survey of NDfM Past participants cited in DELNI, 2007. 
 
Table 5.8: Current Activity of NDfM Leavers 
 NI% GB% 
In employment; of which kind: 
- Full-time 
- Part-time 
- Self-employed 
 
23 
8 
6 
 
32 
12 
4 
Those in employment employed with the music industry (10) (15) 
In education/training 5 2 
Unemployed and claiming benefit/on a government 
training scheme 
43 36 
Unemployed and not claiming benefit  4 9 
Other 11 5 
Source: PEER Consulting Survey of NDfM Past participants cited in DELNI, 2007. 
 
As can be seen in tables 5.7. and 5.8., the participants of the NDfM in Northern Ireland 
performed worse than those in mainland GB in both the short-term and longer-term 
with lower rates of almost all types of employment, except self-employment, lower 
rates of employment in the music industry and far higher rates of returning to 
unemployment and associated benefits.  The DELNI offered no explanation for this 
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disparity103 but instead offered recommendations to improve the performance of the 
NDfM including further restricting the programme to only “those individuals who have 
a realistic chance of succeeding in the music industry” (2007, p. 70) as well as the 
introduction of work placements, increased monitoring and more accessible 
workbooks (ibid, 2007).  Unfortunately, despite Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, 
data was not available for the remainder of the UK.  
 
5.4. Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
Using a range of available administrative data and other evidence this chapter has 
examined the statistical impact of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP).   
 
The first part of this chapter set out the structure of the NDYP before examining the 
possible impact the programme may have had on young people between 1997 and 
2010.  Attention was drawn to how ‘young people’ are defined and how this client 
group may have particular issues not faced by other client groups.  It was argued, 
however, that this definition has evolved over time and appears to be a function of 
changes in JSA eligibility and ILO definitions of ‘young people’ versus ‘adults’.   
 
There is little doubt that as ‘young people’, however defined, make the important 
transition from full-time education to work they will often struggle with the transition.  A 
lack of work experience and work-ready skills will inevitably see them struggle to gain 
employment in the first place, but also to hold down that employment in the longer run 
until they have amassed that experience and skills.  Furlong (2006) makes the point 
that “Many young people move into temporary and insecure employment without 
experiencing NEET”, and also “A move into work or training or continued participation 
in education does not necessarily signify a lack of vulnerability or the absence of a 
need for quality training to sustain future career development” (p. 566).  The important 
conclusion of this is that, even if in employment, younger workers remain vulnerable 
to the increasingly insecure nature of the UK labour market.   
 
                                            
103 An obvious explanation may be the generally higher rates of unemployment in NI and the greater 
opportunities for employment in the music industry in mainland Britain.   
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Given the variation in the age at which young people make the transition from full-time 
education to work is so broad, the age range up to 25 years old seems appropriate.  
The lower limit of 18, however, has been defined by JSA eligibility.  It therefore 
excludes those who leave education between 16 and 18, and also those who may 
have left or who never entered mainstream education earlier, such as school-refusers 
or the children of travellers.     
 
Rates of Youth Claimant Count and Youth Long-Term Unemployment (LTU) amongst 
young people were examined.  It was argued that due to the structure of the NDYP, 
the measured Claimant Count and rates of LTU may have been distorted and 
artificially appeared lower than they would otherwise have been without the NDYP 
(Wood, 1998; White & Riley, 2002).  Evidence to support these claims was indeed 
found in the relevant administrative statistics over the period 1998- 2010.  Far from 
representing some objective social reality, these statistics instead represent the socio-
political nature of their construction.  This raises the question of how useful the Youth 
Claimant Count and Youth LTU measures remain when trying to study the impact of 
youth labour market policy.     
 
It could be argued that these measures remained useful to New Labour on a political 
level.  Being the ‘headline’ figures used by the media to report labour market activity, 
their artificial lowering through the distortion already discussed was to New Labour’s 
advantage.  There was therefore arguably no motivation for them to challenge or 
change these measures and the judgements or social conventions underlying them.  
 
In a number of areas the NDYP was found to be wanting when examining internal 
administrative measures.  A comparison of the number of individual starts to the NDYP 
versus the number of repeat starts suggested a considerable amount of re-tread was 
occurring.  More detailed data was not available until 2011 but this appeared to show 
that from 1999 onwards an average of around 25% of participants had started NDYP 
at least twice.  In some cases, individuals had several programme starts (see Table 
5.2.). This may have been due to the NDYP failing to tackle the underlying barriers to 
employment faced by these participants.  NDYP participants therefore failed to gain 
sustained employment and thus were forced to re-start the NDYP.  It is also possible 
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that they gained no employment between programme starts but merely returned to the 
NDYP after a further 6 months of JSA.      
 
Under New Labour the number of individuals counted as NEET was found to have 
increased steadily throughout their time in office.  Although the term ‘NEET’ is 
contested, it may be indicative of the underlying barriers to employment faced by the 
young which leads to their social exclusion.  The increasing number of young workers 
counted as NEETs would therefore have been very disappointing for New Labour who 
placed tackling social exclusion at their centre of their 1997 manifesto (Labour, 1997).   
 
The NEET concept was also found to be not without its critics (Furlong, 2006; Yates 
& Payne, 2007).  Furlong argued the concept was extremely heterogeneous, including 
young people with a range of labour market experiences: some were NEETs due to 
disadvantage while others were there by choice, e.g. middle class teenagers taking a 
gap year after college.  This raises concerns about how useful this concept is as a 
measure of Youth labour market activity.  Yates & Payne were also concerned that a 
myopic focus on reducing the number of NEETs (those identified as requiring targeted 
support and intervention).  The NEET concept, however, was failing to capture 
important details about their lives and did not propose the right support (ibid, 2007).  
These criticisms of the NEET concept, like those of the Youth Claimant Count and 
Youth LTU, raise the question of how useful this concept is when trying to evaluate 
the labour market impact of welfare-to-work programmes.   
 
A range of estimates for deadweight loss and additionality of the NDYP were 
examined.  Although not conclusive these estimates suggest a high deadweight loss 
of around 50%, and additionality of around 5%.  These estimates are arguably useful 
as they give some indication of the positive effect of the NDYP.  However, it was 
argued that statistical constructs are flawed (McEdowney, 1997).  These criticisms 
include over-simplification of additionality and deadweight to simple counterfactual 
questions, a lack of ‘scientific rigour’ (small sample sizes and non-generalizable 
results), a negative attitude towards deadweight loss (and subjectivity more broadly), 
and an argument that these concepts represent a “crude tool to use in evaluation” 
(McEdowney, 1997. p. 185).  Again, these criticisms, like those of other statistical 
measures, undermine their use for evaluating labour market programmes.   
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The impact of the NDYP on non-participants was also examined.  Previous evaluations 
found little to no evidence of substitution or displacement by NDYP participants (Select 
Committee on Education and Employment, 2000; Beale et al, 2008).  Despite 
suggestions of firms being eager to recruit NDYP participants over others (The 
Guardian, 1997; Local Government Chronicle, 1998; The Sentinel (Stoke), 1998; West 
Morning News (Plymouth), 1998). Layard (2001), however, was quick to dismiss 
substitution or displacement as fallacious social problems.  This appears to be true 
given the available evidence.  Due to a lack of data or other evidence it was not 
possible to estimate the positive impact of the NDYP on the supply of jobs.   
 
Finally, this chapter examined the New Deal for Musicians (NDfM).  Although also 
aimed at the same ‘youth’ client group, the NDfM took a very different approach when 
compared with the NDYP: it was heavily focused on improving directly relevant skills 
and qualifications to boost employability104, work experience and supporting the 
development of personal networks within the music industry through the Music 
Industry Advisors.  The result of this differing approach was that the NDfM performed 
better than both the NDYP and the ND25+.  
  
                                            
104 A human capital approach rather than a simple work-first approach.  
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CHAPTER 6 – The impact on the long-term unemployed – 
The New Deal for 25 plus/New Deal for the Long Term 
Unemployed (ND25+/NDLTU) and Flexible New Deal (FND) 
 
This chapter discusses the impact of New Labour’s labour market policies on the 
working age population who were ‘long-term unemployed’ aged 25 to 49 (inclusive), 
i.e. those too old for the NDYP but too young for the ND50+. New Labour sought to 
reduce unemployment and the New Deal 25 plus (ND25+, sometimes called the New 
Deal for the Long Term Unemployed or NDLTU).  Those aged over 50 years of age 
fell under the New Deal for those aged 50 plus (ND50+) and are addressed in chapter 
7.   
 
6.1. Defining client groups 
 
In terms of the scope of the ND25+, the decision to include those aged between 25 
and 49 is arguably one of administrative expedience and based on age rather than 
any other feature of the client group.  It could be argued that this may have been 
because this client group constitutes the bulk of the unemployed amongst the wider 
working age population105.  Thus, it was felt they required their own New Deal 
programme.  It could also be argued that the definition of this group was also a political 
decision.  For example, ‘Youth unemployment’ as a political issue appears to have 
arisen in the 1970s and 80s when recession and long-term unemployment unduly 
impacted young people (Sinfield, 1981).    
 
When individuals reach the age of 25, if they had been unable to gain a job through 
the NDYP they would have transferred to the ND25+.  However, there is no available 
data or information as to how many individuals would fall into this category of 
transferees.   
 
Those eligible for the ND25+ appear to have been defined by age and the length of 
their unemployment, in this case the client group consisted of those aged between 25 
and 50 years old and met other conditions related to LTU.   
                                            
105 Those aged 16-64 
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It can be argued an unknown number of participants may have joined the ND25+ from 
the NDYP after reaching the age of 25 years old, and an unknown number may also 
have left the ND25+ upon reaching the age of 50 years old.  However, numbers of 
participants making these transitions to and from the ND25+ was not recorded, further 
muddying the water as to the impact of the ND25+.   
 
It could be argued that the 25-49 year old client group appears not to have suffered 
any age-related barriers to employment.  They may however have suffered from more 
general barriers to employment such as a lack of qualifications due to prior educational 
failure, financial insecurity, alcohol and substance abuse, physical and mental health 
problems, discrimination based on features other than age, poor job-search 
behaviour/skills, and a lack of financial incentives (Carpenter, 2006; Hill, 2012).    
 
6.2. The New Deal 25+/New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed 
(ND25+/NDLTU) 
 
The New Deal for 25 Plus was introduced in April 2001 as an improved version of the 
New Deal started in 1998 (Somerville & Brace, 2004).  Participation was required if: 
 
 A person was aged between 25 and 49, and; 
 They had been claiming JSA for 18 out of the previous 21 months, or; 
 They had been receiving National Insurance Credits for 18 out of the previous 
21 months; and 
 They did not live in one of New Labour’s Employment Zone areas.   
 
If an individual lived in an Employment Zone they had to participate in the Employment 
Zone scheme instead (ibid, 2004).  
 
In a similar structure to the NDYP, the ND25+ had a four month Gateway period which 
consisted primarily of intensive help to find unsubsidised jobs (a strong focus on 
search behaviour).  It also offered support with communication skills, interview 
technique, confidence building, homelessness, drug dependency and debt, help with 
basic skills such as literacy, numeracy and IT skills, and support for special groups 
such as those with disabilities or health problems, ethnic minorities and those living in 
rural areas (ibid, 2004).     
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Those who failed to find work during the Gateway period progressed to the ‘Intensive 
Activity Period’ (IAP) which consisted of a set of activities tailored for each individual.  
These would include at least one of the following:  
 Help with basic skills; 
 Work placements with employers; 
 Work experience placements; 
 Training that had strong labour market links; 
 Motivation, soft skills and jobs search provision; and, 
 Any other support which would help to overcome barriers to work (ibid, 2004).     
 
The IAP was designed to: 
 Address ‘deep-seated barriers to work’; 
 Provide work experience; 
 Act as incentive to move into work; and,  
 Serve as a deterrent to fraud (ibid, 2004). 
 
Like the NDYP, there was a subsidised employment element to the ND25+.  However, 
this differed in that there was no formal training commitment or payment for training 
associated with the subsidy (ibid, 2004).    
Also, like all of the New Deal programmes, the ND25+ had a ‘Self-employment 
provision’ which provided assistance with how to set up and run a business and 
supported a period of ‘test trading’.  The role of the Self-employment provision was to 
encourage participants to move into independent self-employment or other 
employment (ibid, 2004)106. 
If a participant passed through both the Gateway and IAP and was still unable to find 
work they moved through to a ‘Follow-through’ period which, unlike the NDYP, only 
lasted for six weeks, but for participants with additional barriers this could be extended 
to a maximum of 13 weeks.   
 
 
 
                                            
106 Underpinned by the belief that some work, any work, is better than no work.  
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6.2.1. Previous evaluations of the ND25+ 
 
Unlike the NDYP, very little research has been conducted into the ND25+.  Only two 
DWP research reports were commissioned to evaluate minor pilot programmes in 
addition to the ND25+ (Page et al, 2006; Miller et al, 2008).   
 
Page et al (2006) evaluated the Gateway to Work (GtW) component of the ND25+ 
which had been introduced in 2003.  The GtW was a two week full-time training 
programme mandatory for those who had been claiming JSA for four weeks after 
joining the ND25+ Gateway.  This sought to improve levels of job take-up by improving 
employability (Page et al, 2006).  The GtW was found to be of only limited success 
and did not represent value for money.  It produced no increase in the proportion 
moving into employment.  Participants left the New Deal from the Gateway slightly 
earlier resulting in a five percentage point reduction in participants moving to the IAP 
(ibid. 2006).   
 
Miller et al (2008) evaluated ‘Employment Retention and Advancement’ (ERA) which 
offered financial incentives and in-work support to help individuals continue and 
advance within the labour market.  The ERA was aimed at unemployed lone parents, 
lone parents working part-time and long-term unemployed individuals in receipt of 
government benefits.  It was found that the ERA had a similar impact on employment, 
earnings and benefit receipts as other individuals in the ND25+ group being evaluated, 
with only small gains (2-3%) in the rate of employment (ibid, 2008).   
 
No other evaluations were carried out, presenting significant gaps in knowledge.  It 
was therefore necessary to gather further data from the DWP tabulation tool and 
conduct further analysis before appropriate conclusions could be drawn.   
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6.2.2. The Impact of the ND25+ 
 
6.2.2.1. Re-tread 
 
Available administrative data for the ND25+ suggests that, like with the NDYP, ND25+ 
participants were highly likely to suffer repeat spells on the New Deal programme.  
Graph 6.1 below shows the number of both individual starters and programme starters.  
The statistics suggested that initially 50% of participants were individuals who had 
been through the programme before.  Although this declines over time until eventually 
reaching zero in March 2010, it suggests that the ND25+ began with only limited 
success in reducing repeat spells, but that this improved over time. 
 
Table 6.1., constructed from data released in 2011 by the DWP, provides a more 
accurate portrayal of the extent of re-tread.  Although considerably less than 50% 
according to this dataset, an average of 22,000 participants re-entered the ND25+ 
annually between 1997 and 2010.  Just like the NDYP, this raises concerns about the 
effectiveness of the ND25+ in reducing long-term unemployment or tackling the 
barriers to sustained employment faced by participants discussed earlier in section 
6.1.  It could be argued that these barriers are likely to be the same or very similar, 
even for this slightly older and more work-experienced client group.  Especially for 
those who entered the ND25+ from the NDYP.  However, no data is available for 
participants who followed this route.  
 
It should be noted that there are periods when there is a peak of re-tread around 2000-
2002 and 2007-2008 amongst those starting the ND25+ for the second and third times.  
These peaks also coincided with major macro-economic shocks of the dot.com bubble 
bursting and the global financial crash.  This suggests that these events may have 
temporarily increased the numbers returning from employment to the ND25+.  
Numbers re-treading the ND25+ remain quite consistent for the remainder of this time 
period.  
 
 
 
187 
 
 
Graph 6.1: ND25+ Starters (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
New Deal 25+ Starters – Individuals contains the number of people starting the programme. If an individual has started more than once, the last start will be 
included.  
New Deal 25+ Starters – Spells contains the number of starts to the programme. If an individual has started more than once, each start will be included.  
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Table 6.1. Number of people starting the New Deal for 25 Plus, and the number 
of times they have joined the programme 
 Total 
Starters 
Number of People who started on ND25+ 
Two 
Times 
Three 
Times 
Four 
Times 
Five 
Times 
Six 
Times 
Seven 
or more 
times 
1998 78,240 40 - - - - - 
1999 149,020 20,140 90 - - - - 
2000 124,750 41,730 8,330 70 - - - 
2001 124,990 28,380 10,190 1,230 20 - - 
2002 122,720 23,700 11,760 3,680 160 - - 
2003 114,680 22,810 9,690 3,370 350 30 - 
2004 108,280 22,720 8,510 3,540 850 60 10 
2005 91,420 20,080 7,750 3,310 1,110 100 20 
2006 101,030 22,250 9,730 4,110 1,480 300 20 
2007 132,320 30,690 14,950 6,980 2,990 880 90 
2008 108,350 25,000 12,140 6,020 2,710 920 190 
2009 86,310 18,850 9,200 4,960 2,380 1,030 320 
2010 67,150 12,590 5,750 2,950 1,460 680 270 
Data Source: DWP, 2011 
 
6.2.2.2. Intensive Activity Periods (IAP) 
 
Like the NDYP, there is only data available for IAP participation between May 2009 
and May 2010. In Table 6.2 below it can be seen that ‘Work Experience Placements’ 
and ‘Training’ were the most popular.  It is interesting and arguably important to note 
that the Employment and Self-Employment IAPs had the fewest participants.  Given 
that these are the pathways which ‘activate’ workers the most by pushing them closest 
to the labour market, one would have expected them to be the most popular.    
 
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this pattern of participation was the case 
throughout the entire ND25+ period of operation under New Labour.  The data may 
instead have reflected the concurrent recession with workers choosing to increase 
future employability by engaging with training and education before returning to more 
active routes into employment once the economy recovered and labour market 
conditions improved. 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
Table 6.2: Stage of participation at the end of the month
 
Total 
 
Gateway IAP – 
Employment  
IAP – Basic 
Employability 
Training/ 
Basic Skills 
IAP – Self 
Employment 
IAP – 
Education  
and Training 
Opportunity 
IAP – Work 
experience 
/ 
Placements 
IAP – IAP 
Training 
IAP – Other Follow 
Through 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
Participants  
(thousands) 
Participants 
(thousands) 
May-
09 
51.88 24.99 0.34 2.37 1.34 1.03 6.68 5.98 0.08 9.08 
Jun-
09 
47.6 21.34 0.35 2.25 1.4 0.93 6.74 5.98 0.07 8.53 
Jul-
09 
41.72 18.03 0.32 1.87 1.29 0.79 6 5.56 0.05 7.81 
Aug-
09 
38.64 17.64 0.27 1.52 1.19 0.66 4.98 4.86 0.03 7.5 
Sep-
09 
36.12 18.27 0.23 1.26 0.89 0.59 3.38 3.89 0.01 7.6 
Oct-
09 
36.17 19.35 0.21 1.3 0.81 0.56 3.14 3.84 0.01 6.96 
Nov-
09 
37.73 20.72 0.2 1.38 0.8 0.61 3.25 4.01 0.01 6.77 
Dec-
09 
39.17 21.88 0.18 1.44 0.78 0.61 3.43 4.15 0.01 6.68 
Jan-
10 
42.04 24.3 0.14 1.46 0.75 0.7 3.62 4.39 0.01 6.66 
Feb-
10 
43.55 25.01 0.11 1.56 0.76 0.77 3.92 4.76 0.01 6.66 
Mar-
10 
45.13 25.79 0.07 1.64 0.83 0.83 4.08 5.08 - 6.8 
Apr-
10 
44.56 26.65 0.04 1.57 0.92 0.82 4.05 5.19 0.01 5.33 
May-
10 
43.27 26.32 0.02 1.51 0.89 0.79 4.16 5.08 0.08 4.42 
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6.3.2.3. ND25+ Leavers 
 
Graph 6.2. below shows leavers from the ND25+.  The available data for the ND25+ 
leavers reflects a similar story to the numbers of starters, suggesting initially high 
levels of re-tread which decline over time as the number of leavers (individuals) and 
leavers (spells) converge.  Again, this may have reflected improvements in the 
performance of the ND25+ during implementation, but this cannot be said for certain.   
 
Graph 6.3. below compares Starters (spells) with Leavers (spells) on the ND25+.  
Overall it took from July 1998 until March 2001 for the first participants to begin leaving 
the ND25+ programme.  However, Graph 6.4 suggests that all of the first participants 
left the ND25+ for work and that none returned.  It is not explained in the data or any 
available document how this could have occurred. 
 
The number of leavers appears to have increased rapidly from March 2001 while the 
numbers who gained employment does not follow a similar trajectory.  This peaks in 
February 2008 when 7,000 more participants left the programme than found jobs.  This 
again is troubling and suggests that the ND25+ had only a limited effect in finding and 
supporting participants into work.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that data of leavers did not record exactly where leavers 
went who did not find employment.  It could be argued that the 25-49 year old age 
group was less of a priority than ‘young people’ who explicitly appeared in the New 
Labour manifesto (Labour, 1997).  There was therefore no recording/monitoring of 
individuals who could be classed as NEETs in the 25+ age group.     
 
Of those who ‘found jobs’, no further data is publicly available as to the nature of the 
‘jobs found’.  This raises countless important questions: Do these jobs constitute 
sustained employment? Were they full or part-time? Were they zero-hour contracts? 
Were they self-employed positions? How much did the roles pay? Did the roles 
constitute a possible long-term career path or a minimum wage job with no prospects?   
 
It can be argued that these are all important questions because New Labour, through 
their manifestos, and other policy documents appeared to prefer an individual to have 
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some work, indeed any amount or type of work, rather than have an individual claim 
out-of-work benefits (Labour, 1997; 2001; 2005; DWP, 1998).  According to the ILO 
definition of ‘in employment’ (ILO, 1982) which was used by the DWP/ONS 
domestically under New Labour107, an individual need only have 1 hour of work per 
week to be considered ‘in employment’.  It is therefore possible that New Deal 
participants could have left the New Deal and found a job with only 1 hour of work per 
week.  This inevitably very low level of income could then have been supported 
through the Tax Credit system introduced from April 1999.  The full impact of the 
introduction of Tax Credits will be discussed in Chapter 9.     
 
Ultimately, given the definition of ‘in employment’ adopted and the support given for 
those in poorly paid jobs, New Labour may have benefited politically from the 
seemingly artificial boost in the numbers of those counted as being ‘in employment’.  
Those placed in the position of being counted as ‘in employment’ while in low paid, 
part-time or otherwise precarious work may have had different feelings and 
experiences about whether they were really better off in work rather than on benefits 
both financially and in terms of job security.   
                                            
107 Unlike the Eurostat definition of Employment used in the European Union Labour Force Survey 
(EU LFS) which has a far greater reflection of individual circumstances by asking a broad range of 
questions about an individual’s type of employment.  Although the ONS appears to sometimes use 
Eurostat data (ONS, 2014b), it does not appear to have adopted their definitions, instead continuing 
to use ILO definitions.  
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Graph 6.2: ND25+ Leavers (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
New Deal 25+ Leavers – Individuals contains the number of people leaving the programme and their immediate destination. If an individual has left more 
than once, the last time they left, with associated immediate destination, will be included.  
New Deal 25+ Leavers – Spells contains the number of completed spells on the programme and the immediate destination of that spell. If an individual has 
left more than once, each spell and immediate destination will be included.  
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Graph 6.3: ND25+ Starters (spells) and leavers (spells) (thousands) 
New Deal 25+ Starters – Spells contains the number of starts to the programme. If an individual has started more than once, each start will be included.  
New Deal 25+ Leavers – Spells contains the number of completed spells on the programme and the immediate destination of that spell. If an individual has 
left more than once, each spell and immediate destination will be included.  
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Graph 6.4: ND25+ Leavers (spells) and Jobs Gained (spells) (thousands) 
New Deal 25+ Leavers – Spells contains the number of completed spells on the programme and the immediate destination of that spell. If an individual has 
left more than once, each spell and immediate destination will be included.  
New Deal 25+ Jobs Gained – Spells contains the number of jobs gained through the programme. If an individual has had two spells and gained a job in 
each of those spells both jobs will be included. However, only one job per distinct spell on the programme will be included.
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6.4. The Flexible New Deal (FND) 
 
In an effort to tackle the perceived failures of the various New Deal programmes, the 
Flexible New Deal was introduced in October 2009 to replace all New Deal 
programmes.  The FND brought together features from across the New Deals, with 
unemployed individuals being supported by advisors who provided one-on-one 
support to develop a plan for, and to find suitable work.   
 
At the centre of the FND were five core principles: 
1. A stronger framework of rights and responsibilities to move benefit customers 
from being passive recipients to active jobseekers.  
 
2. A personalised and responsive approach to individual customer needs 
providing tailored employment and skills support to meet the needs of both 
customers and local employers.  
 
3. A partnership approach with public, private and third sector organisations 
working together to maximise innovation, leading to more and better outcomes.  
 
4. Devolving and empowering communities for future sustainable employment at 
the heart of neighbourhood renewal.  
 
5. Not just jobs, but jobs that pay and offer opportunities for progression, with an 
emphasis on sustaining and progressing in work to ensure all customers who 
need help to develop their skills have access to the relevant pre-employment 
and in-work training (DWP, 2009).   
 
These five principles in themselves raise important implications to consider.  The first 
principle calls for a stronger framework of rights and responsibilities to create active 
job seekers.  The implication being that the previous frameworks were not strong 
enough and that too many benefit recipients were passive.  The second principle calls 
for a personalised and responsive approach aimed at meeting the needs of both 
customers and local employers.  The implication being that it was felt that the previous 
programmes lacked a personalised and responsive approach.  The fourth principle 
promises to devolve and empower communities with sustainable employment.  The 
implication that policy had been unnecessarily centralised and disempowering without 
providing sustainable employment.  The final principle offers ‘not just jobs’, but jobs 
that offer pay and promotions.  This is perhaps the most important implication for this 
thesis, as it implies that the previous New Deal programmes, with their ‘work first’ 
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agenda focused on ‘just jobs’ which did not pay, offered little in the way of progression 
and sustainability, and provided insufficient support for skills development both pre-
employment and once in employment.    
 
6.4.1 The effect of the Flexible New Deal  
 
The FND was in place for 7 months before New Labour left office.  Although the FND 
continued to be in effect until 2011, being replaced with the Coalition Government’s 
Single Work Programme, the scope of this thesis includes only effects within the 
timeframe of New Labour holding office.  Despite only being in place for such a short 
period of time, when Chris Grayling announced the FNDs cancellation in 2010 he said: 
 
“I cancelled the Flexible New Deal because it was clear it wasn’t designed to 
meet the needs of people looking for work, but today’s figures show it is even 
worse than I thought” (Cited in O’Brien, 2010).   
 
 
Figures quoted in 2010 suggest that by November 2010, £500 million had been paid 
for only 16,000 job starts from the FND108 (HC debate, 22nd November 2010).  O’Brien 
(2010) highlights that this low number of job starts is in stark contrast to the 279,000 
who entered the FND in the same time period.  He goes on to emphasise that of the 
16,000 job starts, only 3,870 got a longer-time job.  Although the FND had positive 
results, there was an increasing ratio of short-term job outcomes to FND starts 
suggesting worsening performance.  It could be argued that this ran counter to 
Principles 4 and 5 of the FND: of sustainable employment with opportunities for 
progression.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
108 An average of £30,000 per job start. 
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Graph 6.5. Ratio of FDN starts to short job outcomes 
Source: O’Brien, 2010. 
Note: Could not be re-drawn due to a lack of the original data.  
 
Of research carried out by the DWP itself, only two pieces of evaluation research have 
been conducted on the FND (Vegeris et al, 2010; Vegeris et al, 2011).  These reports 
quite understandably tell the qualitative story of a programme in its infancy suffering 
the inevitable problems of a new government programme: poor understanding of 
systems and procedures, poor communication, problems with outsourced providers 
and a range of reported effects.  Just like the previous New Deal programmes, those 
with better qualifications and older participants reported requiring less support from 
the FND.  Davies (2013) does, however, suggest that the FND failed to meet its DWP 
objectives, perhaps due to the removal of incentivising forces within the quasi-market 
programme.  He also rightly suggests that a ‘work first’ approach is especially 
unhelpful in an economic environment of increasing Claimant Counts.   
 
It could be argued that the FND was a noticeable progression in New Labour’s thinking 
on welfare-to-work: that even in light of other very specific barriers to employment, the 
unemployed generally suffered the same problems.  These included a lack of work 
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experience, work-ready skills and qualifications, affordable childcare, and health 
problems.  The FND therefore appears to have broken down the barriers between 
client groups while at the same time tightening conditionality.     
 
Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion  
 
This chapter focused on the New Deal for 25 Plus (ND25+) and the Flexible New Deal 
(FND).  The structure of the ND25+ was discussed followed by a summary of previous 
evaluations of the ND25+.  It was noted that very few evaluations had been conducted 
(Page et al, 2006; Miller et al, 2008).  Both of these evaluations were of limited scope 
and lacked generalizable conclusions.     
 
Relevant administrative data was evaluated and it was found that, like the NDYP, there 
was a considerable amount of re-tread.  However, over time re-tread did appear to 
reduce.  Table 6.1 showed that repeat spells remained a consistent problem that was 
never fully overcome.  Such high levels of re-tread are indicative of the ND25+ failing 
to tackle the underlying barrier to sustained employment faced by participants.  
 
Intensive Activity Periods (IAPs) of the ND25+ were briefly examined, but with such a 
limited time-span recorded by the DWP, no clear trends could be observed or 
conclusions drawn.  The destination of ND25+ participants was examined.  Again, 
available administrative data was limited and strong conclusions difficult to reach.  
However, it was noted that the all-inclusive definition of ‘in employment’ adopted by 
New Labour was important109.   
 
The final part of this chapter focused on the much-maligned and short-lived Flexible 
New Deal.  This programme could potentially have yielded better results than 
predecessor programmes but was not run for long enough to yield informative 
feedback. Of important note is Davies (2013) who argued against the ‘work first’ 
approach of the FND.  This argument could be applied to all of the New Deal 
programmes, and will be developed as a conclusion of this thesis in chapter 10. 
                                            
109 As discussed in chapters 3 and 4.  
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CHAPTER 7 – The effect on those aged over 50 and the 
Disabled (ND50+ and NDDP)  
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
Although New Labour made explicit policy commitments in their 1997 manifesto 
towards supporting young people into work (Labour, 1997), commitments towards 
older workers and the disabled were noticeably absent.  It was not until the 2001 
manifesto that these groups received attention (Labour, 2001).  However, even then 
most references to older workers and the disabled were heralding policy programmes 
already set in motion such as the NDDP and ND50+.  These client groups were not 
New Labour’s highest priority when it came to welfare-to-work110.   
 
This chapter discusses both the ND50+ and NDDP.  This is because the two client 
groups that these programmes sought to serve overlapped considerably as many 
older workers suffer an increasing “incidence of reported health problems and 
disabilities,” (Humphrey et al, 2003. p. 7). Ill health constitutes one of what Atkinson et 
al, (2006) labelled ‘age-related employment barriers’.  Therefore, many participants 
may have been eligible for either programme, but each programme had their own 
specificities which may have affected their participants and non-participants in different 
ways.    
 
This chapter begins by exploring how disability is defined, the ways in which ‘disability’ 
as defined relates to unemployment, but also how unemployment can cause disability 
and health problems.  This inter-causality has important implications.  As part of the 
debate, rates of incapacity benefit are evaluated and how these have been affected 
by changes in definitions of ‘disability’.  
 
The relationship between older workers and disability is then addressed, especially 
the importance of industrial diseases and age-related conditions.  As part of this 
complex labour market picture, early retirement is examined by looking at state 
pension conditions, industrial superannuation and pay-offs and their effect on older 
                                            
110 Arguably because they reflect ‘the deserving poor’ and were therefore not expected or compelled 
to find work. 
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workers.  Finally, the chapter explores the ND50+ and the NDDP and their statistical 
impact on the labour market.  The chapter finishes with a conclusion which draws 
together this complex debate.  
 
7.2. The broader context  
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis discussed the importance of de-industrialisation and the 
changing structure of the UK economy.  It is also important to consider the effect 
increasing life expectancy has had on the labour market.  In 2012, life expectancy at 
birth reached 79 for men and 82.7 for women.  By 2062 it is expected to reach 87.3 
for males and 93.3 for females (ONS, 2013).  Increasing life expectancy places 
pressure on pension funds.  The result has been a gradual increase in the State 
Pension Age (SPA) and thus the encouragement of older workers to stay in work.  This 
is problematic for those with chronic complaints, including industrial diseases or other 
illnesses and will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
7.3. Defining ‘disability’ 
 
It is a recurring argument throughout this thesis that how client groups are defined 
affects their treatment by policy makers and social statisticians.  Finkelstein (1980) 
argued that the very notion of disability came about as a result of capitalist society and 
the associated processes of urbanisation and industrialisation.  Prior to capitalist 
society, ‘the disabled’ were just individuals who were part of the large marginal and 
often destitute group who survived by begging and through agricultural work.  He 
claims the idea of ‘disabled people’ as a specific group with a defined ‘place’ in society 
just did not occur.  This is not to say that society was not aware of those who were 
often termed as ‘cripples’ who would suffer discrimination, but they were not defined 
as a specific identifiable category. 
 
Following the industrial revolution, more paid work moved to machine-based work in 
urban factories and thus there was no longer demand for the labour of disabled people 
(ibid, 1980).  With less access to work, disabled people began to be perceived as a 
burden on society and thus defined as a social problem (ibid, 1980).  Disabled people 
thus came to be excluded and increasingly segregated from the wider (able-bodied) 
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productive population, increasingly being seen as ‘abnormal’ compared to the ‘normal’ 
able-bodied.  Thus their physical and mental abnormalities led to what Finkelstein calls 
the ‘institutional phase’ during the Victorian era where these abnormalities were 
defined as medical problems with the disabled coming under the control of the medical 
profession within custodial institutions (asylums, alms houses and workhouses) 
alongside the mentally ill, the old and the poor.  This segregation lasted into the 20th 
century.  Finkelstein argued that a third phase in the treatment of the disabled was 
where the medical profession attempted to re-integrate the disabled in order for them 
to become self-supporting.  In his own words: “[…] in industrialised societies, phase 
two can be seen as the period in which cripples disappeared and disability was 
created.  Phase three heralds the elimination of disability” (Finkelstein, 1980. p. 8).  
Finkelstein’s argument, however, is lacking in evidence; the majority of the population 
probably did not work in factories and alternative occupations for disabled people 
probably did exist.  
 
More recently, Bernell (2003) argued that the first step in defining the term ‘disability’ 
is the identification of a theoretical framework from which the actual definition is then 
based.  These frameworks include the functional limitations framework, the medical 
approach and the socio-political approach.  Most definitions of disability have their 
roots in the functional limitations framework (ibid, 2003) where Nagi (1969) uses the 
term disability to describe “an inability or limitation in performing socially defined roles 
and tasks expected of an individual within a given environment” (cited in Bernell, 2003. 
p. 37).   
 
The medical approach differs in that an individual is considered disabled if they have 
one or more specified medical conditions and this approach is often used in empirical 
labour market research (DeJong, Batavia & Griss, 1989; DeLiere, 2000; Parsons, D. 
1980a; 1980b. cited in Bernell, 2003).  This approach is important because individuals 
may be denied being defined as disabled and receiving any appropriate support if their 
condition is not ‘approved’.  Consequently, Bernell argues, “Quantitatively, there is the 
potential to provide inaccurate statistics regarding the number of individuals who are 
work disabled,” (p. 38).  However, this argument of ‘inaccurate statistics’ rests on there 
being some form of objective definition of disability to which prevalent forms of 
measurement do not comply.  Such a definition does not exist, and is arguably unlikely 
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to, especially given the variety of ways that individuals may experience the same 
medical condition.  For example, a condition such as rheumatoid arthritis may present 
as disabling levels of pain in one individual while in another individual the condition 
could respond well to treatment and thus it presents no barrier to them continuing in 
their existing occupation.  The conditions feature on any approved list may also be 
open to reinterpretation by policy makers.  Thus the statistics of those measured under 
this approach represent the health conditions viewed by medical professionals and 
policy makers as work-disabling at a specific point in time.      
 
The socio-political approach, on the other hand, is critical of the previous two 
approaches for viewing disability as a problem that an individual has while placing little 
emphasis on the other talents or technological changes that minimise the need for 
physical capabilities (Hahn, 1985. cited in Bernell, 2003).  Advocates of the socio-
political approach instead shift the focus away from the individual towards the wider 
social, cultural, economic and political environments.  Therefore “disability is 
considered the consequence of a “disabling environment111” (ibid, 2003. p. 38).  It 
could be argued that the socio-political approach is the driving force behind legislative 
attempts to create an enabling environment.  For example, the main consequences of 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was that it made it illegal for potential employers, 
educational institutions and other service providers to give less favourable treatment 
for any reason related to a person’s disability.  It required employers to make a 
‘reasonable adjustment’ for disabled workers.  The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
also created The National Disability Council to assist in the implementation and 
enforcement of the act.  New Labour continued this legislative approach with the 
enactment of The Disability Discrimination Act 2005, The Equality Act 2006 and The 
Equality Act 2010. 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 defines 
disability as “a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term 
adverse effect on his112 ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities” (s.1 (1)(1).  
                                            
111 i.e. the social problem is that individuals are not necessarily disabled by virtue of a physical 
incapacity, but that infrastructure such as train stations were not designed to give individuals with that 
physical incapacity access.    
112 s. 6 of The Interpretation Act 1978 requires the masculine pronoun to be interpreted as referring to 
both sexes unless there is a reason to do otherwise.  
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Such a definition would appear to fit more comfortably within the functional limitations 
framework. 
 
The Labour Force Survey defines a ‘work-limited disabled person’ as somebody who 
has “a health problem which they expect to last for more than a year which limits the 
kind or amount of work they might do,” (Social Trends, 1999).  This definition is 
therefore a mix of the functional limitations framework and medical approach.  The 
long-term sick and disabled are also usually classed as ‘economically inactive’ (ONS, 
2012).  
 
7.4. Disability and unemployment 
 
The definition used by the Labour Force Survey is built on the assumption that having 
a disability will limit the kind or amount of work a disabled person may do.  Given this, 
it is therefore likely that disabled people will suffer from higher levels of unemployment 
overall.  Disabled people also suffer significant barriers to gaining employment and 
are also more likely to suffer from discrimination because of their disability (Roberts et 
al, 2004).  Conversely, being unemployed can also lead to disability, physical and 
mental health problems (Linn et al, 1985).  Research has found that unemployment is 
statistically linked with a higher incidence of somatization disorder113, obsessive-
compulsiveness, depression and low self-esteem, anxiety, feelings of alienation and 
a less internal locus of control, all of which results in more frequent visits to healthcare 
professionals.  
 
This research indicates those defined as ‘disabled persons’ are more likely to be 
unemployed and, that being unemployed has the potential to damage physical and 
mental health resulting in greater numbers being categorised as disabled.  Given the 
wider context of de-industrialisation, structural economic change and an ageing 
population it could be argued that there would be an upward pressure on the number 
of those defined as disabled and suffering unemployment as a result.  This is explored 
further below.  
 
                                            
113 Somatization disorder is a long-term (chronic) condition in which a person has physical symptoms 
that involve more than one part of the body, but no physical cause can be found. 
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7.5. Rates of Incapacity Benefit  
 
Unemployment caused by disability could be reflected in a range of measures and 
indicators such as the key benefits claimed by the disabled during New Labour’s terms 
of office.  These include Incapacity Benefit (IB)114, Income Support (IS)115 and Severe 
Disablement Allowance (SDA)116.  Conversely, it could be argued that related statistics 
instead are more likely to reflect administrative definitions of the time rather than 
reflecting the experiences of those defined as disabled people.  An excellent example 
of this can be seen in Graph 7.1. which plots IB caseloads.    
 
In Graph 7.1. overall there appears to be a gradual long-term decline in Incapacity 
Benefit total caseloads, i.e. individuals claiming IB.  A regression line drawn from the 
data suggests an average decline of 85.2 claimants every 3 months.  May 1997 to 
January 2001 was below trend, January 2001 to October 2008 above and October 
2008 onwards was again below trend. 
 
A simplistic evaluation of this data would suggest that New Labour was succeeding in 
reducing the numbers claiming Incapacity Benefit, perhaps due to providing better 
support to help the disabled enter employment.  However, important changes in IB 
occurred which offer alternative interpretations.  In October 2008, New Labour 
introduced Employment & Support Allowance (ESA).  ESA replaced IB, IS paid 
because of an illness or disability, and SDA.  The introduction occurred at the same 
time as the dramatic drop in IB caseloads in October 2008.  ESA’s replacement of IB, 
IS and SDA offers an explanation for the sudden decrease in IB caseloads. 
 
ESA also changed the definition of what it meant to be disabled.  Although financial 
support remained in place for those capable of no work, all existing IB claimants and 
                                            
114 IB was introduced through the Social Security (Incapacity for Work) Act 1994.  IB replaced 
sickness benefit and invalidity benefit.  IB may be claimed by individuals deemed “incapable by 
reason of some specific disease or bodily or mental disablement of doing work which he could 
reasonably be expected to do in the course of the occupation in which he was so engaged” s.5. 
(171B)(2).  
115 IS was introduced through the Social Security Act 1986.  IS was an income-related benefit and so 
could only be claimed if a claimant was not engaged in remunerative work and had no other income.  
It could therefore be claimed by disabled individuals of working age.  
116 SDA was introduced through The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. To be 
eligible, an individual must have been deemed incapable of work, and have been incapable of work 
for a period of more than 196 consecutive days.  They must also be of working age.   
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new ESA claimants were given a ‘Work Capability Assessment’ (Walker, 2011).  1.3 
million of these assessments were carried out between October 2008 when ESA was 
introduced and November 2010.  39% of those examined were deemed fit enough to 
work, 17% were classified as capable of some form of work with the right support, 36% 
dropped out during the application process and just under 7% or 1 in 14 were classified 
as completely unfit to work (ibid, 2011).  It is not clear from available literature how 
many individuals appealed being classified as fit enough to work or capable of some 
work.  This massive re-classification of claimants previously labelled disabled will also 
have reduced claimant caseloads. 
 
Graph 7.2. plots total claimants for all out-of-work benefits aimed at the disabled: ESA, 
IB and SDA.  However, it does not include IS.  Graph 7.2. displays a similar general 
downward trend in claimant numbers.  In October 2008, total claimants increased 
slightly towards the trend suggesting that changes to IB/ESA simply changed the 
administrative definition of some individuals rather than, as Graph 7.1. indicates, an 
exodus off out-of-work benefits amongst disabled claimants.  
 
Graph 7.2. is also interesting in that total caseloads peaked around November 2003 
with 2.78 million claimants, and total claimants of these benefits being above trend 
between February 2001 and November 2006.  Given the strong average rate of GDP 
growth, especially between the 2001 dot.com bubble recession and the financial crisis 
of late 2007, one would have expected caseloads to be below trend during this period 
as strong growth might have encouraged and supported the disabled to find work117.  
It is also surprising that the graph shows disability claims going down despite 
unemployment going up post-2008.  This suggests that the data may be reflecting 
some other phenomenon, most likely the statistical outcome of changes to the 
structure of welfare programmes118, or as discussed above, changing definitions of 
disability.  
 
                                            
117 This potentially created problems if unemployment recurred: individuals would have proved 
themselves capable of work thus making it more difficult to prove the impact of a disability or illness 
on gaining and maintaining employment.   
118 As was the case with the NDYP. 
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Using available data, literature and media sources, the long-term decline in claimants 
of IB and other disability related benefits remains unexplained.  Related welfare-to-
work schemes which may have had an effect, such as Pathways to Work, were not 
introduced until after 2006.  Although ‘radical reform’ had been planned around 2005 
to reduce IB claimants, New Labour decided to back down and did not plan any target 
reduction in IB during Blair’s time in office (Kirkup, 2006).  Others have suggested that 
the number claiming IB and related benefits was in decline during this period and that 
New Labour were on target for reducing claimant numbers because of the sheer 
number of claimants retiring or dying while on the benefit (Hartley-Brewer, 2006).  At 
the time, Philip Hammond claimed that 880,000 IB claimants were over 55 and would 
retire before the Government’s target date (ibid, 2006)119.  The death and retirement 
of individuals suffering from the legacy of industrial diseases may therefore partly 
explain this long-term decline in claimant numbers.  
                                            
119 This further supports the argument that the NDDP and ND50+ served an overlapping client group.  
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Graph 7.1: Incapacity Benefits Total Caseloads (thousands) 
October 2008: Introduction of 
ESA 
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Graph 7.2.: Total claimants of Employment & Support Allowance and other incapacity benefits 
Source: ONS, 2014b.  
Notes: Includes claimants of Employment and Support Allowance, Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance.   
Not seasonally adjusted
Equation of trend line: 
y = -3.3289x + 2774.7
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7.6. Older workers and disability  
 
As noted above, older workers suffer an increasing “incidence of reported health 
problems and disabilities,” (Humphrey et al, 2003. p. 7).  Their research consisted of 
2,808 face-to-face interviews with individuals aged 50 to 69 years of age and was 
conducted during the summer of 2002.  This study found the most widely reported 
problems were heart, blood pressure or circulation problems (23% of respondents), 
followed by problems or disabilities connected with the back or neck (21% of 
respondents), legs or feet (21% of respondents), and arms or hands (17% of 
respondents).  Psychological problems were relatively less widely reported by 
respondents: 8% of respondents reported suffering from depression, bad nerves or 
anxiety and 3% reported suffering from mental illness or other nervous disorders.  The 
majority of those who took part in this particular study (60% of respondents) described 
their general health as either ‘good’ or ‘very good’ suggesting that older people accept 
increasing health problems and assess their general state of health in this context 
(Humphrey et al, 2003).  Less of a surprise is that recipients of IB were the most likely 
to report having poor general health (ibid, 2003).   
 
The mechanics of the link between the categories ‘older workers’, ‘disability’ and 
‘unemployment’ is strong.  The natural aging process inevitably takes its toll.  However, 
in the wider context of de-industrialisation and structural economic change discussed 
in Chapter 1, the legacy of industrial diseases also appears to have been of great 
importance.  Humphreys (2003) found that around 30% of those leaving work did so 
due to illness/health problems.  The effect of industrial diseases on older workers is 
explicitly recognised by the DWP in their Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefits: 
technical guide (Gov.uk, 2014) which includes an extensive list of over 70 prescribed 
diseases, their causes and associated occupations.  Diseases categorised under 
group A have a physical cause, group B have a biological cause, group C have a 
chemical causes and group D includes any other cause.  For example: Disease 
Number A2 is Cataract which is linked to any job involving “Frequent or prolonged 
exposure to radiation from red-hot or white-hot material. For example, glass and metal 
workers, stokers” (Gov.uk, 2014. p. 44).  
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On the whole, New Labour adopted and maintained the previous benefits regime for 
workers affected by industrial illnesses through the Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992 and the Social Security Administration Act 1992.  New Labour 
modified these acts only slightly with the Social Security Act 1998.  This merely 
clarified the decision making process as to what constitutes an industrial accident 
(Sections 29 and 30) and made allowance for further regulations (additions or 
modifications) concerning industrial diseases (Section 32).  Given this policy 
inheritance (Rose, 1990) it could be said that there existed great stability in the 
administration of benefits towards individuals who were defined as suffering from 
industrial diseases or the consequences of industrial accidents.  
 
The benefits payable under this legislation were known as Industrial Injuries Scheme 
Benefits (IISB) (Gov.uk, 2014).  These benefits included: 
 Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit; 
 Constant Attendance Allowance; 
 Exceptionally Severe Disablement Allowance; 
 Reduced Earnings Allowance120; 
 Retirement Allowance.  
 
The level of payments made to claimants depended on the ‘Degree of Disablement’ 
as defined in the DWP Regulations and expressed as a percentage (Gov.uk, 2014).  
For example, loss of sight is 100%, loss of one hand is 60%, and the loss of an index 
finger would be 14% (ibid, 2014).  Therefore, older individuals with any form of 
industrial illness or injury were likely to be defined as disabled under the Industrial 
Injuries Scheme, thus making them eligible for both the New Deal for 50 Plus and the 
New Deal for Disabled People.  As argued at the beginning of this chapter, there was 
considerable overlap between these two groups.   
 
The Industrial Injuries Scheme used a medical approach to defining ‘disability’.  This 
is potentially problematic as it ignores the role of the physical environment around an 
individual.  It also ignores the subjective experience of the individual who is 
                                            
120 Individuals can only receive Reduced Earnings Allowance for accidents that happened, or 
diseases that started, before 1 October 1990 (Gov.uk., 2015). 
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categorised as being disabled and their capacity to overcome any medical problem.  
Individuals are instead assessed for their ‘Degree of Disablement’ and given benefits 
according to a set scale.  This would have the potential effect of incentivising labour 
market withdrawal rather than participation121.   
 
It is interesting to note how little research has examined these labour market 
dynamics, especially the effect of age-related illnesses122.  It is also important that it 
was possible for individuals classed as disabled to withdraw from the labour market in 
another way: early retirement.  The following section examines that route. 
 
7.6.1. The effect of pension eligibility on early retirement for disabled 
workers 
 
As part of this complex labour market picture, early retirement was examined by 
looking at State Pension (SP) conditions, industrial superannuation (occupational 
pensions) and redundancy pay and the effect they had on older workers and those 
categorised as ‘disabled’. 
 
The Pensions Act 1995 set out the SP conditionality which New Labour inherited, while 
The Pension Schemes Act 1993 regulated private pension schemes.  National 
Insurance contributions were governed by The Social Security Contributions and 
Benefits Act 1992.  The State Pension Age (SPA) under Labour was 65 for men and 
60 for women.  The Pensions Act 1995 included transitional conditions to gradually 
increase and equalise the pension age for those born after the 6th April 1950123.  The 
Pensions Act 2007 further increased the pension age for women born between 6th 
April 1959 in increments onwards towards a SPA of 68 years for men and women.  
However, to be eligible for the full pension while Labour were in power, men required 
44 qualifying years (of NI contributions) while women required 39 qualifying years. 
 
                                            
121 This would be a negotiated withdrawal, not an ensnaring of ‘skivers’.  Welfare recipients would 
have a proven willingness to work demonstrated by their work history.   
122 It should be noted, however, that disability legislation does not concern itself with age but with the 
nature of previous employment.  
123 However, none of this had a statistical effect before 2010.  
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Therefore, early retirement was impossible if an individual was planning to rely upon 
their State Pension.  Individuals suffering from industrial illnesses in such a position 
would have had to have waited, perhaps relying on Incapacity Benefits, Income 
Support and other benefits to tide them over in the meantime. 
 
Older workers classified as disabled who were members of occupational pension 
schemes, on the other hand, faced very different possible outcomes.  In an effort to 
encourage these workers to retire earlier, redundancy packages and pay offs could 
have been offered which included ‘buying back years’, i.e. topping up occupational 
pensions to allow these individuals to retire before SPA.  This is potentially significant 
as large numbers of individuals could have ceased to be included in most labour force 
data while still being of working age124.  It is possible that these individuals could 
instead have been counted through the LFS and classified as ‘economically inactive’ 
despite their not showing on any other benefit claimant statistics.  This possibility does 
appear to be true of available LFS data as can be seen in Graph 7.3. below.  Above 
the age of 50, economic activity declined and economic inactivity increased to the 
extent that 40% of men aged between 60 and 64 were categorised as economically 
inactive.  This particular snapshot of data was at the height of the recession, and thus 
it could also be expected that employers would shed older workers first. 
 
Graph 7.3. Economic activity and inactivity of men by age (April to June 2008) 
 
Source: ONS, 2009b.  
Note: Could not be redrawn due to lack of original data. 
                                            
124 Working age population is defined by the ONS as those between 16 and 64 years of age.  This is a 
simple adoption of the ILO definition of working age population.    
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The available data suggests that older workers and those defined as disabled were at 
great risk of being pushed out of the labour market.  It is therefore important to examine 
the two key programmes New Labour had in place to try to discourage labour market 
exit amongst these two groups.  The remainder of this chapter debates the ND50+ 
and the NDDP schemes. 
 
7.7. The New Deal 50+ (ND50+) 
 
7.7.1. Structure of the ND50+ 
 
The New Deal for 50 Plus was aimed at the long-term unemployed amongst older 
workers, i.e. those over 50 years old.  It was introduced in April 2000.  There was again 
a focus on paid employment, by which it was meant working as an employee for 
someone else, or being self-employed (Somerville & Brace, 2004).  
 
Participation in the ND50+ was voluntary.  It was aimed at individuals who had lived 
in the UK, had been made redundant following a downsizing or closure of the 
organisation because of economic downturn, found it difficult to get a job because of 
the lack of any qualifications and there being less demand for unskilled labour in their 
area, had left work to look after a member of their family, or, had a disability or long-
term illness125 (ibid, 2004). 
 
To have entered the ND50+, individuals had to: 
 Be over 50 years old (there was no early entry or upper age limit); 
 Have received at least one of the following benefits: 
o Job Seeker’s Allowance 
o Incapacity Benefits 
o Severe Disablement Allowance 
o Income Support 
o Minimum Income Guarantee (this was replaced by State Pensions 
Credit from October 2003) (ibid, 2004).   
 
The ND50+ had a very different structure to the NDYP and ND25+.  The programme 
was instead composed of three elements: Advice from a New Deal personal advisor 
                                            
125 The ND50+ was therefore also aimed at ‘the disabled’. 
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on how to find paid employment (sometimes called ‘Caseloading’126); being able to 
claim Working Tax Credit once participants have secured paid employment; and, 
being able to claim a grant to help with training once paid employment is secured (ibid, 
2004).   
 
7.7.2. The effect of the ND50+  
 
Few DWP-commissioned evaluations of the ND50+ have been conducted.  The DWP 
has, however, funded a number of studies on pilot programmes associated with the 
ND50+ (Atkinson et al, 2006; Dorsett & Speckesser, 2006; Dorsett & Smeaton, 2008; 
Tennant et al, 2007; Daly, 2009; Davis & Ritters, 2009; Watt & Blair, 2009), and also 
on the broader topic of ‘older workers’ (Boaz et al, 1999; Costigan et al, 1999; Hayden 
et al, 1999; Humphrey, et al, 2003; Dominy & Kempson, 2006; Gerwyn & Griffiths, 
2006; Metcalf & Meadows, 2006; Vickerstaff et al, 2008; Blekesaune et al, 2008; Willis 
& Dalziel, 2009).  
 
It is interesting to note that the same themes emerge across these reports; that older 
people suffer health problems which tend to increase with age; that they tend to have 
caring responsibilities such as elderly parents or children; that they tend to have fewer 
qualifications than younger people; and, that they are potentially more likely to suffer 
discrimination on the grounds of age.  As Boaz et al comment, “It is evident that older 
people are a diverse group in all respects” (1999. p. 45).  They helpfully suggest that 
despite this diversity, these barriers to employment are very much the same problems 
as in wider society.  It was argued that these barriers should be tackled across the 
labour market, rather than just in isolated client groups (ibid, 1999).     
 
The DWP tabulation tool offered only a limited amount of administrative data relating 
to the ND50+, in this case Starters (individuals) and Jobs Gained (individuals).  It is 
not clear from the DWP or other government sources whether more data was 
collected.  It is also not clear why ‘Jobs Gained’ began being recorded before ‘Starters’.  
                                            
126 This may have been a kind of holding pattern, especially for private providers to process 
participants.     
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Despite this limited amount of data, it is possible to get a sense of the overall trajectory 
of the programme’s statistical impact127.  
 
It could be argued that the data suggests the ND50+ had an increasing ‘success’ rate 
over time in finding jobs for those who started the programme.  As can be seen in 
Graph 7.4 below, the number of starts gradually declines while the number of jobs 
gained converges with it, eventually overtaking starters on a number of occasions.  It 
could therefore be argued that these numbers suggest a rocky start but improving 
performance of the ND50+ programme.  Alternatively, it could be argued that job 
centres were boosting their results by recording anyone who found a job who was over 
50, whether or not they had been on the programme.  
 
However, like the ND25+, the scope of the ND50+ programme was arbitrarily defined 
by the age of the participants.  An unknown number of participants may have joined 
the ND50+ from the ND25+/NDLTU when they reached the age of 50 years old.  As 
mentioned in section 7.6.1., it could be argued that the ND50+, like Incapacity Benefits, 
may have been used by participants as a stop-gap between redundancy in later life 
and retirement.  However, it is not possible to determine to what extent this may have 
been true with the existing data and information in the public domain.   
 
 
                                            
127 However, some deadweight effect may also have existed as was found on the NDYP (NIESR, 
1999; Riley & Young, 2000; Blundell et al, 2004).   
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Graph 7.4: ND50+ Starters (individuals) and Jobs Gained (individuals) (thousands) 
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7.8. The NDDP 
 
7.8.1. Structure of The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) 
 
The NDDP was a voluntary programme aimed at helping those with an incapacity, 
illness or disability to return to work.  Like the ND50+, participation was entirely 
voluntary.  To qualify for participation, individuals must have been in receipt of one of 
the following benefits: 
 Incapacity Benefit; 
 Severe Disablement Allowance; 
 National Insurance Credits on the grounds of incapacity; 
 Income Support with a disability premium; 
 Income Supporting pending the result of an appeal against disallowance from 
Incapacity Benefit; 
 Housing Benefit with a disability premium; 
 Council Tax Benefit with a disability premium; 
 War Pension with an Unemployability Supplement; 
 Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit with an Unemployability Supplement128; 
or, 
 A benefit to Incapacity Benefit that has been imported into the UK under the 
European Community Regulations on the co-ordination of social security and 
the terms of the European Economic Area Agreement (Somerville & Brace, 
2004).  
 
Also, to have been eligible, individuals had to be aged between 18 and pension age 
(60 for women and 65 for men), although there were some exceptions, such as those 
aged between 16 and 20 who were registered with Connexions or the Careers Service 
(ibid, 2004).   
 
The NDDP initially consisted of: 
 The NDDP gateway; 
 Jobcentre Plus Work Focused Interview/Work Focused Meeting; 
 A meeting with a New Deal for Lone Parents Personal Adviser.   
 
Those found to be eligible were then referred to ‘Job Brokers’ whose role was to 
provide long-term support, help participants find and secure paid work, and help them 
to remain in paid work (ibid, 2004).    
 
                                            
128 Unemployability Supplement (UNSUPP) was abolished on 6th April 1987 but people in receipt of 
the benefit immediately before 6th April 1987 continued to receive it (gov.uk, 2014).  
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7.8.2. The effect of The NDDP 
 
It is important to note that as a voluntary programme, NDDP participants were self-
selecting.  Participants would only have put themselves forward if they felt capable of 
working.  It is, therefore, to be expected that the programme would have more success 
in helping participants into work compared with the compulsory New Deal 
programmes.   
 
DWP data for the NDDP offers all of the measures used on other New Deal 
programmes, but ‘NDDP Leavers (individuals)’ is not available after November 2007.  
It could be argued that the data reflects the voluntary nature of the NDDP; Graph 7.5 
(below) shows a much smaller gap between ‘Job Broker Registrations (individuals)’ 
and ‘Job Broker Registrations (spells)’, suggesting that participants were far less likely 
than other ND programmes to be repeat participants129.   
 
Those who self-selected to participate may already have been aware that they would 
be likely to find jobs through the programme.  On the other hand, it could also show 
that self-selecting participants were unlikely to want a repeated spell through the 
programme.  Of those who did repeat the programmes, they appear to have been 
equally successful in finding jobs, as can be seen in Graph 7.6 (jobs gained: individuals 
and spells) and Graph 7.7 (leavers: individuals and spells).  These are very much in 
contrast to the NDYP which was compulsory and suffered much higher rates of re-
tread.   
 
In terms of leavers compared to those who were concurrently registering with Jobs 
Brokers seen in Graph 7.8, there is a vast gulf at one point, reaching 3,280 in March 
2006.  Jobs gained versus leavers in Graph 7.9 again suggests a strong reflection of 
the self-selecting nature of participants with very high levels of success in gaining 
employment.   
 
When all of these measures are compared to the total numbers of individuals claiming 
IB while New Labour were in power in Graph 7.1, the results may at first glance 
                                            
129 Also of note in Graph 7.5 is the decline in NDDP Job Broker Registrations following the 2007 
recession.  This may be evidence of a discouraged worker effect. 
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suggest a strong and positive impact of the NDDP through New Labour’s entire term 
in office.  Total caseload declined from 1.56 million (2 d.p.) in May 1997 to 1.03 million 
(2 d.p.) by May 2010, with the strongest declines occurring alongside peaks in the 
number of NDDP participants gaining jobs. 
 
However, this should not underplay the importance of other concurrent developments 
which may also have effected IB caseloads, for instance the introduction of the 1995 
and 2005 Disability Discrimination Acts.  These Acts both re-defined the meaning of 
‘disability’ and ‘disabled person’ while also giving strong protections against 
discrimination, especially in the area of employment.  Although difficult to evaluate the 
effect of such rights-based policy in isolation, DWP research suggests that employers 
were less likely than ever to discriminate against the disabled (Roberts et al, 2004).  
The ‘enabling environment’ such legislation created by mandating the provision of 
facilities for disabled people further reduced the barriers to entering and sustaining 
employment faced by those defined as disabled. 
 
The New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) was well researched (Dorsett et al, 1998; 
Arthur et al, 1999; Ashworth et al, 2001; Corden & Sainsbury, 2001; Hedges & Sykes, 
2001; Hill et al, 2001; Hiscock & Ritchie, 2001; Loumidis et al, 2001a; Loumidis et al, 
2001b; Molloy et al, 2003; Beyer et al, 2004; Grewal et al, 2004; Roberts et al, 2004; 
Berthoud, 2006; Davis et al, 2006; Legge et al, 2006; Needels & Schmitz, 2006; Pires 
et al, 2006; Roberts et al, 2006; Stafford et al, 2006; Greenberg & Davis, 2007; 
Kasparova et al, 2007; Orr et al, 2007).  This research conducted into the NDDP and 
around issues of disability, despite its often narrow scope, highlighted the same 
themes that emerged in the research into other New Deal programmes and other client 
groups.  These are: closeness to the labour market in terms of recent work experience, 
qualifications, skills, health issues and caring responsibilities.  This is important as it 
suggests that, despite the perceived variation in barriers to employment between the 
client groups addressed by the various New Deal programmes, the reality appears to 
have been that all unemployed individuals faced the same range of barriers to 
employment, but each individual came with their own unique combination of these 
barriers.  
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Graph 7.5: NDDP Job Broker Registrations (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
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Graph 7.6: NDDP Jobs Gained (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
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Graph 7.7: NDDP Leavers (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Ju
l-
0
1
Se
p
-0
1
N
o
v-
0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
M
ar
-0
2
M
ay
-0
2
Ju
l-
0
2
Se
p
-0
2
N
o
v-
0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
M
ar
-0
3
M
ay
-0
3
Ju
l-
0
3
Se
p
-0
3
N
o
v-
0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
M
ar
-0
4
M
ay
-0
4
Ju
l-
0
4
Se
p
-0
4
N
o
v-
0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
M
ar
-0
5
M
ay
-0
5
Ju
l-
0
5
Se
p
-0
5
N
o
v-
0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
M
ar
-0
6
M
ay
-0
6
Ju
l-
0
6
Se
p
-0
6
N
o
v-
0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
M
ar
-0
7
M
ay
-0
7
Ju
l-
0
7
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Month and year
NDDP
Leavers
(individuals)
(thousands)
NDDP
Leavers
(spells)(thou
sands)
223 
 
 
Graph 7.8: NDDP Job Broker Registrations (individuals) and Leavers (individuals) (thousands) 
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Graph 7.9: NDDP Jobs Gained (individuals) and Leavers (Individuals) (thousands) 
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7.9. Chapter 7 Conclusions 
 
At the centre of the New Deal for Disabled People is the convention of ‘disability’.  In 
the literature to be ‘disabled’ is portrayed as a binary condition: one is either disabled 
or able-bodied and capable of work.  This ignores the fact that ‘disability’ is often not 
a constant condition but that medical symptoms often wax and wane.  This has 
important implications for social policies, as Berthoud argues: “[…] social policies can 
create or reinforce, as well as follow, social conventions: a scheme based on the 
consensus that disabled people are not necessarily expected to work may discourage 
disabled people from returning to work” (2006. p. 69).   
 
Therefore, conventions of ‘disability’ have important implications for the statistical 
constructions used in modern social policy.  Although New Labour initially appeared 
to have adopted existing conventions of disability set out in The Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995, they went on to challenge those conventions with The 
Disability Discrimination Act 2005, The Equalities Act 1996 and The Equalities Act 
2010.  Rather than categorising some individuals as ‘disabled’, this legislation adopted 
a socio-political approach and sought to change the wider physical and cultural 
environment by outlawing discrimination on the grounds of disability and ensuring that 
public and private facilities were accessible.  The introduction of Employment and 
Support Allowance in 2008 also challenged existing definitions of disability by re-
assessing significant numbers of individuals who had previously claimed Incapacity 
Benefit.     
 
Within the existing literature there is significant evidence to suggest that the measures 
of disability adopted by New Labour, like the other measures discussed in this chapter, 
hid a much more complex labour market.  Bartholomew (2006) highlights the 
conjunction of rapidly increasing levels of IB in the 1980s and early 1990s with 
geographical pockets of high unemployment.  The indefinite and more generous 
nature of IB compared with other out-of-work benefits may have encouraged more 
individuals to have claimed IB on the basis of medical conditions such as stress and 
backache which are difficult to prove (ibid, 2006).  Houston & Lindsay (2010) 
convincingly explain this rise in the number of people claiming IB in terms of industrial 
decline and reduced demand for manual labour that occurred in the UK during this 
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time.  They are keen to stress that this rise is not a result of a ‘dependency culture’ 
with many health issues affecting IB claimants which make categorically defining 
claimants as ‘disabled’ or otherwise very difficult.  It could also be argued that an 
important factor is that the first to be made redundant are usually workers perceived 
as less productive, i.e. older workers with a poor health record.  Thus, numbers of 
disability benefit claimants would increase before increases in wider measures of 
unemployment.  In the case of IB it can be argued, therefore, that New Labour appear 
to have adopted existing definitions and conventions of ‘disability’ and ‘fit for work’, but 
the introduction of ESA dramatically shifted these definitions thus challenging 
underlying conventions.  This affected who was counted, how they were counted and 
ultimately how they were treated by the DWP.   
 
Although the existing data paints an interesting labour market picture, all too often the 
statistics tell us more about changes in definitions and conventions rather than the 
effect of a particular policy or programme.  As found in previous chapters, the 
usefulness of using social statistics to analyse and evaluate welfare programmes 
appears to be increasingly undermined.   
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CHAPTER 8 – The effect on client groups defined by family 
structure: The New Deal and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents 
(NDLP, ND+fLP) and New Deal for Partners (NDP)  
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses New Labour’s labour market policy aimed at other client groups 
who are arguably defined by the nature of their family structure.  This chapter, 
therefore, concentrates on the New Deal for Lone Parents, The New Deal Plus for 
Lone Parents and The New Deal for Partners.   
 
Although it is not explicit in available policy documents or academic literature how lone 
parents were identified, this was most likely done as a result of their Income Support 
claim.  The claim process would have probed their individual, family and financial 
circumstances, and thus also identified to the DWP partners who may have been 
unemployed.   
 
Two of the explicit aims of the NDP were to reduce the number of households where 
nobody worked and to contribute to a reduction in child poverty (Somerville & Brace, 
2004).  These two aims appear to have been at the core of what New Labour was 
hoping to achieve with the NDLP, ND+fLP and NDP.   
 
It can be implied from these policy aims that there was an acceptance by New Labour 
policy makers that family structures were changing: that it made less sense to structure 
welfare around ‘households’ led by a male bread-winner and a female care-giver but 
to instead individualise the social obligation to work regardless of family structure.  As 
can be seen in Graph 8.1. below, the Labour Force Survey recorded this gradual 
change in family structures with a downward trend in the number of Married Couple 
families and an upward trend in Lone Parent families between 1996 and 2010.   
 
The remainder of this chapter will discuss NDLP, ND+fLP and NDP in greater depth.  
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Graph 8.1. UK Family structure 1996-2010 
Source: ONS (2014). Households and Families. 
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8.2. The Lone Parent client group  
 
The definition of the lone parent client group, like the client groups in previous 
chapters, appears to have been driven in large part by benefit eligibility.  This can be 
seen in the participation requirements for NDLP/ND+fLP which required individuals to 
have:  
 
 Been aged 16 or over; 
 Had a dependent child under 16; 
 Been in receipt of Income Support or not working (Somerville & Brace, 2004).  
 
Being over 16 years old, this group would have been or become eligible for substantial 
welfare support including Child Benefit and Free School Meals for their child(ren), 
Income Support for themselves, Council Tax Benefit and, perhaps most importantly, 
Housing Benefit or social housing.   
 
The lone parent client group and wider policy towards them is particularly well 
researched (Marsh, 1997; Finlayson & Marsh, 1998; Thomas et al, 1999; Lacovou & 
Berthoud, 2000; Marsh et al, 2001; Millar & Ridge, 2001; Marsh & Rowlingson, 2002; 
Vegeris & McKay, 2002; Casebourne & Britton, 2004; Marsh & Vegeris, 2004; Martin 
et al, 2004; Knight & Kasparova, 2006; Goodwin, 2008; Riccio et al, 2008; Collard & 
Atkinson, 2009; Casebourne et al, 2010; Finn & Gloster, 2010; Gloster et al, 2010; 
Ray et al, 2010; Sims et al, 2010; Haux, 2012).   
 
A recurring theme amongst this vast array of research is a lack of affordable childcare 
and linked with this the financial uncertainties that would occur in low-paid and usually 
part-time employment.  These presented the strongest barrier to members of this 
group entering or sustaining paid employment.   
 
Like all other client groups addressed by the New Deal programmes, health issues, a 
lack of qualifications/skills and limited work experience hindered employability and 
appeared to present consistent barriers to sustained employment.  This is important 
because parental employment was a central pillar of New Labour’s strategy to reduce 
child poverty.  Indeed, New Labour consistently stated that employment was the best 
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route out of poverty (Blair, 1996; Labour, 1997).  The assumptions supporting this were 
discussed in chapter 4 and 5.    
 
It is not clear from available literature if this client group was made the subject of policy 
exclusively for economic reasons or if perhaps New Labour were making a moral 
judgement about family structure.  Given their record of anti-discrimination policy (for 
example The Equality Act 2006, Sexual Orientation Regulations 2006 and The 
Equality Act 2010) this is unlikely to be the case.  However, it could be argued that 
perhaps New Labour believed these particular client groups, by virtue of their 
circumstances, required support more focused on their needs.  It could also be said 
that Tax Credits and the National Minimum Wage had important roles to play as part 
of this policy agenda of supporting vulnerable client groups into work130.  
 
8.3. The Structure of the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and New 
Deal Plus for Lone Parents (ND+fLP) 
 
The NDLP was initially a voluntary programme open to eligible lone parents.  New 
Labour had the target of raising the proportion of lone parents in work to 70% over the 
course of ten years (Somerville & Brace, 2004).  The NDLP programme aimed to help 
and improve prospects, living standards, job readiness and employment opportunities 
for lone parents (ibid, 2004). 
 
To participate, individuals must have: 
 Been aged 16 or over; 
 Had a dependent child under 16; 
 Been in receipt of Income Support or not working;  
 Not been an asylum seeker, but would be eligible if they had Exceptional Leave 
to Remain, Indefinite Leave to Remain, Refugee Status, Discretionary Leave or 
Humanitarian Protection (ibid, 2004).    
 
                                            
130 Discussed in Chapter 10.  
231 
 
The programme consisted of a series of interviews between participants and a New 
Deal personal advisor who offered help, guidance and support for the transition into 
work.  This support included help with the costs of travel or childcare and training.   
 
The NDLP became the New Deal Plus for Lone Parents which began to be rolled out 
in the spring of 2005.  This built on the normal provisions of the NDLP by offering on-
going support from Jobcentre Plus Personal Advisors prior to and during the transition 
to work, financial support of £40 per week in the form of In Work Credit (IWC), childcare 
support through extended school childcare and other provision, more training 
opportunities, and confidence building through methods such as mentoring (Select 
Committee on Work and Pensions, 2007).   
 
Policy towards lone parents was developed further in November 2008 with the 
introduction of Lone Parents Obligations (LPO).  A central component of LPO was that 
lone parents would gradually lose their eligibility for Income Support based on the age 
of their youngest child.  The changes to loss of eligibility for IS was introduced in 
phases: from November 2008 lone parents with a youngest child aged 12 and over, 
from October 2009 with a youngest child aged ten and over, from October 2010 with 
a young child aged seven and over, and from May 2012 with a youngest child aged 5 
and over.  Lone parents who lost entitlement to IS were expected to claim JSA or 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). 
    
8.4. The effect of the NDLP and ND+fLP 
 
The NDLP and ND+fLP, like the NDYP, is well researched.  However, like the NDYP 
this research focuses largely focused on small pilots or covered only short periods 
(Jarvis, 1997; Finch et al, 1999; Woodfield & Finch, 1999; Hales et al, 2000a; Hales et 
al, 2000b; Hasluck et al, 2000; Lewis et al, 2000; Dolton et al, 2006; Knight et al, 2006; 
Thomas & Jones, 2006; Brewer et al, 2007; Brown & Joyce, 2007; Hosain & Breen, 
2007; Ray et al, 2007; Thomas, 2007; Cebulla et al, 2008; Jenkins, 2008). 
 
It is unsurprising that those studies which evaluated the NDLP and ND+fLP, and which 
were funded by the DWP, are noticeably uncritical of the performance of these 
programmes in reducing unemployment amongst lone parents, despite reports of what 
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could be argued to be quite a low percentage of participants finding jobs  (Knight et al, 
2006).       
 
Analysis conducted for this thesis suggested high levels of re-tread amongst 
participants of the NDLP.  The financial crisis in 2007 (and possibly the introduction of 
Lone Parent Obligations in November 2008 and October 2009131) appears to have 
exacerbated this problem as can be seen in the concurrent spike of initial interviews 
(spells) compared to initial interviews (individuals) in 2007-08 in Graph 8.2.  This is 
supported by similar peaks in the numbers of starters in Graph 8.3.  There are also 
high levels of spells throughout the programme.   
 
In terms of jobs gained, the NDLP does appear to have had some measure of success 
in finding jobs, with peaks in March 2004132, as can be seen in Graph 8.4.  However, 
as highlighted earlier in this chapter, there is no clear causal relationship between the 
NDLP/ND+fLP and individuals finding work.  The estimate of Okun’s law found earlier 
suggests significant deadweight loss as many New Deal participants would have found 
jobs anyway.  There may also have been many easy-to-place well-qualified individuals 
with recent work experience.   
 
The introduction of the LPOs appears to have further affected the numbers leaving the 
NDLP/ND+fLP with a spike in early 2008, as can be seen in graph 8.5.  However, this 
also coincides with a slowing in GDP growth and an increase in unemployment across 
the whole population.  This may, therefore, have resulted in more lone parents who 
had been made redundant joining the NDLP immediately with a hope of returning to 
employment more quickly, although this cannot be said with certainty.   
 
                                            
131 Lone Parent Obligations meant that lone parents lost entitlement to Income Support based on the 
age of their youngest child.  This was phased in; from November 2008, for lone parents with a 
youngest child aged 12 and over; from October 2009, to lone parents with a child aged ten and over, 
with further tightening of conditionality after New Labour had left office (DWP, 2013).  
132 From available research no reason could be found immediately to explain this peak in 2004.  The 
NDLP and ND+fLP were operated ‘in-house’ by the DWP for their entirety.  However, in 1998 New 
Labour had introduced the National Childcare Strategy that included provision of free part-time 
childcare.  Although initially limited, the offer of a free place was extended to all three year olds from 
2004 (Gheera et al, 2014).  
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Graph 8.5. suggests that numbers joining and numbers leaving the NDLP/ND+fLP 
tended to follow each other’s trends.  This could be explained in terms of participants 
not remaining on the course for long periods.  Some will inevitably find work, while 
some will return to Income Support or other benefits.  Those who had another child 
would also no longer have been covered by the programme because they were no 
longer available for work.  Graph 8.6. suggests that over time the numbers leaving the 
NDLP/ND+fLP for work decreases over time.  This would, therefore, suggest a 
decreasing ‘success’ rate of the NDLP/ND+fLP in terms of finding work for participants.   
 
The NDLP/ND+fLP programmes differ from other New Deal programmes in that 
participants are defined not only by their own characteristics (in this case single 
parenthood), but also those of their children (the age of the youngest child).  It could 
be argued that these programmes reflect the moral judgements made by policy 
makers towards single parenthood.  The voluntary nature of the NDLP/ND+fLP until 
the introduction of LPOs suggest that New Labour were generally supportive of those 
who found themselves lone parents.  The literature and the policy programmes lack 
the language of moral condemnation found in the writings of moral underclass 
discourse (Murray & Mead, 1987) of the previous Conservative administration in their 
“Back to Basics” campaign of the early 1990s.  Despite this, no explicit statement 
appears to have been made by New Labour extolling the virtue of unpaid work such 
as raising children.  On the contrary, even towards the end of his premiership, Blair 
restated his belief that work was “the best form of welfare” (Blair, 2007. cited in Smith 
et al, 2010).     
 
It could be argued, however, that the introduction of LPOs in 2008 reflected a change 
in the conventions adopted by New Labour; perhaps a feeling that lone-parents, 
despite having childcare responsibilities, were capable of at least some work.  On the 
other hand, the retrenchment towards less generous welfare policy may also have 
reflected the tightening fiscal position of government following the slowing of growth, 
the financial crisis and associated bank bailouts.   
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Graph 8.2: NDLP Initial Interviews (Individuals and spells) (thousands) 
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Graph 8.3: NDLP Starters (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
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Graph 8.4: NDLP Jobs Gained (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
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Graph 8.5: NDLP Leavers (individuals and spells) (thousands) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Se
p
-9
8
Ja
n
-9
9
M
ay
-9
9
Se
p
-9
9
Ja
n
-0
0
M
ay
-0
0
Se
p
-0
0
Ja
n
-0
1
M
ay
-0
1
Se
p
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
2
M
ay
-0
2
Se
p
-0
2
Ja
n
-0
3
M
ay
-0
3
Se
p
-0
3
Ja
n
-0
4
M
ay
-0
4
Se
p
-0
4
Ja
n
-0
5
M
ay
-0
5
Se
p
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
6
M
ay
-0
6
Se
p
-0
6
Ja
n
-0
7
M
ay
-0
7
Se
p
-0
7
Ja
n
-0
8
M
ay
-0
8
Se
p
-0
8
Ja
n
-0
9
M
ay
-0
9
Se
p
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
0
M
ay
-1
0
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
s
Month and year
NDLP Leavers
(Individuals)
(thousands)
NDLP Leavers (Spells)
(thousands)
238 
 
 
Graph 8.6: NDLP Starters and Leavers (spells) (individuals)  
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Graph 8.7: NDLP Jobs Gained and Leavers (spells) (individuals) 
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8.5. The Structure of The New Deal for Partners (NDP) 
 
The NDP was designed for the partners of out-of-work benefits claimants (whether 
they were married or just living together), and aimed to get at least one member of the 
household into work.   
 
The main aims of the NDP were to: 
 
 Reduce the number of households where nobody worked; 
 Encourage unemployed partners to become economically active; 
 Help partners already working part-time to increase their hours if they wished 
or to improve their employment prospects; and 
 Contribute to a reduction in child poverty (Somerville & Brace, 2004).   
 
As discussed in 9.1., this individualisation of labour market policy appears to reflect 
New Labour’s acceptance that family structure was changing and that labour market 
policy should reflect this.   
 
Like the NDLP, it gives access to a personal adviser who provides incentives and 
support in looking for and moving towards work (ibid, 2004).  From October 2004, the 
NDP was extended to include partners in families receiving Working Tax Credit (ibid, 
2004).  Both non-working partners working less than 16 hours a week were eligible133.  
According to Somerville & Brace, “The aim of this [was] to further reduce child poverty 
by helping both partners to support the family through paid work” (p. 311).  While the 
NDP was voluntary, from 12th April 2004, Work Focused Interviews became 
mandatory for partners whose claim for a specified benefit had lasted six months, but 
only in areas with Jobcentre Plus offices (Coleman et al, 2006).   
 
8.6. The effect of the NDP 
 
                                            
133 This requirement is linked to the Working Tax Credit requirement that a single parent with 1 or 
more children had at least 16 hours of work per week. It required couples with 1 or more children to 
have at least 24 hours work between them (with 1 of the couple working at least 16 hours per week).   
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Of all the New Deal programmes, the New Deal for Partners arguably had the least 
possible effect with the lowest numbers of Starters and Leavers compared to other 
New Deal programmes.  Unlike other small New Deal programmes like the ND50+, 
the NDP had a number of evaluations commissioned by the DWP (Coleman et al, 
2006; Dorsett et al, 2006; Thomas et al, 2006; Coleman et al, 2007) with an evaluation 
commissioned on the dynamics between partners and mothers entering employment 
(Paull, 2007).   
 
The evaluations which were carried out focused on the Work Focused Interviews for 
Partners (WFIPs) which had become mandatory in April 2004.  These evaluations 
used both qualitative and quantitative approaches allowing for a synthesis of the whole 
programme to be made (Coleman et al, 2007).  The results of this synthesis were 
scathing.  The WFIP and NDP had not succeeded in meeting their main objectives 
(ibid, 2007).  A cost-benefit analysis of the programme showed that the NDP 
programme was not cost effective with additional net benefits of -£16,700 per 
additional job entry and -£15,300 for the economy (ibid, 2007).   
 
It could be argued that available data from the DWP would tend to support these 
conclusions.  Graph 8.7. below shows a poor uptake of the NDP programme with very 
low numbers of Starters.  However, Graph 8.8. shows that during the first two years of 
operations there was a high success rate in partners gaining employment.  
Unfortunately, this success rate is not sustained.  This could arguably be explained in 
terms of those with the fewest barriers to employment quickly finding employment, 
leaving participants with much harder to tackle barriers.  The available evaluations, 
although placing much of the blame on poor implementation by Jobcentre Plus staff, 
do also suggest that partners are perhaps one of the most difficult client groups to 
support due to multiple barriers to employment including the complexity of their 
financial situation (Coleman et al, 2007).   
 
The New Deal for Partners, like the other New Deals, placed work (or at least a 
movement towards work) at its centre.  Participation was voluntary.  However, like the 
NDLP/ND+fLP, eligibility was defined not only in terms of the characteristics of the 
individual participant, but also their relation to another individual.  In this case, their 
partner, another out-of-work benefit claimant.  This is important because it also 
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reflected a move away from ‘the household’ towards ‘the individual’ as a basis for 
judgement of the justice of social outcomes.  Declining numbers of nuclear families 
and increasing numbers of single-parent and other types of non-traditional family 
structure as observed in section 8.1. and Graph 8.1. makes such changes in 
perspective towards ‘the individual’ seem inevitable.          
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Graph 8.7: New Deal for Partners Starters and Leavers (individuals) (thousands) 
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Graph 8.8: New Deal for Partners Jobs Gained and Leavers (individuals) (thousands) 
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8.7. Chapter Conclusion  
 
This chapter has explored the effect of New Labour’s labour market policy on client 
groups defined by family structure, namely, lone parents and their partners.  To 
support these groups into work, New Labour devised The New Deal for Lone Parents 
and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents (NDLP/ND+fLP) and The New Deal for Partners 
(NDP).    
 
It was argued that these programmes were set against a backdrop of changing family 
structures in the UK with increasing numbers of non-traditional and lone-parent 
families and decreasing numbers of traditional nuclear families.  New Labour’s 
approach to labour market policy in this area, therefore, appeared to reflect less of a 
focus on ‘the household’ and an increasing focus on ‘the individual’.  The individual, in 
this case defined by their family structure, became the subject of policy action.   
 
Interestingly, two of the explicit aims of the NDP was to reduce the number of 
households where nobody worked and to contribute to a reduction in child poverty 
(Somerville & Brace, 2004).  Therefore, attempts to get either mothers and/or their 
partners into work seemed appropriate in pursuit of this goal.  The focus on individuals 
rather than households also seems fitting, especially where relationships may be less 
stable and shifting than within traditional family paradigms.   
 
As in previous chapters, the administrative data gathered to evaluate these 
programmes appears to embody shifting administrative definitions and conditionality 
over actual labour market conditions.  For instance, the introduction of Lone Parent 
Obligations (LPOs) in November 2008 and October 2009 seems to have dramatically 
increased the numbers of NDLP starters.  This is supported by the DWP’s own 
research which suggests: 
 
“There is clear evidence of significant moves between the out-of-work benefits 
(IS, JSA and ESA/IB/SDA) around the time the lone parents lose IS entitlement, 
with the fraction of JSA and ESA rising as the fraction on IS falls” (DWP, 2013. 
p. 32).   
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Therefore, the introduction of LPOs and the tightening of benefit conditionality moved 
significant numbers of claimants around from IS to other out-of-work benefits.  It was 
also found that there was no sudden increase in lone parents entering paid 
employment: 
 
“The fraction recorded as being in work increases steadily over time, from up 
to 12 months before loss of IS entitlement, with no discernible jump at the time 
that lone parents are estimated to lose IS entitlement (DWP, 2013. p. 32).  
 
 
This is shown clearly in Graphs 8.9. and 8.10. below showing phase 1 of LPO 
(November 2008) and phase 2 (October 2009).    
 
Graph 8.9. Outcomes for lone parents potentially affected by LPO, Phase 1.  
 
Source: DWP, 2013. 
Note: Could not be re-drawn due to a lack of the original data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8.10. Outcomes for lone parents potentially affected by LPO, Phase 2. 
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Source: DWP, 2013. 
Note: Could not be re-drawn due to a lack of the original data 
 
Changes to childcare may also have had an effect on lone parent outcomes.  In 1998, 
New Labour introduced the National Childcare Strategy that included provision of free 
part-time childcare.  Although initially limited, the offer of a free place was extended to 
all three year olds from 2004 (Gheera et al, 2014).  However, there is insufficient 
relevant qualitative or quantitative data to be able to draw any firm conclusions.   
 
The following chapter explores the effect of an increasingly flexible labour market on 
UK workers.  It focuses on The Flexible New Deal, The National Minimum Wage and 
the range of Tax Credits introduced by New Labour during their time in office.  It argues 
that these policies acted as a catalyst towards increasing labour market flexibility 
leading to the emergence of ‘the precariat’.  
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CHAPTER 9 – Making work pay  
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
Chapters 5 to 8 explored New Labour’s New Deal programmes.  Amongst a range of 
other observations, these chapters were highly critical of the social statistics used by 
New Labour and others to evaluate the government’s labour market policy.  This was 
due to them depending heavily on the categories adopted during the statistics’ 
construction and the conventions underpinning those categories.   
 
This chapter explores the effects of the New Labour policies designed “To encourage 
work and reward effort” (Labour, 1997. p. 11) which later emerged as the policy mantra 
“make work pay” (Grover, 2005).  This was underpinned by New Labour’s belief that 
“the best form of welfare for people of working age is work” (DSS, 1997).  In pursuit of 
this aim, New Labour introduced the National Minimum Wage (NMW) and a range of 
Tax Credit programmes.  This chapter argues that the NMW and Tax Credits had a 
complex effect on the British labour market; that these policies attempted to modernise 
the labour market and were a catalyst for increasing flexibility.  This effect included a 
rise in precarious part-time and self-employment with Tax Credits bridging 
employment breaks and subsidising low paid work.  Therefore, as was found in 
previous chapters, the distinction between categories ‘unemployment’ and 
‘employment’ are being blurred and the meanings increasingly challenged.  This 
further supports the claim of this thesis: that the statistical evaluation of labour market 
policy is increasingly difficult as the categories underpinning the measurement of 
social phenomena are disrupted.   
 
9.2.1. The National Minimum Wage (NMW) 
 
9.2.1.1. Introduction of the NMW 
 
Prior to the introduction of the NMW, Wage Councils had existed to set minimum rates 
of pay across the majority of low pay sectors.  However, these bodies had been 
ineffective and were abolished by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights 
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Act 1993134.  Although the TUC had argued for industrial pay bodies, they had been 
critical of the Wage Councils for being unsuccessful in boosting pay or policing 
compliance (Silkin, 2014).  There was also concern within the trade union movement 
that a minimum wage would undermine trade unions and collective bargaining 
(Institute for Government, 2011).  Despite including a minimum wage in their 1992 
manifesto of half male median earnings, eventually rising to two thirds, Labour lost the 
electoral argument to Conservative claims that such a minimum wage would cost 
between 750,000 and 2,000,000 jobs (ibid, 2011).  The 1992 electoral defeat marked 
a shift in both academic and policy circles, with researchers challenging the consensus 
view that a minimum wage would destroy jobs.  For example, Hutton (1997), a key 
New Labour intellectual influence, stressed that an economy with no minimum wage 
protection leads to a downward spiral of low wages and low productivity as firms fail 
to train their staff, with threats to profitability putting further downward pressure on 
wages.  Consequently, New Labour’s 1997 election manifesto sought to end this 
downward spiral of pay and ensure that work was fairly rewarded (Labour, 1997), but 
policy aims were not supported by a growing weight of academic evidence.   
 
Following their election win, New Labour quickly established the Low Pay Commission 
(LPC) in July 1997 to make policy recommendations.  This was followed by the 
passage of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.  In addition to establishing the 
National Minimum Wage, the Act codified the previously non-statutory LPC.  The LPC 
existed to make recommendations on the rates of NMW.  Based on the 
recommendations in the first report of the LPC, New Labour introduced the NMW 
formally on 1st April 1999 (Low Pay Commission, 2000).  The historic rates of the NMW 
are in Table 9.1 below.   
  
                                            
134 And their role is outside the scope of this thesis.   
250 
 
Table 9.1: The historic rates for the NMW for when New Labour were in power 
From Adult Rate  
(for workers 
aged 22+) 
Development Rate  
(for workers aged 18-
21) 
16-17 Year-
Olds Rate 
Median real hourly 
wage* 
1 Oct 2009 £5.80 £4.83 £3.57 £14.12 
1 Oct 2008 £5.73 £4.77 £3.53 £13.98 
1 Oct 2007 £5.52 £4.60 £3.40 £13.73 
1 Oct 2006 £5.35 £4.45 £3.30 £13.51 
1 Oct 2005 £5.05 £4.25 £3.00 £13.14 
1 Oct 2004 £4.85 £4.10 £3.00 £12.84 
1 Oct 2003 £4.50 £3.80 - £12.23 
1 Oct 2002 £4.20 £3.50 - £11.89 
1 Oct 2001 £4.10 £3.50 - £11.01 
1 Oct 2000 £3.70 £3.20 - £10.15 
1 Apr 1999 £3.60 £3.00 - £9.50 
Sources: Low Pay Commission, 2012.  Hours and Earnings Panel Dataset, 2013 
Notes: The Apprentice Rate was not introduced until 1st October 2010 and so has not been included.  
The 16-17 Year Olds Rate was not introduced until 2004.  
*Median wage calculated by the author from a combined average of the 1975, 1985 and 1995 
Cohorts.  
 
When deliberating over their recommendations for the NMW, the National Minimum 
Wage Act said the LPC:  
 
“(a) shall have regard to the effect of this Act on the economy of the United 
Kingdom as a whole and on competitiveness; and 
(b) shall take into account any additional factors which the Secretary of State 
specifies in referring the matters to them.” (1998. s.7.(5)).    
 
The actual methodologies adopted by the LPC varied over time as their experience 
and knowledge developed.  For example, in their own words the LPC says “We started 
our work in July 1997 by reading published research and analysis” (Low Pay 
Commission, 1998. p. 21).  They then went on to invite written and oral evidence from 
a range of stakeholders, commission a wide array of research from academic and 
commercial researchers and conduct site visits (ibid, 1998).  The LPC’s conclusions 
were, therefore, reached through analysis of existing literature and their own research.  
The actual policing of NMW compliance was conducted by HMRC.  Although some 
issues were identified, non-compliance was limited (LPC, 2012). 
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9.2.1.2. The effect of the NMW on firms 
 
A significant amount of research has focused on the effect of the NMW on firms.  This 
is important because neo-classical economic theory would suggest that increasing the 
cost of labour above the market equilibrium would reduce the demand for, and 
increase the supply of, labour, thus leading to a surplus (i.e. disequilibrium 
unemployment).  However, a substantial body of research shows that the NMW had 
minimal negative impact on firms and their ability to employ the labour they needed. 
 
It is important to say that the effect of the NMW varied considerably across the different 
sectors of the economy.  The four sectors of the economy with the largest number of 
jobs affected by the introduction were: wholesale and retail (350,000 jobs); hotels and 
restaurants (300,000 jobs); business services (170,000 jobs); and health and social 
work (160,000 jobs) (Forth & O’Mahony, 2003).   
 
Early on it was reported that firms had not changed their employment practices (Low 
Pay Commission, 2000).  However, over time problems emerged with the existing 
reward structures of large and small companies alike due to the upward pressure at 
the bottom end of pay scales and the earnings distribution more generally135 
(Grimshaw & Carroll, 2002; Income Data Services, 2004; 2006; 2007; Denvir & 
Loukas, 2006; Low Pay Commission, 2005; 2009; Stewart, 2009)136.  Employers 
responded to increases in the NMW by adjusting non-wage costs, changing pay 
structures, reducing over-time and unsociable hours premia, making pension and 
annual leave entitlement less generous, merging geographical and hierarchical pay 
zones, reducing hours of work available (Stewart & Swaffield, 2004; Low Pay 
Commission, 2011) or by reducing the speed at which they hired new workers 
(Galindo-Rueda & Pereria, 2004).  This research undermines some of the claimed 
benefits of the NMW by suggesting the terms and conditions of low-paid workers were 
damaged to compensate for the increased cost.     
 
                                            
135 Labelled as ‘spill-over effects’ (Stewart, 2009).    
136 Although some have argued that the NMW did not affect pay practices directly.  Instead the NMW 
acted as a broad benchmark rather than a direct influence on pay (Ram, Edwards & Jones, 2004).   
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Other research has suggested a negative effect on firms’ profitability.  In a limited study 
of only 265 small businesses it was reported by just over half of respondents that NMW 
increases were seriously damaging their profitability (Low Pay Commission, 2004).  
This was due to what they felt were ‘arbitrary and substantial’ up-ratings in previous 
years.  Stronger evidence exists in the form of 21 studies commissioned by the LPC 
examining the effect of the NMW on firms which corroborated this effect (Low Pay 
Commission, 2001).   
 
The NMW was also found to have had a significant impact on wage costs in a number 
of low-paying sectors and some firms struggled to adapt to this (Low Pay Commission, 
2001).  After the initial ‘shock’ of the introduction of the NMW, some firms began to 
pass on cost increases in the form of higher prices, especially in the first 4 years after 
its introduction (Wadsworth, 2008) 137.  However, other research refutes these claims, 
instead suggesting there was no significant effect on wages or profits (Draca et al, 
2005; Dolton et al, 2012), or indeed any effect on employment when the UK was 
examined in isolation (Stewart, 2003) 138 or when compared with other OECD 
countries (Dolton & Bondibene, 2011).     
 
Despite these challenges, businesses reported being able to adapt through improved 
productivity, raising prices, accepting reductions in profits and tightening control of 
labour costs (Low Pay Commission, 2001; Forth & O’Mahony, 2003; Denvir & Loukas, 
2006).  Research by others corroborates the negative hours effect139, especially during 
periods of recession (Dickens et al, 2009; Dickens & Dolton, 2011; Bryan et al, 2012).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the effect of the NMW was not consistent across different 
sectors of the economy.  Neither was it consistent geographically (Dolton et al, 2009) 
nor by size of firm (Arrowsmith et al, 2003).  Due to the informality of employment 
                                            
137 Other research suggests this effect was far from universal and that the majority of employers were 
comfortably able to adjust pay rates to NMW level without harming employment or pay differentials 
(Income Data Services, 2011).  
138 Dolton, Makepeace & Tremayne (2011) argue that there was a countercyclical relationship 
between economic growth and wage settlements which is to be expected.  However, the years of the 
NMW being in force were characterised by slightly higher wage settlements than would otherwise 
have been the case.   
139 The downward pressure on hours.  
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relations in small firms, the effect of the NMW was often mediated through flexible 
working (ibid, 2003).   
 
Despite this there were positive, if perhaps not intentional, effects on firms.  Due to the 
increasing cost of labour, firms in low-pay sectors increasingly invested in the 
productivity of their staff (Arulampalam, Booth & Bryan, 2002. cited in Metcalf, 2002; 
Metcalf, 2004; Rizov & Croucher, 2011).  Additionally, the NMW may also have 
reduced staff turnover (Low Pay Commission, 1998) which would have benefited firms 
in the form of lower recruitment and training costs.   
 
9.2.1.3. The effect of the NMW on individuals  
 
The effect of the NMW on individuals was more complex than those on firms.   
 
Research conducted using the Labour Force Survey found a 2-4 percentage point 
increase in the employment rate of low-skilled individuals (Dickens et al, 2011).  This 
manifested itself as falling unemployment amongst men and reduced inactivity among 
women (ibid. 2011).  However, Dicken’s research contradicts previous research which 
argued the opposite was true.  Previous research argues the probability of those 
unemployed before the introduction of NMW moving into employment is lower and 
often accompanied by a higher probability of economic inactivity (Stewart, 2002).  The 
Low Pay Commission’s own research instead suggests a complex interplay between 
the NMW and job-seeker search behaviour:   
 
“The results are best described as mixed.  There is some evidence that the 
introduction of the NMW and early upratings may have been associated with 
reduced search activity (and pay-related search activity) among minimum 
wage workers (the treatment group).  There is, however, no evidence of 
effects from subsequent upratings (Low Pay Commission, 2009. p. 34) 
 
However, Robinson & Wadsworth’s (2005) research suggested that for those with 
more than one job, the NMW had no effect on the incidence of second job holding.  
 
Over a million low-paid workers benefited from the NMW (Low Pay Commission, 
2004).  Around 10% of working households relied on workers paid the minimum wage; 
in 7% of working households the NMW workers were the only source of income 
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(Wadsworth, 2007).  More important, however, is the profile of these beneficiaries of 
the NMW.  Two thirds were working women and of those, two thirds were part-time 
workers (Low Pay Commission, 2000).  Concurring research found that most parents 
prioritised finding working hours that suited them and then found childcare to match, 
and therefore, part-time work was preferred by parents of young children as they 
sought to combine working with spending time at home (Nicholls & Simm, 2003).  This 
is important because, as discussed in chapter 7, engaging lone parents and other 
women with work and raising female labour market activity rates were an important 
policy goals for New Labour.  The majority of lone parents would have been part-time 
due to the need to balance work with their caring responsibilities.     
 
One of the key measures used by the Low Pay Commission to evaluate the effect of 
NMW was ‘Bite’ which they defined as: “The value of the minimum wage relative to 
the median” (Low Pay Commission, 2009. p. xii).  Table 9.2 below shows the gradually 
increasing bite of the NMW versus median income from 1999 to 2010.  However, the 
increase in the NMW as a percentage of mean wages was less pronounced.  This 
reflects, as the Low Pay Commission acknowledges, that the ‘results’ depend entirely 
on the definitions adopted and the methodologies used in analysis.  This particular 
dataset used three methodologies, and even in the notes it warns that comparisons 
over time “should be made with care” (Low Pay Commission, 2011. p. 26).  Using 
some of this contrived data, Wadsworth argued:  
 
“Around 30 per cent of minimum wage workers live in households with an 
aggregate income less than sixty per cent (sic) of the median household income 
for all households with at least one employee, (compared with a 10 per cent 
share among all other working households).  Two thirds of minimum wage 
workers live in households with a total income below the median for all working 
(employee) households.” (2007. p. ii).   
 
While Wadsworth may make these claims, such evidence and arguments are limited 
as they fail to take the cost of living into account (real wages and disposable income) 
which may give a better indication of the actual standard of living faced by NMW 
workers.   
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Table 9.2: Bite of the Adult Minimum Wage at Various Points on the Earnings 
Distribution for Those Aged 22 and Over, UK, 1999-2010 
 Data 
year 
(April) 
Adult 
NMW 
(£) 
Adult minimum wages as % of 
L
o
w
e
s
t 
d
e
c
ile
 
L
o
w
e
s
t 
q
u
a
rt
ile
 
M
e
d
ia
n
 
M
e
a
n
 
U
p
p
e
r 
q
u
a
rt
ile
 
U
p
p
e
r 
d
e
c
ile
 
ASHE without 
supplementary 
information 
1999 3.60 83.9 65.1 45.7 36.6 30.4 21.1 
 2000 3.60 81.2 64.2 45.4 35.7 29.8 20.6 
 2001 3.70 80.3 63.0 44.2 34.7 29.0 19.9 
 2002 4.10 85.2 67.5 47.2 36.5 30.8 21.0 
 2003 4.20 82.4 65.8 46.5 35.9 30.5 20.8 
 2004 4.50 84.9 67.6 47.5 37.2 31.3 21.4 
ASHE with 
supplementary 
information 
2004 4.50 85.6 68.3 48.1 37.7 31.6 21.7 
 2005 4.85 88.0 69.9 49.4 38.5 32.3 22.1 
 2006 5.05 87.5 69.9 49.4 38.4 32.3 22.1 
ASHE 2007 
methodology 
2006 5.05 87.5 70.0 49.7 38.5 32.5 22.3 
 2007 5.35 89.2 71.7 51.0 39.6 33.6 22.9 
 2008 5.52 89.7 71.6 50.6 39.2 33.2 22.8 
 2009 5.73 89.6 71.7 50.7 39.7 33.3 22.9 
 2010 5.80 89.7 72.0 50.8 39.6 33.2 23.0 
Source: Low Pay Commission, 2011 
Notes: LPC estimates based on ASHE140 without supplementary information, April 1999-2004; ASHE 
with supplementary information, April 2004-2006; and ASHE 2007 methodology, April 2006-2010, 
standard weights, including those not on adult rates of pay, UK.  Direct comparisons before and after 
2004, and those before and after 2006, should be made with care due to changes in the data series. 
(Low Pay Commission, 2011. p. 26).   
 
It is not clear from Table 2 how the deciles and quintiles are calculated and whether 
variation in hours of work are taken into account.  Despite this, the data portrayed 
suggested an increasing bite of NMW compared to average wages.   
 
                                            
140 ASHE is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings conducted by the ONS.  
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Graph 9.1 below shows the increases in the real and relative value of the Adult 
Minimum Wage from 1999 to 2010 against RPI and CPI.  However, this data may 
again show that the results reflect the construction of the measure more than they 
reflect any reality.  These results can, therefore, only be taken as suggestive of the 
NMW increasing in relative and real value over the time that New Labour was in power.   
Graph 9.1: Increases in the Real and Relative Value of the Adult Minimum 
Wage, UK, 1999-2010 
 
Source: Low Pay Commission, 2011.  
Notes: LPC estimates based on ONS data, AEI including bonuses (LNMQ), AWE total pay (KAB9), 
CPI141 (D7BT) and RPI142 (CHAW), monthly, seasonally adjusted (AWE143 and AEI144 only), UK (GB 
for AWE and AEI), 1999-2010. AEI was replaced as a National Statistic by AWE in January 2010.  
The AEI series ended in July 2010. (Low Pay Commission, 2011. p. 24.)   
Could not be re-drawn due to a lack of the original data.  
 
Important questions are also raised when the NMW is considered against the 
prevailing tax-free allowance.  A model was constructed (table 3 below) using OECD 
                                            
141 CPI: Consumer Price Index, is a statistical estimate of changing price levels based on a ‘typical’ 
basket of consumer goods and services purchased by households  
142 RPI: Retail Price Index. Not used since 2013.  Similar to CPI but includes an element of housing 
costs, e.g. council tax, mortgage interest payments, etc. It is therefore usually higher than CPI, as can 
be seen in Graph 9.1 
143 AWE: Average Weekly Earnings 
144 AEI: Average Earnings Index 
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estimates of the average annual working hours to calculate the annual income of a 
full-time worker at the different rates of NMW.  When considered against the prevailing 
tax-free allowance it raises the question of actually how much better off NMW workers 
were.  Why was the tax-free allowance not raised to take the working poor out of tax 
all together?  With such low tax-free allowances, were NMW workers really better off 
in work?  With the help of Tax Credits, perhaps, but how would such outcomes be 
viewed by more traditional socialists who spoke the language of ‘working class 
emancipation’145?  Under the system created by New Labour, working people appear 
instead to merely move from one form of welfare dependency to another.   
 
Table 9.3: Estimated full-time annual income for different rates of NMW against 
the prevailing tax-free allowance 
From Annual 
average 
working 
hours  
Estimated full-
time annual 
income for 
those on the 
Adult Rate (for 
workers aged 
22+)  
Estimated full-
time annual 
income for those 
on the 
Development 
Rate (for workers 
aged 18-21) 
Estimated 
full-time 
annual 
income for 
those on the 
16-17 Year-
Olds Rate 
Prevailing 
tax-free 
allowance 
01-Apr-
99 
1716 £6,177.60 £5,148.00 - £4,335.00 
01-Oct-
00 
1700 £6,290.00 £5,440.00 - £4,385.00 
01-Oct-
01 
1705 £6,990.50 £5,967.50 - £4,535.00 
01-Oct-
02 
1684 £7,072.80 £5,894.00 - £4,615.00 
01-Oct-
03 
1674 £7,533.00 £6,361.20 - £4,615.00 
01-Oct-
04 
1674 £8,118.90 £6,863.40 £5,022.00 £4,745.00 
01-Oct-
05 
1673 £8,448.65 £7,110.25 £5,019.00 £4,895.00 
01-Oct-
06 
1669 £8,929.15 £7,427.05 £5,507.70 £5,035.00 
01-Oct-
07 
1677 £9,257.04 £7,714.20 £5,701.80 £5,225.00 
01-Oct-
08 
1659 £9,506.07 £7,913.43 £5,856.27 £6,035.00 
01-Oct-
09 
1651 £9,575.80 £7,974.33 £5,894.07 £6,475.00 
                                            
145 The International Workingmen’s Association (1867), for example, argued that emancipation of the 
working classes must come from the working classes themselves.   
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Data Sources: Average working hours (OECD StatExtracts, n.d.). TA.1. Income Tax Personal 
Allowances and Reliefs 1990-91 – 2015-16 (Gov.uk, 2015b).  
Note: Authors own calculations. The 16-17 year old rate was introduced in 2004. 
  
Looking at more focused research there were suggestions of a strong link between 
the pressure being put on firms who paid the NMW being passed on to employees in 
the form of work intensification (Denvir & Louskas, 2006).  This included reductions in 
staffing levels, usually through non-replacement, staff being forced to work harder and 
longer hours ‘with flexibility’ rather than formal increases in the difficulty or number of 
tasks assigned.  Rather than investing in their workers or capital that will make their 
labour more productive, “some employers appear to be especially and worryingly 
dependent on the use of low wages as a major part of their business strategy, notably 
in hairdressing” (Denvir et al. 2009. p. 41).  However, it was not made clear by Denvir 
et al how capital investment could increase the productivity in labour intensive 
industries such as hairdressing.  
 
Despite the encouragement of female labour market participation by New Labour 
through the NDLP, lone parent obligations and the NMW, the LPC’s own research 
suggests that jobs which paid the NMW were of poor quality:   
 
“We again find that minimum wage jobs are more likely to be: part-time; 
temporary; held for less than a year; in the private sector; in small and medium 
sized firms, and in certain low-paying industries (such as retail and hospitality) 
and occupations (such as hairdressers, cleaners, bar staff and retail 
assistants).  These jobs are most likely to be carried out by women, young 
people, older workers, disabled people, ethnic minorities or those with no 
qualifications” (Low Pay Commission, 2011. p. 65).   
 
The short duration of minimum wage jobs is corroborated by others with as many as 
half of jobs paid at or below the NMW being less than 12 months in duration (Jones et 
al. 2004; Bryan & Taylor, 2006).  This research strongly undermines the stated aims 
of the NMW to ‘make work pay’ and reduce social exclusion amongst key client groups.  
It instead suggests that these groups who were supposedly of key importance to New 
Labour faced dead-end roles of limited duration with limited scope for personal/career 
development or progression.  
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Women were found to have been negatively impacted by the NMW in terms of 
recruitment (Stewart, 2004.).  However, this research carries the caveat that it was 
sensitive to the choice of wage variable and estimation method.  It is also interesting 
that the overwhelming majority 146of persistent NMW workers were women (Bryan & 
Taylor, 2004; 2006; Brewer et al, 2009; Jones et al. n.d).  Perhaps of greater 
importance was that a third of the same persistent NMW workers had no qualifications 
at all and that half were in semi-skilled or un-skilled manual occupations (Bryan & 
Taylor, 2006).  In the existing NMW research there is little discussion of the need to 
develop the qualifications and skills of individuals, i.e. to support NMW beneficiaries 
beyond NMW jobs.  A limited amount of training was provided as part of the New Deal 
Programmes, but a lack of qualifications/skills was not perceived as a policy problem 
requiring action once an individual was in work.  It was only a ‘problem’ when the 
individual was categorised as ‘unemployed’.  Once they were in employment, it was 
no longer a problem.  This was perhaps the glaring sin of omission by New Labour 
labour market policy makers.  Work, any work, was preferable to no work.  Once the 
headline statistics were measured and showed decreasing unemployment and 
increasing labour market activity, then the key goal was achieved.   
 
On a more positive note, the introduction of the NMW reduced the gender pay gap by 
0.3-0.4 percentage points (Manning & Dickens, 2002), and wage inequality more 
generally (Metcalf, 2009), mostly probably because the majority of roles at the lower 
end of the pay scale were filled by women and the NMW pushed their wages upwards.  
However, the existing research makes no mention of how the remaining gender pay 
gap would be bridged.  A linked but unintended negative effect of the NMW is that the 
relative costs of employing more expensive male labour are reduced, and therefore 
demand for low-skilled female employees may have fallen, therefore widening rather 
than narrowing earnings differentials in the longer run (Edwards & Gilman, 2009).   
 
The effect of the NMW on young people was also positive.  For example, the 16-17 
year-old rate of the NMW introduced in October 2004 offered for the first time a 
minimum wage to an otherwise ignored group at the margins of the labour market 
while at the same time not leading to any significant decrease in numbers of young 
                                            
146 80% according to Bryan & Taylor (2006)  
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people staying on in education (Low Pay Commission, 2004; Couler et al, 2010).  An 
apprentice rate of the NMW was not introduced until after New Labour left office in 
2010 and is therefore outside the scope of this thesis.  Upon reaching the mean rate 
of NMW at age 22, young people found work more attractive compared to when they 
were 21, inducing labour market participation and increasing job search activity 
(Dickens et al, 2010; 2011147).  This allayed the fears of Croucher & White (2011) that 
too high a minimum wage for young people would instead act as a disincentive to 
investing in education by encouraging early labour market entry and displacing older 
workers in the process.  This is not to say that the NMW did not affect the completion 
of Apprenticeships.  Lanot & Sousounis (2011) argued that although the NMW had no 
effect on school enrolment148, the NMW may have had a small negative effect on FE 
and HE enrolment but a stronger negative effect on the completion of Apprenticeships 
and other forms of youth training.  
 
Agency workers were another group significantly affected by the NMW.  The leisure 
sector (with 50 per cent of employers) and the hotel sector (with 42 per cent of 
employers) reported the highest proportions of agency staff employed (Income Data 
Services, 2009).  However, the TUC found that due to illegal deductions, many agency 
workers failed to earn the minimum wage (2005).  These deductions, made by 
employment agencies, included charging for inflated transport, accommodation, 
clothing and meal costs (TUC, 2005).   
 
9.3. Tax Credits 
 
9.3.1. Tax Credits in the UK  
 
In-work benefits have a long history.  However, this history is not within the scope of 
this thesis.  It will only be noted here that Working Families Tax Credit replaced the 
very similarly structured Family Credit in 1999.   
 
The system of Tax Credits developed by New Labour and administered by HMRC 
included: 
                                            
147 While Fidrmuc & Horrilo (2011) found a negative but insignificant effect.   
148 Supporting earlier research by Dickerson & Jones (2004) and Frayne & Goodman (2004).   
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 Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC); 
 Disabled Persons Tax Credit (DPTC); 
 Working Tax Credit (WTC); and, 
 Child Tax Credit (CTC). 
 
9.3.2. Overview of Tax Credit Programmes under New Labour 
 
 Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) 
 
WFTC was introduced in April 1999 and operated until March 2003 when it was 
replaced by Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit.  WFTC was the successor to 
Family Credit (FC) which had been in operation since 1988, and like FC, provided 
means tested ‘awards’ renewable every 6 months.  It was also only available to 
households with children.   
 
 Disabled Persons Tax Credit (DPTC)  
 
DPTC replaced what was Disability Working Allowance (DWA) from 5th October 1999.  
It was a tax credit available to people who were working at least sixteen hours a week 
and who had an illness or disability which disadvantaged them in getting a job.  It was 
also replaced in April 2003 by Working Tax Credit.  
 
 New Tax Credits (NTC)  
 
New Tax Credits (NTC) comprised of Working Tax Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit 
(CTC) and was introduced in April 2003 (Franses & Thomas, 2004).  Like WFTC, 
payments were made to supplement the income of households or individuals who 
were employed or self-employed.  Key differences between WFTC and WTC were that 
WTC was based on gross income rather than net income, and also there were no 
longer any capital limits barring eligibility (Lee, 2003; Adler, 2004).  The level of ‘award’ 
of WTC is made up of ‘elements’ and is subject to withdrawal once a certain level of 
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income is reached149. CTC was one such ‘element’ and payments were made to 
supplement the income of individuals who had one child or young person who normally 
lived with them (HMRC, 2012).  The level of payments depended on the individual’s 
annual income.   
 
The changes to out-of-work and in-work support is shown in Table 9.4 below.   
 
Table 9.4. Support for non-pensioner households before and after April 2003 
 Support for out-of-work 
households 
Support for working 
households 
Before April 2003 Income Support/Job Seeker’s 
Allowance (adult element) 
 
 
Income Support/Job Seeker’s 
Allowance (child element) 
 
 
Child Benefit 
 
Working Families Tax 
Credit/Disabled Person’s 
Tax Credit (adult credit) 
 
Working Families Tax 
Credit/Disabled Person’s 
Tax Credit (child credit) 
 
Children’s Tax Credit 
 
Child Benefit 
 
After April 2003 Income Support/Job Seeker’s 
Allowance (adult element) 
 
Child Tax Credit 
 
Child Benefit  
 
Working Tax Credit 
 
 
Child Tax Credit 
 
Child Benefit 
Source: Lee, 2003. p. 19.  
    
These changes suggest a consolidation of support for working households, but 
Hodgson & Boden (2008) argue that WTC had three key characteristics:  
 it was an overt labour activation policy; 
 there was a high degree of means-testing and eligibility checking that appears 
to be designed to influence behaviour;  
 it had a delivery mechanism that created the impression of a tax reduction 
rather than a welfare payment due to administration of the scheme by HMRC.  
 
                                            
149 Working Tax Credit will be integrated into the new Universal Credit in 2016.   
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It could be said that these were very much the same characteristics as its predecessor, 
the WFTC.  However, unlike WFTC, New Tax Credits encompassed a wider range of 
recipients than previously, including parents not in work and households without 
children (Hall & Pattigrew, 2008).  In addition, New Tax Credits were introduced with 
a number of explicit targets: 
   
 “reduce the number of children in low-income households by at least a quarter 
by 2004, as a contribution towards the broader target of halving child poverty 
by 2010 and eradicating it by 2020; 
 demonstrate progress by 2006 on increasing the employment rate and reducing 
the unemployment rate over the economic cycle; 
 over the three years to 2006, increase the employment rates of disadvantaged 
areas and groups, taking account of the economic cycle – lone parents, ethnic 
minorities, people aged 50 and over, those with the lowest qualifications, and 
the 30 local authority districts with the poorest initial labour market position, and 
significantly reduce the difference between their employment rates and the 
overall rate; 
 reduce the proportion of children in households with no one in work over the 
three years from spring 2003 to spring 2006 by six and a half per cent; and 
 in the three years to 2006, increase the employment rate of people with 
disabilities, taking account of the economic cycle, and significantly reduce the 
difference between their employment rate and the overall rate.  Work to improve 
the rights of disabled people and to remove barriers to their participation in 
society” (Franses & Thomas, 2004. p. 1).  
 
As was discussed in previous chapters, it is difficult if not impossible to un-tangle the 
complex interactions between economic growth and labour market policy including 
Tax Credits.  It is only possible to estimate the effect of policy based on certain 
assumptions.  However, as has become increasingly apparent throughout this thesis, 
the results of these estimates appear to reflect the statistical assumptions assumed 
rather than changes in the UK labour market. 
 
9.3.3. The effect of Tax Credits (TC) 
 
In a similar fashion to the New Deal programmes and the NMW, the effect of TC on 
claimants appears complex.  This appears especially true for those on the boundary 
of the labour market (such as those with children) due to the complex interaction of 
tax-free allowances, Tax Credits and available childcare.  While they may have 
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escaped from an out-of-work benefits trap they are instead faced with conflicted 
incentives and demands.   
 
The following sections address each of the TC programmes chronologically.   
 
9.3.3.1. Working Families Tax Credits (WFTC)  
 
Working Families Tax Credit was in many ways very similar to its predecessor Family 
Credit in that it required individuals to work 16 hours per week before they were 
eligible, as can be seen in Graph 2 below.  However, unlike Family Credit, WFTC and 
WFTC with childcare had a later and more gradual taper of withdrawal of payments 
(55p in the pound rather than 70p in the pound (McLaughlin, Trewsdale & McCay, 
2001)) up to a much higher limit of working hours, ensuring a much higher wage 
subsidy.   
 
 
Graph 9.2: Structure of Family Credit versus WFTC  
Source: Blundell & Walker, 2001. p. 5.  
Note: Could not be re-drawn due to a lack of the original data. 
 
WFTC with the additional childcare payments was significantly more generous, clearly 
in an effort to support those with children, especially women, into work.  WFTC linked 
with the New Deal for Lone Parents represented a clear and structured activation path; 
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from economic inactivity, to actively seeking work, to working with the support of in-
work benefits150.  Families returning to work tended to earn about the NMW and, 
therefore, the need for further in-work support such as WFTC remained (McKay, 
2003).  
 
Before the introduction of WFTC, the Treasury estimated that: “almost 500,000 
families pay income tax to the Inland Revenue while receiving Family Credit from the 
Department of Social Security” (as it then was) and that “the net effect of WFTC will 
be to take 97 per cent of them out of tax” (Lee, 2000. cited in Adler, 2004.).  
Nevertheless, the introduction of WFTC only partly resolved this problem because 
other in-work benefits, specifically Housing Benefit and Council (local) Tax Benefit, 
were not included in the reform (Adler, 2004).  It was also estimated that the 
participation rate of single mothers increased by 2.2% (around 34,000 individuals), 
that the participation rate of married women with employed partners declined by 0.57% 
(20,000 individuals) suggesting an overall increase in participation of 30,000 (Duncan, 
Giles & MacCrae, 1999; Blundell et al, 2000.).   
 
Despite the positive statistics cited by Adler and others, the WFTC was based on some 
potentially flawed assumptions.  Firstly, because WFTC reached higher up the income 
distribution scale, those higher up will have faced higher marginal tax rates than they 
had under FC (McLaughlin, Trewsdale & McCay, 2001.).  This did not occur until 
around £300 per week which the Treasury believed “was a sufficiently high-income 
point for this feature of WFTC not to be a problem.” (McLaughlin, Trewsdale & McCay 
2001. p. 167).  Despite the more gradual taper of WFTC compared to FC, this 
assumption appears to ignore the negative incentive for individuals to try and advance 
their career beyond low-paid work.     
 
A second implicit assumption is that families pool all earnings because such 
programmes were based around family income (Blundell & Walker, 2001).  However, 
the assumption of ordered un-chaotic lives with pooled financial resources and robust 
financial planning appears to be at odds with what could be expected of the average 
                                            
150 Lone parents were a key target for these reforms as they comprised 22% of all families by 1998 
but 55% of families with children in poverty (Gregg, Harkness & Smith, 2009). 
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WFTC claimant.  In addition, Blundell & Walker suggest that the means-testing nature 
of WFTC may distort other behavioural incentives; encouraging individuals to have 
children but dis-incentivising them to partner.  These incentives are further 
strengthened if pooling of financial resources does not occur (ibid, 2001). 
Means-testing therefore appears to undermine the intended policy goals of the NDLP 
and Tax Credits by encouraging a greater incidence of the ‘problem’ they sought to 
reduce: single parents with children living in poverty.  As will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter, in addition to single-parenthood, WFTC did little to tackle 
other underlying drivers of low-paid work, such as poorly qualified individuals with 
limited skills, limited employability and geographical immobility.  Even if individuals 
wanted to ‘get on’, there appeared to be limited scope to do this.        
 
It could also be said that WFTC was of little use for those at the margins of the labour 
market who were unable to meet the 16 hours of work requirement, perhaps due to 
extra caring responsibilities.  They would still have been able to claim other in-work 
benefits such as Income Support, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, but were 
excluded from the benefits of WFTC.  From the available literature it appears that the 
16 hours requirement was chosen as cut off for WFTC due to the definitions of the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) (Walling, 2007): those working less than 16 hours per 
week were defined as part-time.  Therefore, like definitions of ‘youth’ as being aged 
between 18 and 24 years old, this arbitrary definition was linked to an important 
measure used by government.  By encouraging individuals to work over 16 hours, 
more individuals would be ‘counted’ as full-time rather than part-time, which would 
appear better for political purposes.   
 
A significant administrative failure of WFTC was under- and over-payments.  Both 
caused claimants causing significant financial hardship.  Over-payment was often 
worse because these were later clawed back (Adler, 2004; Hodgson & Boden, 2008; 
Breese, Maplethorpe & Toomse. 2011; Toomse, 2011).  A clear link has been drawn 
between the structure of WFTC and other Tax Credits and these problems, i.e. like 
Family Credit, the award was based on a snapshot of recent income, and once set it 
was fixed and unalterable until the end of the six month award period (Adler, 2004) 
with an annual reconciliation of income against entitlement at the end of each tax year 
(Hodgson & Boden, 2008).  This six-month award structure meant there were winners 
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(those whose income went up during that six months gained) and losers (those whose 
incomes went down lost out).  This was in sharp contrast with other means-tested 
benefits such as Income Support or JSA which could be adjusted on a week-by-week 
basis to take account of changing circumstances (ibid, 2004).  It could be argued that 
the design of WFTC was, therefore, flawed from the start.  Given the short-term, 
temporary and unpredictable nature of low-paid work undertaken by those on the 
periphery of the labour market, a six month award period does not appear at all 
appropriate.  However, it could be argued that Tax Credits were an attempt to try and 
more closely align the tax and benefits systems under HMRC.    
 
The administration of the Tax Credits was also described as “a fiasco” (Adler, 2004. 
p. 99) due to long delays and over-payments.  The long delays required the 
introduction of emergency payments for those in greatest needs.  Assessment errors 
of these also led to overpayments which the Inland Revenue then sought to recover151 
(Adler, 2004; Hills et al, 2006 cited in Hodgson & Boden, 2008; Griffen, 2007; Freeth 
& Fond, 2011).  This problem would have been compounded by the fact that many 
claimants would be living ‘hand-to-mouth’ anyway, and were reported to have poor 
financial management skills (Hills et al, 2006 cited in Hodgson & Boden, 2008).  It can 
be expected that any over-payment would have been spent not saved.   
 
The issue of over-/under-payments highlights the general point that the Inland 
Revenue (which went on to became HMRC in 2005 after it merged with Her Majesty’s 
Customs and Excise152) had no experience of administering benefits, but was highly 
experienced at assessing an individual’s tax liabilities on an annual basis.  This begs 
the questions of why the Inland Revenue/HMRC were entrusted with this 
responsibility.  It has been argued that by paying in-work benefits through the tax 
system via the IR/HMRC there was less of a stigma attached (Hall & Pattigrew, 2008).  
                                            
151 In 2003-4, around 1.9 million people (a third of applicants) were overpaid a total of nearly £2 billion. 
Around 283,000 families were overpaid by more than £2,000.  By 2005, recipients had begun to 
challenge attempts to recover overpayments.  In desperation the government raised the income 
disregard (a safe harbour that allows for an incorrect estimate of income, from £2,500 to £25,000, 
thus cutting the link between tax and welfare, and reducing the responsiveness of the benefit system 
to increases in income (Hodgson & Boden, 2008). 
152 As was mentioned earlier, there appear to have been attempts to reduce administrative costs 
across the piste, in this case by reducing the assessment of income from two government 
organisations down to one.  This was an explicit aim of the New Labour government (DfES & DSS 
1998).   
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However, payment through the tax system (via employers153) caused a range of other 
issues such as personal embarrassment and individuals choosing not to make a claim 
(Athayde et al, 2003).  Employer resistance eventually led to this method of payment 
being abandoned (Hodgson & Boden, 2008).   
 
Other administration problems with WFTC include the need to complete and submit 
long and complex application forms to the Inland Revenue (Adler, 2004).  Associated 
with this was the problem of eligible non-recipients (ENRs), i.e. individuals who were 
eligible, but for whatever reason, chose not to claim.  Firstly, like DPTC, many ENRs 
did not know they were eligible154 (Breese, Maplethorpe & Toomse. 2011).  22 per 
cent gave other reasons for not claiming, such as concerns about over-payments, the 
perceived complexity of the Tax Credit system and a previous bad experience with 
HMRC (Breese, Maplethorpe & Toomse, 2011).  This reflected a broad theme in 
existing research that the government systems were seen as overly complex, 
frequently changing and therefore alienating (Griffen, 2007; Hall & Pattigrew, 2008; 
Toomse, 2011).  Even the renewals process was seen by many respondents as overly 
complex (Toomse, 2011; Hall, 2012).  A smaller group gave personal reasons such as 
not wanting to be supported by the state (Breese, Maplethorpe & Toomse. 2011).  
Individuals who identified as Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) and recent immigrants 
reported increased difficulties where they had limited England language ability (Hall & 
Pattigrew, 2008; Breese, Maplethorpe & Toomse, 2011).  Despite these administrative 
difficulties, there was no clear link between these problems and rates of labour market 
participation amongst any client group.   
 
A post-hoc evaluation of WFTC argued that an estimated 81,000 additional individuals 
moved into the labour force adding over five percentage points to the lone parent 
employment rate for a much lower administrative cost than its predecessor, Family 
Credit (Coleman et al, 2003).  It was argued that there was no evidence to support 
WFTC having an adverse effect on wage progression but may actually have 
encouraged it (ibid, 2003).    
                                            
153 A process known as Payment Via Employer (PVE) (Athayde et al, 2003).  
154 84 per cent had heard of tax credits but had much less knowledge of how eligibility criteria applied. 
80% had heard of tax credits but thought they were not eligible.  78 per cent of those who had heard 
of tax credits gave this belief they were not eligible as their main reason for not claiming (Breese, 
Maplethorne & Toomse, 2011).   
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9.3.3.2. Disabled Persons Tax Credit and the Disability Element of 
Working Tax Credit 
 
As mentioned earlier, DPTC replaced what was Disability Working Allowance (DWA) 
from 5th October 1999.  By 2003, nearly 27,000 individuals and households were in 
receipt of it (Atkinson, Meager & Dewson. 2003).  Existing research suggest the 
personal characteristics of DPTC recipients were similar to those of economically 
active disabled people in general, with the exceptions that: 
 
 “they were much more likely to be single, or to have dependent children, or both 
(two-fifths were single parents) 
 they were more likely to have no (or poor) educational or vocational 
qualifications” (Atkinson, Meager & Dewson. 2003. p. 1).   
 
Atkinson, Meager & Dewson also identified a ‘high impact group’ of 23% who claimed 
they would not be doing their present job were it not for support of DPTC.  DPTC was 
the decisive factor in their decision to enter and sustain employment (ibid, 2003).  It is 
interesting to note, as with other Tax Credits, “women, older people, the self-
employed, and most particularly, single parents, were over-represented in this high 
impact group” (Atkinson, Meager & Dewson. 2003. p. 2). Coleman et al (2003) found 
almost identical results with a third of DPTC saying that Tax Credits had allowed them 
to work and made it financially viable.   
 
This research therefore suggests that although ‘disability’ is the common feature or 
requirement for recipients of DPTC it appears to be not the only contributing factor 
towards needing to claim DPTC to support low-paid employment.  Having children and 
limited employability appear to be key factors, and yet while DPTC offered no childcare 
support or support in improving employability itself, the New Deal for Disabled People 
did offer such support.  This evidence makes a compelling case for a well-supported 
route from economic inactivity to supported work for ‘disabled’ people.  As discussed 
in Chapter 8, whether an individual is counted and ‘treated’ by welfare-to-work and 
associated labour market activation policies depend entirely on the definition of their 
characteristics and the associated moral expectations.  New Labour made it clear that, 
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although they would not compel those defined as disabled to work, they would facilitate 
their labour market entry if the ‘disabled’ felt able155.        
 
On a related note, Turley, McAlpine & Thomas (2008) found that claim behaviour of 
the disability element of WTC was influenced by respondents’ perception of their own 
condition and whether it constituted a ‘disability’:  
 
“Respondents who were aware of the disability element did not always consider 
themselves to be eligible as they felt their condition did not qualify as a disability, 
particularly in the case of those with mental health problems.  Where 
respondents did consider themselves to have a disability, they were unsure 
whether their specific disability met the eligibility criteria” (Turley, McAlpine & 
Thomas. 2008. p. 10). 
 
Again, there is no objective measure of ‘disability’ and a claimant’s own perceptions 
can have an effect.  This may have been especially true of ‘invisible’ illnesses such as 
mental health or chronic pain conditions where the claimant may have worried about 
being believed.   
 
Existing research was strongly supportive of how DPTC was received by recipients 
and administered by the HMRC: DPTC acted as a strong work incentive (a third of 
recipients said DPTC allowed them to work or made work more worthwhile financially), 
it was a necessary part of family incomes (80 per cent said they found it essential or 
very helpful, and for some it had a major positive financial impact), there was little 
stigma (61 per cent agreed it was less stigmatising to claim a Tax Credit than a benefit, 
and only 9 per cent disagreed) and compliance costs were regarded as low on both 
objective and subjective measures of costs (no statistically significant impact on PVE 
on payroll costs was found) (Coleman et al, 2003).  This research is corroborated by 
others who found positive responses from employees who received DPTC and 
responded with ‘positive feelings’ related to the income source and conceptualisation 
(liking the visibility on their wage slip of the boost to their income, the ease of checking 
whether payments were correct and liking what seemed like a tax relief) (Corden & 
                                            
155 At a supra-national level, the OECD (2003) and the UN (2006) were promoting labour market 
participation amongst the disabled, and this will have informed the UK Government’s policy at the 
time.    
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Sainsbury, 2003)156.  This research raises the question of why simple tax-relief, i.e. 
increasing the tax-free allowance to take low-paid workers out of tax, was not adopted 
as a way to ‘make work pay’. This question appears especially strong with the 
hindsight of the Conservative-Liberal-Democrat Coalition who did pursue such a 
welfare policy.  However, unlike a Tax Credit, increasing the tax-free allowance from 
say £10k to £10.5k per annum would have had no impact on somebody earning only 
£8k per annum while also benefiting the higher paid.   
 
Despite all the positive research findings, significant problems existed, especially 
negative feelings towards the Payment Via Employer system by employees and 
employers.  Smaller employers found PVE more difficult to administer than larger 
employers (Coleman et al, 2003).  Employees reported problems with payment 
(employer-related delays in receipt, lack of transparency of DPTC on wage slips, 
inconvenience of receiving large amounts of cash or large cheques, non-reliability of 
specially created pay slips during periods away from work, relationships at work, 
employer learning of impairment or ill-health, employer reluctance to engage or keep 
employees using Tax Credits, damaged relationships through delays or 
misunderstanding with employers or pay staff, unpleasant remarks, suspicion or 
jealousy among pay staff, colleagues or employers) (Corden & Sainsbury, 2003).  
Respondents also reported negative feelings about themselves (wanting privacy in the 
workplace while being reminded of illness or impairment with every wage slip) (ibid, 
2003).  Finally, respondents highlighted budgeting issues (poor fit of wage periodicity 
with budgeting strategies) and the openness of DPTC to collusive fraud with 
employers (ibid, 2003).   
 
Other major problems included a lack of understanding of the main structural features 
of DPTC leading to individuals not claiming and a dilution of incentive effects (Corden 
& Sainsbury, 2003).  This problem was also not corrected by the time WTC with the 
disability element was introduced (Turley, McAlpine & Thomas. 2008).  This is deeply 
troubling given the need to engage with arguably harder to reach client groups such 
as the disabled.  It is also worrying that, despite the problem of educating/training 
                                            
156 Others have found that payment via wages has not changed claimant behaviour to any great 
degree (McKay, 2002).  
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clients about TC being known in 2003, the problem was still reported in 2008.  This 
suggests a lack of reflective practice/evaluation by those administering the Tax Credit.    
 
9.3.3.3. The effect of New Tax Credits (Working Tax Credit and Child 
Tax Credit) 
 
Despite the introduction of New Tax Credits (WTC and CTC), the reported statistics 
for enrolment from 2005-2006 were very similar to those of WFTC: take up rates of 
61% of those eligible for WTC (McAlpine & Thomas, 2009).  There was, however, a 
surprising difference between take-up rates of WTC between those who had children 
(90%) and those who did not (22%) (ibid, 2009).  This has been attributed to very 
similar reasons for poor take-up during the WFTC’s period of operation: a desire for 
financial independence and alienation from the perceived complex process (ibid, 
2009).   
 
Franses & Thomas (2004) argued that an important difference in the delivery of New 
Tax Credits (NTCs) is the role the Jobcentre Plus played in influencing claimant 
behaviour.  Critical to any decision to take paid work was a genuine desire to work, a 
clear understanding of NTCs in making work a viable option, the extent of NTC-related 
discussion with a Jobcentre Plus advisor and whether they demonstrated that 
employment was financially worthwhile.  This seems highly plausible given the 
reported ‘alienating’ effect of the perceived complexity of TC.  The Jobcentre Plus 
would have been in the perfect position to advise on New Deal programmes which 
were operating concurrently, thus further complementing the activating qualities of TC.   
 
The Childcare Element (CCE) of Working Tax Credit was arguably the most important 
aspect of WTCs.  The CCE was valued by recipients enabling them to return to work 
and use formal childcare (Turley & Dickens, 2008).  This was important where informal 
options were not available or were considered undesirable, and where household 
income was less than £20k per annum.  Other important reported benefits were that 
CCE enabled part-time work and a better work-life balance, a choice of jobs, the choice 
between formal over informal care and a feeling of financial independence through 
work (ibid, 2008).  CCE had less of an effect on higher-income households, as would 
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be expected.  These responses suggest that CCE was highly effective and highly 
regarded by those who claimed it.   
 
In addition to CCE, decisions about childcare were being driven by other factors, such 
as personal beliefs about the best way to bring up children (Hall & Pattigrew, 2008), 
the availability of childcare locally and perceptions of its quality (Nicholls & Simm, 
2003), as well as the unpredictability of a child being ill (ibid, 2003).  
 
9.3.4. Tax Credits Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Section 9.3. of this chapter has examined the range of Tax Credits introduced and 
operated by New Labour between 1997 and 2010.   
 
The apparent effect of Tax Credits does seem to vary depending on the economic 
cycle.  Despite declining rates of unemployment such as those experienced between 
1997 and 2008157, receiving Tax Credit support appears to be strongly associated with 
lone parents, the disabled and their partners moving into paid work of 16+ hours (Hall 
& Pattigrew, 2008; Toomse & Maplethorpe, 2011).  During the economic downturn, 
TC became even more important for 2 in every 5 (42%) recipients (ibid, 2011).   
 
It could be argued that, rather than supporting individuals free from welfare 
dependency, TC extend welfare dependency to those in work.  Tax Credits merely 
subsidised low-skilled, labour-intensive work rather than finding ways to improve the 
nature of work for these individuals158.  This is fundamentally at odds with traditional 
socialist values such as ‘Working Class emancipation’ (International Workingmen’s 
Association, 1867): the idea that individuals should be supported to become free from 
charity and capable of financial independence.  While New Labour and The Third Way 
may have claimed to have been avowedly anti-ideological (Oppenheim, 1999) driven 
by ‘what works’, it has rightfully been claimed that this is disingenuous (McLaughlin, 
Trewsdale & McCay, 2001).  McLaughlin, Trewsdale & McCay argue that caring 
                                            
157The dot-com crash slowed, but did not halt, the decline in rates of unemployment.   
158 See Lloyd, Mason & Mayhew (eds.) (2008) who argue that a trade-off is made between low-paying 
jobs and labour market inactivity. For example, France took the view that labour market inactivity was 
preferred to low-paying jobs.  The UK, on the other hand, preferred individuals working no matter 
what the occupation or level of pay.  
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labour, i.e. the important role played by women, and the appropriate unit upon which 
to base assessment for income transfer (couple or individual), also remained 
unsolved.   
 
Notwithstanding Tax Credits being paid through the tax system, there also remained 
a stigma attached to them (25% thought there was a stigma attached to Tax Credits 
compared with 66% who thought the same of more traditional benefits) (Breese, 
2011).   
 
Difference-in-difference estimates by Gregg, Harkness & Smith (2009) suggest that 
Tax Credits raised employment rates of lone parents by 5 percentage points.  They 
also found lone parents increased the number of hours they work from short hours to 
16-hours per week to become eligible for Tax Credits while there was also some 
evidence of full-time workers reducing their hours (ibid, 2009).  Tax Credits also meant 
that women were also cushioned should they become lone parents (Jenkins 2008; 
Gregg, Harkness & Smith, 2009).   
 
Despite the ambitions of New Labour to support lone parents and other potentially 
vulnerable women, many women found their experiences of Tax Credits to have been 
marked by stress and depression linked to financial insecurity and debt (Ridge & Miller, 
2011).  As Ridge & Miller put it: “Their aspirations, especially for financial security, 
were not always congruent with the reality of employment in low-paid work.  Incomes 
were usually low, but complex” (2011. p. 95).  This creates a rubber band of poverty 
dynamics where incomes do not reach far above the poverty line, making families 
vulnerable to small shocks in incomes or circumstances (Lydon & Walker, 2005; Ridge 
& Miller, 2011).  Tax Credits also have further unintended consequences such as 
creating fiscal drag and benefit erosion which damages welfare beneficiaries 
(Sutherland et al, 2008).  They have also been found to damage wage progression 
(Lydon & Walker, 2005).  
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the British labour market was 
changing considerably and Tax Credits have added complexity to the lives of 
individuals with already chaotic lives.     
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A key criticism of all Tax Credits that the literature appears to omit is the enormous 
financial cost of Tax Credits, and more importantly, the opportunity cost of taxpayers 
money which could have been invested in perhaps more effective long-term solutions, 
such as adult education, skills development and other training.  The effect of this is 
that the number of Tax Credit recipients would continue to rise if the underlying barriers 
to higher-paying work were not addressed.  This appears to be confirmed by the both 
WFTC/CTC and NTC statistics. 
 
Graphs 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 below all suggest consistently increasing numbers of 
claimants.  In their own analysis, the HMRC admits that these statistics show “that the 
numbers of families who benefit from the childcare element has consistently risen over 
time, from 318 thousand in April 2004 to around 486 thousand in December 2010” 
(HMRC, 2010a. p. 12).  This increasing number of claimants can be linked to a 
consistently increasing cost of the Tax Credit programmes as shown in Graph 9.6.  
The cost of Tax Credits increased by an average of £1.99 billion a year from £4.85 
billion to £28.51 billion per annum.  Over the course of New Labour’s time in office, 
this amounted to £219.31 billion.  This is a considerable sum of public money which 
could arguably have been put to better use, for example, by supporting adult education 
and training so that low paid workers could progress beyond low-paid jobs requiring 
public subsidy to keep those workers out of poverty.  It also raises the question of 
whether such subsidies were compliant with EU legislation governing the subsidisation 
of domestic industries in order to make them artificially competitive.      
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Graph 9.3: Number of Working Families’ Tax Credit recipients, November 1999 
to November 2002  
Source: Inland Revenue, 2005 
Notes: Could not be re-drawn due to lack of original data.
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Graph 9.4: Number of families receiving WTC-only (working families with no children) 
Source: HMRC (2010a) 
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Graph 9.5: Number of families benefiting from the Childcare Element 
Source: HMRC (2010a) 
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Graph 9.6: Nominal Tax credits spending 1997-2010 
Source: HMRC (2014)  
y = 1991.3x + 730.86
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Hodgson & Boden (2008) have been highly critical of Tax Credits.  Hodgson & Boden 
argue that Tax Credits were being used overtly as a labour activation tool rather than 
a just a method of income supplementation by requiring a work test, i.e. individuals 
must work 16 hours and more to be eligible.  This, they claim, is because of Labour’s 
belief that the route out of poverty rests in paid work only, ignoring the predicament of 
the workless.  However, Hodgson & Boden failed to appreciate the overall positive 
effects that this labour market activation had, especially long-term effects.   
 
Ferrara, Hemerijck & Rhodes (2001) cited in Adler (2004) keenly emphasised the 
advantages of Tax Credits in that they were indifferent to the nature of the claimant’s 
previous or present employment and thus they covered not only the ‘old risks’ of short-
term unemployment, sickness, retirement and spousal death, but also the ‘new risks’ 
associated with self-employment, low-pay and ‘atypical’ employment.  Self-
employment and under-employment are therefore key issues which will be discussed 
in the next section of this thesis.   
 
In a similar fashion to the research on the New Deal and NMW, available data and 
research appears more likely than not to represent its social construction, especially 
the definitions and categorisation adopted, and supporting conventions used in 
defining who is to be counted and ‘treated’ by social policy.  This is in stark opposition 
to a claimed objective reality which is corroborated from multiple viewpoints.  This adds 
further weight to the argument that social statistics are increasingly less helpful when 
used for the evaluation of social policies.     
 
9.4. Self-employment and increasingly precarious work 
 
While the National Minimum Wage ensured a minimum hourly rate of pay and Tax 
Credits supplemented that low rate of pay, the very nature of work was becoming 
much more flexible and arguably more precarious (see Chapters 1 and 4).  An 
important indicator of precarious work is levels of self-employment.  Self-employment 
is inherently unstable as individuals rely upon short-term, daily or zero-hour contracts, 
which are sensitive to business confidence.  As was discussed in Chapters 5-8, all of 
the New Deal programmes had a pathway to support individuals to becoming self-
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employed.  Given this, it could be expected that rates of self-employment would have 
increased under New Labour.   
 
To see whether this was the case, Graph 9.7 below plots numbers of self-employed 
individuals both immediately before and after New Labour were in power, up to March 
2015.  Despite a small decline from 3.492 million in September 1996 to 3.178 in 
September 2000 (shortly after the peak of the global dot-com bubble), rates of self-
employment rose strongly and almost continuously for the next 15 years.  This strong 
growth in self-employment even during times of recession suggests that there is 
unlikely to be a cyclical link and that other factors are likely at work.   
 
It is interesting to note that by 2013, 84% of the increase in self-employed workers 
were aged 50 and above (ONS, 2013b).  Were these individuals highly-trained 
professionals who chose to go freelance, or, were these older workers ejected from 
the regular labour market by redundancy and age discrimination to become low-skilled 
periphery workers?  It could be argued that during this period there was significant 
consolidation in a number of markets through mergers and acquisitions.  This will have 
encouraged asset-stripping, downsizing, outsourcing and re-structurings, resulting in 
large swathes of middle and lower management workers being made redundant.  
Being in their later years, many may have re-invented themselves as ‘consultants’ 
rather than wishing to be counted as ‘unemployed’.  Sadly a more comprehensive 
profile of their career path was not available making more thorough analysis 
impossible.   
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Graph 9.7: Total Self-employment March 1996-March 2015 
Source: ONS, 2015. JOBS04 Self-Employment jobs by industry (UK totals). 
Note: Data is not seasonally adjusted 
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This increase in self-employment raises another important question related to 
precarious work.  Did this increase in self-employment also represent an increase in 
underemployment?  The ONS defines underemployed workers as:  
 
“[…] those who are employed but who either wish to work more hours in their 
current role or who are looking for an additional job or for a replacement job 
which offers more hours.  They must also be over 16 and be currently working 
under 40 hours per week if they are between 16 and 18 and under 48 hours if 
they are over 18.  Finally, they must be able to start working extra hours within 
the next two weeks” (ONS, 2014c).  
 
Using this definition, the ONS has collected data since 2000 which is plotted below in 
Graph 9.8 by employment type (employed and self-employed).  The data collected 
suggests that rates of underemployment for the self-employed were below those of 
the employed until Q4 2008, and have more closely matched those of the employed 
since then although rising slightly above.  This is also supported by other ONS data 
measuring hours worked: the self-employed work an average of 38 hours per week 
compared to 36 for employees (ONS, 2013b)159.  This therefore suggests no clear 
relationship between self-employment and underemployment.  The graph does 
demonstrate, however, that unemployment rates alone do not measure the extent of 
job loss during the 2008 downturn, i.e. that the reality is more complex than headline 
statistics would have us believe.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
159 However, this was only an average.  There may have been significant divergence in hours worked 
amongst the self-employed with some working significantly more hours and some significantly less 
than the average.  Unfortunately, no information on the dispersion of the hours worked is available.  
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Graph 9.8: Underemployment levels and rates of employees and self-employed workers, 2000 to 2014 
Source: ONS (2014c) Underemployment and Overemployment in the UK – 2014. November 2014. 
Note: Data is not seasonally adjusted 
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9.5. Chapter Conclusion 
 
This first part of this chapter discussed the National Minimum Wage and the effect 
of the NMW on both individuals and firms.  The second part of this chapter 
examined the various Tax Credit programmes operated by New Labour from 
1999 onwards, and the effect these programmes may have had on claimants.  
Both of these policies were essential components of New Labour’s policy mantra 
of ‘making working pay’ (Grover, 2005) as part of wider labour market activation 
policies which included the New Deal programmes.  Available research and data 
suggests that both the NMW and TC achieved their desired goals.   
 
However, the existing research takes available data at face value and fails to ask 
more of both how the data was constructed, and what else may have been 
occurring in the British labour market.  For example, rates of self-employment, 
arguably a form of precarious employment, rose steeply even in the face of the 
2008 recession.  This increase appears to mask complex changes in the labour 
market.  It may show, for example, the externalising of workers to reduce costs 
such as Employers’ National Insurance and older workers being forced out of the 
labour market only to re-invent themselves as ‘consultants’.  Underemployment 
increased for the self-employed during the financial crisis, but again, the 
measurement of such statistics make it difficult to draw any strong conclusions.  
It could be said that statistics available from the ONS, HMRC and DWP presume 
the employment practices of a previous age, i.e. the post-war period, when 
attempts were made to regularise work.  As work becomes more precarious and 
less regularised, such statistics struggle to explain trends in the British labour 
market.   
 
The conventions underpinning New Labour’s choice of policies is also worthy of 
discussion.  As part of their labour market activation policies, great emphasis was 
put on encouraging lone parents into work.  Lone parents were identified as an 
important client group requiring support to enter the labour market through the 
New Deal for Lone Parents, childcare provision, and Child Tax Credits.  This 
raises the question of what about the role of women as care givers?  Was this 
role undervalued by New Labour, or did it represent a perhaps more feminist 
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policy ambition that women should be financially independent and that financial 
independence was judged as more important than being a stay-at-home carer?  
At what point did they come to consider stay-at-home mothers as ‘unemployed’ 
and in need of treatment?  Sadly, from available evidence, it is only possible to 
speculate.  
   
It is also important to discuss New Labour’s belief that “the best form of welfare 
for people of working age is work” (DSS, 1997).  However, it can easily be argued 
that this is not the case.  All work is not equal, nor is it equally beneficial to an 
individual’s welfare.  What of those who work in poorly paid jobs that barely pay 
the bills? What of those working dangerous jobs which may inflict industrial 
diseases and injuries?  Traditional socialist writers railed against such treatment 
of workers arguing “the economical subjugation of the man of labour to the 
monopoliser of the means of labour – that is, the source of life – lies at the bottom 
of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation and political 
dependence,” (The International Workingmen's Association, 1864).  They instead 
called for working class emancipation.  This can be interpreted as lifting 
individuals out of poverty and forms of exploitative work.  New Labour’s labour 
market activation was driven by this belief in work as the best form of welfare.  
This was at the expense of alternative policies which could have increased the 
employability of workers above the lowest paid and precarious sectors of the 
labour market.  Instead, taxpayer’s money was used to subsidise low-paying 
companies and sectors.  Tax Credits were in effect a subsidy for exploitative 
companies who also had no incentive to invest in their staff’s human capital 
(Grover, 2003)160.  Such an investment would have cost companies in the short-
term through training costs, and in the long-term, in higher wages.  This subsidy 
effect may have benefited firms financially, and encouraged them to locate to or 
remain in the UK, but whether it was positive for individual workers remains up 
for debate.   
 
                                            
160 Grover’s neo-Marxist interpretation of this was that New Labour sought to reconstitute the 
‘reserve army of labour’ to ensure that labour was as cheap as possible for exploitation by 
capital.  
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Across New Labour’s wider labour market policy, skills development was limited.  
Although the New Deal programmes offered some skills development, this was 
focused on basic levels of ‘numeracy’ and ‘literacy’, i.e. just enough to help 
people into work, and nothing more.  This is in stark contrast to their commitment 
to early years education (especially the ‘Schools for the future’ programme) and 
FE.  New Labour also introduced University tuition fees through the Teaching and 
Higher Education Act 1998 which were means-tested and paid for through a 
system of student loans.  These policy decisions, in addition to those already 
discussed in previous chapters, suggest a sustained attempt by New Labour at 
‘individualising’ interactions with the welfare state.  Expectations of individual 
responsibility appear to have increased substantially during their time in office as 
the cost of adult education and training were passed on to individuals away from 
the state and private companies.   
 
The next and final chapter draws together the evidence and arguments made 
throughout this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 10 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has sought to answer the research question:  
 
What were the effects of New Labour’s active labour market policy 
on rates of social dependency in the working age population during 
their time in office?  
 
This final chapter will reflect upon the evidence presented in this thesis, and 
advance a range of conclusions as they relate to this research question.  It will 
begin with a summary of the key findings of this thesis as they relate to the UK 
labour market as a whole, the New Deal programmes, Tax Credits and the 
National Minimum Wage. It will go on to detail the implications of these key 
findings, especially where lessons can be learned.  
 
10.1. The UK labour market 
 
Conclusion 1: Economic growth matters 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis focused on the UK labour market under New Labour.  It 
explored a range of labour market measures including rates of unemployment as 
measured by the Claimant Count and ILO Unemployment (the most frequently 
used measures of social dependency amongst the working age population by 
New Labour during their time in office).  The most important finding here is that 
Statistical analysis suggest that Okun’s Law held true in the UK during New 
Labour’s time in office.  Okun’s Law is the claimed statistical relationship between 
economic growth and unemployment.  Statistical analysis suggested that 50 per 
cent of decline in the unemployment during New Labour’s time in office could be 
explained by growth in GDP.   
 
However, this means that 50 per cent of the decline in unemployment is not 
explained by this theory and model. Although it may appear to be common-sense 
that a growing economy creates jobs and therefore reduces the number of 
individuals counted as unemployed, Okun’s Law fails to offer a more thorough 
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explanation of the causal mechanisms.  This suggests that although economic 
growth is important, other factors such as active labour market policy may also 
have had an effect on rates of unemployment.   
 
Conclusion 2: Unemployment is not an objective measure of labour market 
activity, but a social construct underpinned by conventions. Related labour 
market statistics are increasingly difficult to evaluate and perhaps less 
helpful to study statistically 
 
The social category of ‘unemployment’ has been used as a tool by social policy 
makers and economists in the UK through the 20th century to create a statistical 
structure to the labour market for the purpose of social ordering; to create a 
distinction between those in regular and formal waged work (the employed), 
those not in regular and formal waged work (the unemployed) and the 
economically inactive161.  However, as discussed throughout this thesis, the 
socially constructed structure of these measures and the distinctions they create 
are increasingly being blurred.  This challenges the usefulness of this tool for 
evaluators of social policy.  
 
This thesis has shown how New Labour co-opted and re-defined numerous 
statistical and social conventions surrounding labour market categories of 
‘unemployment’ and ‘employment’, ‘youth’, ‘disability’, ‘single-parenthood162’, and 
‘older workers’.  These were not fixed social objects but subject to changing 
social and statistical definitions which then led to movements in the headline 
social statistics themselves. New Labour created new sub-categories and 
imposed obligations on each – delineating a more detailed form of social ordering 
by determining which groups should be treated favourably or otherwise.  As 
Bovens et al argued, evaluation is not an objective science but inherently 
normative163.  The consequence of this is that the notion of unemployment (its 
                                            
161 The economically inactive was defined as those not in employment or looking for it.  For 
example, stay-at-home mothers.  As discussed in Chapter 8, the definition is misleading as it 
ignores the significant contribution to the economy of those in care-giving roles.  
162 This category was important because, unlike the others, it focused on family structure rather 
than just an individual’s features.  
163 It would be difficult to argue otherwise. 
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meaning, measurement and treatment) is increasingly difficult and perhaps less 
helpful to study statistically.   
 
ILO Unemployment, the Claimant Count and ILO Employment were all conceived 
in the post-war era of Keynesian economic management when full 
employment164 was a key objective.  However, neo-liberal labour market flexibility 
has transformed the UK labour market.  Controlling inflation has replaced full 
employment as the key macro-economic objective, and as a consequence of 
these developments “the growth of the precarious sector of the labour market 
and the increase in temporary and casual forms of employment perhaps 
challenges the traditional focus on unemployment as the measure par excellence 
of labour-market disadvantage” (Bovens et al. 2006. p. 567).  This thesis 
discussed the way in which the measure of ILO Unemployment and the Claimant 
Count measures were constructed very narrowly so as to minimise the number 
of individuals counted. ILO Employment, on the other hand, was constructed very 
broadly so as to maximise the number of individuals counted.  The notion that 
employment removes the risks of social dependency has been completely 
undermined.  This adds further weight to the argument that these ‘measures’ are 
of increasingly limited utility as an evaluative tool.  
 
As a result of flexibility there has been a de-standardisation of job contracts in 
the UK. Previous statistical and social conventions of employment have broken 
down.  Recent reforms by Iain Duncan Smith (2010-2016) have continued this 
direction of travel, with those ‘in work’ (but subsidised by Tax Credits) now 
expected to attend job centres to have their search for work with longer hours 
inspected and evaluated.  Due to the moral judgements of policy makers, these 
individuals have been re-classified; from being seen as ‘respectable’ workers 
who were activated by New Labour’s reforms, to instead being perceived as 
‘scroungers’ dependent on state support.   
 
                                            
164 The employment contract itself was subject to legal and conventional requirements such as 
a five day working week, paid sick leave, etc. that enabled the worker to live independently of 
direct state support.  Increasing flexibility has changed this.  
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Conclusion 3: Labour’s ALMP were a continuation of previous neo-liberal 
labour market policies 
 
Although Tony Blair’s election as Party Leader in 1994 was part of New Labour’s 
political rehabilitation and involved an ideological shift towards the political 
centre165, as O’Brian argues The Third Way was still conceived in response to 
“specific dilemmas conceived largely in terms associated with the New Right,” 
(2000. p. 403).  New Labour adopted that same language of Moral Underclass 
Discourse which had come to furnish the debate surrounding the British welfare 
state from the 1980s.  As far back as the Poor Laws, a distinction has been made 
between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor166 and New Labour’s work first 
agenda continued that moral dividing line.  Paid work was virtuous while welfare 
dependency was reprehensible167.  Although these distinctions have changed 
over time, they have not disappeared.  New Labour wholeheartedly embraced 
these conventions and they came to inform their welfare and labour market policy 
before and during their time in office168.  It would be fair to describe much of New 
Labour’s active labour market policy as a continuation of Conservative policy pre-
1997.  A number of programmes were continued and effectively just re-branded.  
For example, Job Seeker’s Allowance, introduced in 1996, was continued and 
maintained throughout New Labour’s time in office.  The New Deal for Young 
People bore many similarities to the ‘Youth Credits’, ‘Youth Training’ and ‘Youth 
Training Scheme’ which preceded it.  In many ways, the NDYP was just the next 
in a long line of labour market policies aimed at ‘young people’.  Similarly, 
Working Families Tax Credit replaced the very similarly structured ‘Family Credit’ 
in 1999, and was itself succeeded by the similar New Tax Credits comprising 
Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit.  These similarities demonstrate the 
                                            
165 As discussed in Chapter 2. 
166 And arguably, well before that with the distinction rooted in religious theological argument.  
167 It could be argued that social insurance schemes perform the task of distinguishing the 
deserving from the undeserving: those with NI contributions can claim benefit ‘as of right’ as the 
contributory record bears witness to previous regular employment.  However, the self-employed 
and school leavers would lack such a record.  Retrenchment under the Conservatives reduced 
the rights of benefit claimants with contributory records.  
168 As discussed throughout this thesis, conventions carry with them not only the technical 
definitions but they are also inherently socio-political and rooted in deeply embedded moral 
judgements.   
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longevity of moral distinctions underpinning those conventions which sought to 
distinguish and categorise claimants according to their attitudes towards work.    
 
New Labour concentrated on a pragmatic ‘what works’ approach (Lister, 2001), 
and therefore continued along well established policy pathways.  As one critic put 
it, New Labour failed to challenge the values of a Thatcherite legacy in British 
politics and “tended to subordinate other principles of judgement to the 
managerial calculus of economy and efficiency” (Clarke et al. 2000, p. 10).  
Indeed, New Labour’s acceptance and zealous implementation of New Public 
Management strategies with their need to set targets and use them to evaluate 
programme performance169 was a major driving force behind their ALMP – the 
most prominent example being New Labour’s target of getting 100,000 young 
people in work (Labour, 1997).  Unsurprisingly perhaps, a stream of criticisms 
emerged surrounding the target-driven culture of New Labour (Ball, 1999; 
Fielding, 1999; 2006; Flynn, 2007; 2006; Hambleton et al, 1997 cited in Alcock, 
2007; Hood, 2005; Reay & Wiliam, 1999).  The recurring theme of this thesis is 
that the statistical conventions – how the ‘problem’ was defined, counted, and 
targeted – were what ultimately drove policy.  These statistical conventions were 
not fixed, but changed during New Labour’s time in office. Key client groups such 
as young people, single parents, older workers and the disabled were identified 
and defined by features subject to moral judgement such as age, family structure, 
physical ability and willingness to work.  However, the boundaries of these 
definitions were altered, thus changing how individuals were treated by the 
welfare state.  
 
10.2. The New Deal Programmes 
 
Conclusion 4: New Labour met their target of 100,000 young people into 
work, but would probably have met it without the NDYP 
 
                                            
169 Indeed, in 2001 Blair created the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) headed by Michael 
Barber to “deliver measurable improvements in performance” (Barber, 2008. p. 71) which had 
not been forthcoming in the first term. This unit was the source of many targets and reforms 
during this second term.  
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Statistically, the NDYP was a ‘success’ with the Youth Claimant Count reducing 
by 181,000 between May 1997 and July 2004.  However, the structure of the 
NDYP was found to have a radically distorting effect on the Claimant Count as 
NDYP participants would not be counted in it170.  This thesis also argued that the 
Employment option of the NDYP would also have distorted both the Claimant 
Count downwards and ILO Employment upwards challenging commonly 
accepted social conventions of what it means to be ‘employed’.  As a 
consequence of this effect on the Claimant Count, significant numbers of young 
people were also not counted as long term unemployed (White & Riley, 2002).  
During the Follow-through period of the NDYP, participants were eligible to make 
a new JSA claim, effectively re-setting the clock covering the period for which 
they were ‘counted’ as being Claimant Count ‘unemployed’.   
 
No further research has been conducted since Wood (1998) or White & Riley 
(2002) to test whether these distorting effects continued over the course of the 
NDYP.  This thesis filled that gap.  It demonstrated that the distorting effect of the 
NDYP on the Claimant Count and Youth LTU continued throughout New Labour’s 
time in office.  This compares strongly with the ILO Youth Unemployment rate 
which is constructed by asking a sample of young people if they self-identify as 
unemployed.  There was an overall increasing trend from 19.6 per cent in May 
1997 to 32.2 per cent in May 2010 (ONS, 2011a).  This is mirrored by the number 
of NEETs in England from 2000 to 2010 where the number increased from 
655,000 to 927,000 in 2010, with a peak of 1,074,000 in Q2 2009 (ONS, 2010).  
Therefore, the Claimant Count and LTU rates for young people were substantially 
reduced by the structure of the NDYP.  When young people self-reported their 
relationship to work, a far higher and increasing rate of ‘unemployment’ emerges.  
This adds further weight to the argument that social statistics are not ‘measures’ 
of labour market activity and tell us little about the nature of the UK labour market.   
 
As part of the NDYP success story, the evidence suggests that the NDYP picked 
the easy-to-place with nearly 100 per cent of NDYP leavers gaining employment 
in April 1998 falling consistently to a low of only 31 per cent in January 2009.  
                                            
170 Supporting the initial findings of Wood, 1998 and White & Riley, 2002.   
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There was an average ‘success rate’ of 63 per cent.  High and increasing levels 
of re-tread suggested that the NDYP was also failing to tackle the barriers to 
sustained employment faced by young people.  These can include a lack of 
qualifications due to prior educational failure, financial insecurity, alcohol and 
substance abuse, physical and mental health problems, discrimination based on 
features other than age, poor job-search behaviour/skills, and a lack of financial 
incentives171 (Carpenter, 2006; Hill, 2012).  The structure of the NDYP, especially 
the Gateway period, focused heavily on improving search behaviour, but it was 
only when participants reached the Options stage that they could engage with 
full-time education and training.  Although only a limited time period of data was 
available to evaluate the Options Period, it appears that less than 10 per cent of 
NDYP participants engaged with the option of Full Time Education and Training.  
It is not clear from the available literature whether this churn at the boundary of 
the labour market was deliberate as a form of labour market activation.   
 
In terms of ALMP aimed at young people, the NDYP can be strongly juxtaposed 
with the New Deal for Musicians.  The NDfM offered participants support in the 
form of:  
 
 A full-time education and training open learning pack from a Music Open 
Learning Provider (MOLP); 
 Access to specialist Music Industry Advisers (MIA); and, 
 Self-Employment Flexibilities.   
 
The NDfM emphasised education and training, but also networking and self-
employment, so that musicians were first prepared for the labour market, and 
then given access and opportunities.  Although only a limited number of small 
scale evaluations were carried out (Cloonan, 2002; 2003, Kazimirski, 2001; 
Thomas et al, 2000; 2001), overall the NDfM had a higher percentage of leavers 
entering employment.  The NDYP would have been more far effective if it had 
adopted a similar strategy and structure as the NDfM.  
 
                                            
171 However, this would attribute the problem solely to individuals rather than a lack of suitable 
jobs or the increased precarity caused by flexibilisation.  The UK suffers serious geographical 
pockets of deprivation and limited job opportunities due to deindustrialisation. Also, all of these 
features could be listed as consequences of unemployment, not just causes.   
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Conclusion 5: The ND25+, like the NDYP placed too much emphasis on 
search behaviour with insufficient support for increasing employability 
 
To cater for unemployed individuals too old for the NDYP and too young for 
ND50+, New Labour also introduced the New Deal 25 plus (ND25+, sometimes 
called the New Deal for the Long Term Unemployed or NDLTU).  Unlike the 
NDYP, very little research had been conducted into this programme.  This thesis 
fills that gap in the current state of knowledge.  
 
This thesis found that, like the NDYP, the ND25+ suffered the same key 
problems: high rates of re-tread alongside very limited uptake of Employment, 
Self-Employment, and education/training opportunities during the programme.  
Like the NDYP, the ND25+ placed a strong emphasis on search behaviour and 
finding work as soon as possible.  Indeed, the Intensive Activity Periods which 
formed part of the programme was there to act as an incentive for participants to 
move into work (Somerville & Brace, 2004).  This again reflects the liberal 
mentality that support from the state provided to the ‘undeserving poor’ should 
be uncomfortable so as to minimise the likelihood of permanent social 
dependency.  This is a fundamental misdiagnosis of welfare dependency as 
being a personal choice rather than individuals facing multiple barriers to 
employment.  
 
Conclusion 6: New Labour’s ALMP struggled to cope with an ageing 
population suffering increasing rates of illness and disability.  Age and 
disability defined this group while insufficient emphasis and resources 
were focused on their other, more significant, barriers to employment  
 
This thesis considered ALMP aimed at older workers and the disabled.  It was 
argued that the New Deal for those aged over 50 years of age (ND50+) and the 
New Deal for Disabled People (NDDP) served overlapping client groups.  As 
Humphrey et al (2003) noted, older workers tend to suffer an increasing number 
of health problems and disability (2003).  Increasing life expectancy and 
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expectations of a gradual increase in the State Pension Age172 have also 
encouraged older workers to remain in the labour market.   
 
Just as the NDYP was built around the evolving category of ‘young people’, the 
NDDP was built upon a constantly changing category of ‘disability’.  New Labour 
continued to challenge the idea of disability and overcome the “disabling 
environment” (Bernell, 2003. p. 38) through legislation.  The most important piece 
of legislation, just prior to New Labour’s election was the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995.  This was followed up by New Labour passing Disability Discrimination 
Act 2005, The Equality Act 2006, and The Equality Act 2010. 
 
During New Labour’s time in power there was a gradual reduction in the number 
of individuals claiming Incapacity Benefit.  This could be linked with the large 
proportion of these individuals being over 55 (880,000 of the of the 1.3 million IB 
claimants in 2006 (Hartley-Brewer, 2006)).  The most dramatic reduction in IB 
claimants occurred in October 2008 with the introduction of Employment & 
Support Allowance173.  ‘Fitness for work’ assessments re-categorised large 
numbers of former IB Claimants as ‘fit for work’.  Early retirement due to ill health 
may also have played a part in the decline in IB Claimants demonstrated by 
increasing numbers of men being counted as economically inactive (ONS, 
2009b).  Therefore, IB statistics from 1997-2010 reflect a number of shifts in the 
way individuals with physical or mental health barriers to employment were 
categorised and consequently counted.    
 
This thesis found that clients of the NDDP and ND50+ suffered similar barriers to 
employment174 as some clients of other New Deal Programmes, i.e. they tended 
to lack recent work experience, qualifications, and skills, suffer from health issues 
                                            
172 Although SPA did not increase during New Labour’s time in office they did legislate for 
increases in the SPA in the future.  
173 Employment & Support Allowance saw IB claimants having to undergo a Work Capability 
Assessment for continued support. 39% of those examined were deemed fit enough to work, 
17% were classified as capable of some form of work with the right support, 36% dropped out 
during the application process and just under 7% or 1 in 14 were classified as completely unfit 
to work (Walker, 2011).  
174 It could be argued that these barriers were constructed by employers, not the claimants 
themselves.  This is in contrast to some EU countries where employers are obliged to retain 
workers deemed incapacitated. The liberal-minded UK on the other hand imposes no such 
obligations.  
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and have caring responsibilities.  In spite of this broad range of barriers to 
employment, age and health were considered the defining features of this group.  
Therefore, although considerable focus was placed on overcoming perceived 
disability and age-related barriers to employment, insufficient attention was paid 
to upgrading programme participant’s skills and qualifications to make them more 
employable.    
 
Conclusion 7: Family structures are changing, and while women are 
increasingly expected to find paid work, they are also expected to retain 
their role as primary care givers 
 
This thesis explored ALMP where client groups were defined by family175 
structure, specifically The New Deal and New Deal Plus for Lone Parents and 
New Deal for Partners (NDLP, ND+fLP, NDP).  
 
The structure of UK families is changing (if slowly) with fewer married couple 
families and increasing numbers of lone parent families (ONS, 2014).  New 
Labour’s policy shows a moral acceptance of this trend as welfare became 
increasingly individualised.  NDLP, ND+fLP and NDP sought to reduce the 
number of households where nobody worked and also to contribute to a reduction 
in child poverty (Somerville & Brace, 2004).   
 
A common theme in previous evaluations was a lack of affordable childcare and 
the financial uncertainty of low-paid and usually part-time employment.  This 
presented the strongest barrier to members of this client group entering or 
sustaining paid employment.  However, as was found in other New Deal 
evaluations, health issues, a lack of qualifications/skills and limited work 
experience hindered employability and appeared to present consistent barriers 
to sustained employment.  
 
The NDLP and ND+fLP was underpinned by New Labour’s belief that work was 
the best form of welfare (Blair, 2007. cited in Smith et al, 2010).  This was further 
                                            
175 What constitutes ‘a family’ is itself the consequence of changing conventions.   
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re-enforced with the introduction of Lone Parent Obligations (LPOs) in 2008 
whereby lone parents progressively lost payments under Income Support as their 
youngest child reached a certain age.  The introduction of Lone Parent 
Obligations suggests that un-paid work, such as raising children, was 
increasingly seen as less worthy of social support.  Individuals were expected to 
find childcare solutions for themselves with minimal support.  Some work, any 
paid work, appears preferable to ‘economic inactivity’.  As Lister so clearly argued 
“paid work [was] fetishised as the citizenship responsibility over other forms of 
work such as care work and community or voluntary work” (2001. p. 432).    
 
However, throughout New Labour’s time in office, there remained strong gender 
differences in the expectations of policy-makers. Partners, usually men, were 
subject to the NDP on an increasingly compulsory basis176.  While the 
NDLP/ND+fLP was predicated on there being dependent children, the NDP had 
no such expectation: the partner was not the primary care giver and should 
instead undertake paid work (supported by Tax Credits where necessary).  
Therefore, despite increasing expectations that females should work, they were 
also expected to continuing fulfilling the bulk of caring responsibilities. 
Conventional behaviours and expectations such as the male breadwinner and 
female carer remained in place.   
 
Conclusion 8: New Labour’s ALMP, especially their New Deal programmes, 
misdiagnosed the causes of unemployment.  
 
The ‘work-first’ strategy of New Labour’s ALMP, although a mixture of ‘carrot and 
stick’, focused almost entirely on pushing individuals into employment as it was 
claimed that this presented the best route out of poverty for many of Britain’s 
poorest individuals and families.  It is questionable as to whether this represented 
the best available long-term strategy compared to giving individuals the skills and 
qualifications that are likely to reduce their chances of being out of work in the 
first place.  New Labour’s strategy did not foster the positive contribution to 
economic growth that could have been made by a re-skilled and up-skilled 
                                            
176 However, evaluations of the NDP were scathing, i.e. Coleman et al, (2007).   
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workforce.  However, this may have been a deliberate policy of inaction driven 
by the liberal attitude that claimants (the undeserving poor) must not be offered 
the opportunities denied to the lowest paid unskilled labourer’s son/daughter (the 
deserving poor).  
 
10.3. Tax Credits and The National Minimum Wage 
 
Conclusion 9: The National Minimum Wage did help the lowest paid 
 
A key part of New Labour’s ALMP was “To encourage work and reward effort” 
(Labour, 1997. p. 11) which later emerged as the policy mantra “make work pay” 
(Grover, 2005).  Tax Credits and the National Minimum Wage were key to this 
strategy.   
 
Over a million low-paid workers benefited from the NMW (Low Pay Commission, 
2004).  Around 10% of working households relied on workers paid the minimum 
wage; in 7% of working households the NMW workers were the only source of 
income (Wadsworth, 2007).  The NMW provided a minimum, although still not 
generous, hourly wage. Importantly, the negative impacts of the National 
Minimum Wage predicted by neo-liberal economists failed to materialise.   
 
Conclusion 10: Tax Credits and the National Minimum Wage acted as a 
catalyst towards flexible and increasingly precarious employment 
 
This is indicated by rates of self-employment and under-employment177 which 
increased under New Labour, with rates of self-employment accelerating 
upwards in 2003 when Working Tax Credits were introduced.  This is because 
Tax Credits enabled individuals to take up precarious low-paid work which they 
would formerly have been unable to do, or chosen not to do.   
 
Although New Labour argued for flexibility of labour markets which served both 
employers and employees (Labour, 1997), they failed to clarify exactly where 
                                            
177 Indicators of precarious employment.  Self-employment increased from 3,178,000 in June 
2000 to 3,888,000 in June 2010.  This increase continued long after New Labour left office.   
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they thought that balance lay.  In practice, their policy, suggested a strong 
preference in favour of employers.  Growing flexibility is of key importance as it 
blurs the line distinguishing ‘the employed’ and ‘the unemployed’178, thus allowing 
statistical targets to ‘respond’ to state policy while encouraging dependency in 
the form of Tax Credits for those unable to earn a living wage.   
 
10.4. Policy Implications 
 
Policy recommendation 1: ALMP should focus on upgrading skills and 
qualifications for the 21st century.  
 
The UK economy had changed due to de-industrialisation and continued to 
change developing into a knowledge-driven service economy179.  Evidence, 
including the Leitch Review of Skills (2006), identified major skills shortages as 
the demand for unskilled labour collapsed, while the demand for more skilled and 
qualified workers has increased.  Although Welfare-to-work programmes 
emphasised the improvement of basic soft skills, large numbers of the working 
population continued to lack basic literacy, numeracy and communication skills 
(Work and Pensions Committee, 2002a; Leitch, 2006. cited in Wiggan, 2007; Hill, 
2012).  The New Deal Programmes appeared to have had an overall positive 
effect in supporting client groups who faced multiple barriers when trying to 
engage with the labour market.  However, the New Deal Programmes (excluding 
the NDfM) failed to focus effort and resources into upskilling the workforce and, 
therefore, supporting employability and occupational mobility180.  This supports 
those who have similarly argued that The New Deal Programmes failed to raise 
skill levels and were instead focused on pushing participants into insecure 
contingent employment (Peck & Theodore, 2000. Cited in Wiggan, 2007).  Some 
clients groups, such as older workers, may have been hit especially hard by this 
failure as their previous education/training and work experience would have been 
                                            
178 One could go so far as to say it destroys the distinction completely.  This is especially true of 
welfare changes which occurred during the Coalition such as the introduction of Universal 
Credit where even those in paid employment were the subject of assessments if they also 
received welfare support.   
179 Non-structural factors were also important – the rise of neo-liberal assumptions about the 
primacy of market forces in shaping employment and its obligations.   
180 The ability of individuals to change job or career. 
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outdated.  Therefore, although New Labour spoke frequently of tackling barriers 
and providing support towards work181, a consistent strategy to improve the 
employability of all unemployed individuals was not forthcoming.  This is 
supported by evidence in this thesis of significant amounts of ‘re-tread’ in the 
various ND programmes which indicates their clients were failing to integrate into 
the labour market in any permanent fashion.  
 
Prematurely pushing workers into the first available job has not proved 
successful.  Therefore, future ALMP should focus on preparing the unemployed 
by upgrading their skills and qualifications for the increasing demands of the 
economy.  Indeed, investment should not only be made in the marginalised 
workforce but should seek to address skills shortages across the board.  As to 
whether such a policy would be affordable, it could be argued that education and 
training policies pay for themselves many times over through reduced social 
spending and increased tax revenues.   
 
Policy recommendation 2: Requiring employers to advertise all jobs  
 
The New Deal programmes placed considerable effort on improving and 
encouraging search behaviour as part of the ‘work first approach’.  However, 
estimates suggest that up to 60% of job vacancies are not advertised (I’Anson, 
2012) forming the ‘hidden jobs market’.  None of the New Deal Programmes dealt 
with this opposite side of the gaining employment equation: ensuring that all jobs 
were advertised publically and that vacancy information was more freely 
available.  This again indicates that New Labour followed the implicit assumption 
of all liberal economies – that no obligations should be placed on employers.  
Therefore, employers could be compelled to publically advertise all vacancies, 
perhaps through the Job Centre network.  In addition to improving the efficiency 
of the labour market at matching employers with employers, it would add 
additional transparency helping to tackle related issues of discrimination.  
 
Policy recommendation 3: Devolve economic development policy 
                                            
181 With an underlying goal of reducing poverty, especially child poverty.  
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There was and continues to be well documented regional disparities in the UK 
economy.  None of the New Deal Programmes offered re-location support to aid 
geographical mobility182 as part of the Programmes183.  Supporting re-location 
could have helped more individuals into employment, but would most probably 
have placed further pressures on housing and other infrastructure in the south 
East of England.  Immigration into the UK from Eastern and Southern Europe 
after the 2004 enlargement of the EU played an important part in filling skills 
shortages and job vacancies in the South East. Although not central to this thesis, 
it is important to note that New Labour continued the well-established policy of 
filling skills shortages through the judicious importation of foreign-trained labour 
rather than going to the trouble and expense of training the UK’s jobless.  
Although New Labour flirted with regional development and planning policy which 
could have worked to solve these regional disparities, their lack of commitment 
again reflected the liberal foundation of New Labour’s economic policy.   
 
As the first conclusion of this thesis stated, economic growth matters.  A stronger 
commitment could be made to devolve economic development to local authorities 
so that they are better able to respond to local economic and labour market 
dynamics.   
 
Policy recommendation 4: Additional free pre-school and wrap-around 
childcare 
 
A recurring theme throughout this thesis has been the availability of affordable 
childcare. Indeed, for the lone-parent client group this was the most important 
barrier to finding sustained employment.  Although the Conservative government 
has plans to increase the number of free pre-school hours to 30 hours per week, 
it still falls short of the childcare required for a full-time position.  Additional 
childcare provision for pre-school children would support new-mothers back into 
                                            
182 The ability of individuals to re-locate for work.  
183 However, New Labour did invest heavily in regional economic policy through the Regional 
Development Agencies. Moreover, their work is not within the scope of this thesis.  
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work, while wrap-around care before and after school would support the parents 
of older children.  
 
Policy recommendation 5: Provision of a basic income 
 
Perhaps the most controversial policy recommendation is the provision of a basic 
income to all UK citizens.  A basic income is a universal unconditional sum of 
money.  This thesis has focused on the contested ‘moral order’ surrounding the 
provision of welfare and the New Labour’s continuation and promotion of neo-
liberal precepts of labour market management, i.e. they focused on individual 
behaviour and personal responsibility.  A basic universal income paid to all UK 
citizens would negate the need for (and cost) a bureaucratic administration 
enforcing the moralistic views of the government of the day through means-
testing and conditionality.  Instead those unable to work would be taken care of, 
while those capable of work could choose to take paid employment to further 
increase their welfare.  
 
Policy recommendation 6: Downgrade statistical measurement in favour of 
other methods of policy evaluation 
 
A key finding and recurring theme of this thesis is that it is increasingly difficult to 
study and evaluate labour market policy statistically.  This final policy 
recommendation proposes that the emerging limitations of statistical evaluation 
be recognised, and alternative evaluation methods and models be deployed in 
future.  
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